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Abstract
The notion that trade and capital flows drive exchange rates is widespread in the 
financial press but receives scant attention in economic research. The flow market 
model of the exchange rate has fallen out of fashion in the 1970s, at a time when 
stock-oriented approaches, such as monetary and portfolio balance models, gained 
prominence. However, given the limited empirical success of mainstream exchange 
rate models over the past decades, it may be time for a reassessment of the flow 
market approach.
The aim of this work is to demonstrate how balance of payments imbalances 
influence the demands for different currencies in the foreign exchange markets over 
time. A dynamical system approach is used to assess how international payments 
evolve for different sets of assumptions regarding the joint dynamic behaviour of 
various balance of payments components. An important finding is that while the 
different components of the balance of payments affect international payment flows 
directly in a given country, they also determine the accumulation of foreign assets 
and liabilities in that country, or its international investment position. However, 
the international investment position itself gives rise to international payments, for 
instance when foreign debt becomes due and is repaid or when interest payments on 
the existing debt stock are made. The dynamical system approach is further applied 
to topics such as currency crises and the exchange rate performance of commodity 
exporters.
Two empirical essays on the important case of Japan confirm the above hypothe­
ses. The first essay builds a vector error correction model for the nominal exchange 
rate and the current account in Japan. The model allows for a Markov-switching 
stochastic trend in the current account. The model is capable of producing the strong 
cycles of the current account and the gradual adjustment of the exchange rate, which
16
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can both be observed in the Japanese data. Bayesian estimation proceeds using an 
innovative Gibbs sampling procedure.
The second essay estimates the maturity structure of Japan’s foreign lending. 
It constructs an explicit measure of cross-border payment flows across Japanese 
borders, based on the estimated maturity structure of Japan’s foreign lending. The 
simulated cross-border payment flows are shown to closely follow the movements 
of the Japanese exchange rate.
An additional empirical essay considers the reverse question of how the current 
account is influenced by exchange rate fluctuations. Based on German and Japanese 
data, it is shown that strong exchange rate movements have tended to influence the 
trend of the current account, rather than its level as is typically assumed in the 
literature.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The flow approach to exchange rate determination
Many economists regard the balance of payments as an important driving force 
behind the fluctuating movements of international exchange rates. According to 
economists and market practitioners alike, the main reason why balance of pay­
ments imbalances matter for exchange rates is that they give rise to international 
payment flows that affect the demand for different currencies. In earlier days when 
many countries had tight capital controls in place, it was widely observed that cur­
rent account imbalances, in particular trade surpluses and deficits, had a consider­
able impact on countries’ exchange rates. When a country’s net exports rose, its 
currency tended to become stronger; when exports fell, the currency weakened.
The view that international payment flows determine exchange rate movements 
used to be popular in academic circles in the 1960s and 1970s and was referred to 
as the flow market model of the exchange rate, or the balance of payments approach 
to exchange rate determination. However, while versions of the flow market model 
appeared in many textbooks of international economics well into the 1970s, the 
model started to fall out of fashion at about that time. The foreign exchange analyst 
Rosenberg (1996) puts it like this in his book on "Currency Forecasting": "Today, 
the BOP flow approach [to exchange rate determination] is treated with very little
18
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respect among academic economists. Most academic survey articles on exchange 
rate economics either ignore it altogether or use it as a straw man to make case 
for alternative models of exchange rate determination. In contrast, most market 
participants today probably still rely on some variant of the BOP flow approach in 
their analysis of exchange rate movements and in their formulation of international 
investment strategy.”
The flow market model lost attractiveness for theoretical as well as empirical 
reasons. At the theoretical level, economists turned away from flow-oriented models 
of exchange rate determination as they became more interested in models empha­
sizing stock variables, such as the flexible-price and sticky-price monetary models 
or the portfolio balance model. At the empirical level, it seemed difficult, for in­
stance, to reconcile the high volatility of exchange rates with the predictions of the 
flow market model when major exchange rates started to float in the early 1970s.
Ironically, even though the flow market model could not explain certain pat­
terns of exchange rate behaviour, its new competitors did not do any better, on the 
contrary: As Meese and Rogoff (1983a) demonstrated in one of the most widely 
cited papers in the international economics literature, the mainstream exchange rate 
models of the time failed the simplest empirical tests as they were not even able to 
outperform a simple random walk model in an out-of-sample forecasting exercise. 
Their finding has never really been overturned or explained and continues up to 
now to exert a pessimistic effect on the field of empirical exchange rate modelling 
(Frankel and Rose, 1995).
An important new development in exchange rate economics is the recent emer­
gence of the so-called microstructure approach to exchange rates, which was facili­
tated by the increasing availability of micro data from the foreign exchange markets 
(Evans and Lyons, 2002). A major finding of this new area of research is that for­
eign exchange order flows have a significant impact on exchange movements at 
short horizons; it has also been discovered that this effect is often quite persistent. 
The typical explanation is that in highly decentralized foreign exchange markets, 
order flows contain information about the relative scarcity of currencies. What is 
interesting about the microstructure approach is that it once again emphasizes a flow 
variable, namely order flow, to explain exchange rate behaviour.
19
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1.2 Objectives
The dynamics of international payments
Rather than looking at high-frequency data, the objective of this thesis is to investi­
gate the empirical factors underlying medium- and long-term exchange rate move­
ments. An important hypothesis is that flow variables—such as trade and capital 
flows—play a significantly larger role for exchange rates in the real world than is 
generally acknowledged in the theoretical macroeconomic literature.
More than thirty years have past since exchange rates started to float in major 
industrialized countries. This implies that it is now much easier than before to es­
tablish patterns in the empirical behaviour of exchange rates. There is now ample 
evidence that the current account has a considerable effect on countries’ currencies. 
During the past three decades, Japan’s current account, for instance, experienced 
five large swings. The yen appreciated considerably in periods when the current 
account boomed, and it depreciated whenever Japan’s external performance weak­
ened. However, as countries have opened up their capital accounts, international 
capital flows have significantly increased in volume and have begun to influence 
exchange rates to a considerable extent as well.
The balance of payments is a national accounting identity and thus always adds 
up to zero. Therefore, one might ask how the balance of payments, or any com­
ponent of it, should affect the exchange rate of any country. What the following 
chapters seek to demonstrate is that while the balance of payments always has to 
balance, international payment flows between a country and its trading partners do 
not. International payment flows in this context are assumed to comprise changes in 
bank balances and all other cash flow that might be expected to affect the demand 
and supply conditions in the foreign exchange markets (throughout the text, I will 
use the terms "international payment flows" and "international cash flow" synony­
mously). This is not to say that the balance of payments does not matter. On the 
contrary, international payment flows are closely linked to, and influenced by, the 
balance of payments.
20
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Global financial imbalances
This dissertation investigates how international payment flows are determined and 
how they affect the behaviour of exchange rates. The focus is on the dynamic evo­
lution of international cash flow over the medium and long term, rather than just 
on its day-to-day, or month-to-month, fluctuations. The idea is that while the dif­
ferent components of the balance of payments affect international payment flows 
directly in a particular country, they also determine the accumulation of foreign as­
sets and liabilities in that country, or its international investment position. However, 
the international investment position itself gives rise to international payments, for 
instance when foreign debt becomes due and is repaid or when interest payments 
on the existing debt stock are made.
Over the past few decades, many countries have opened up their capital markets 
to the outside world. This development has led to increasing external imbalances; 
a good example is the United States whose current account deficit has now—once 
again after the 1980s—reached record levels. Moreover, capital flows have become 
much more volatile, and the composition of capital flows has also changed. An 
important objective of this study is thus to analyze how these developments have 
influenced international payment patterns over time and to find out in what ways 
exchange rates are determined in different ways than before.
1.3 Innovative approach
In recent years, researchers have once again started to study the empirical link 
between balance of payments fluctuations and exchange rate movements. For in­
stance, Brooks, Edison, Kumar and Sl0k (2001) provide evidence that shows that 
the yen exchange rate has remained closely tied to the current account over recent 
years whereas portfolio flows, which have not been so relevant for the yen-dollar 
exchange rate in their view, have mattered more for the euro-dollar exchange rate. 
Hau and Rey (2003) report that international equity flows and repatriations of div­
idends appear to be highly correlated with exchange rates in many countries. A 
crucial innovation of the research presented here is the explicit empirical modelling
21
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of international payment flows in a dynamic context, based on the interrelatedness 
of the various balance of payments components.
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The ignored exchange rate 
fundamental
2.1 What should a PhD economist know about ex­
change rates?
Understanding exchange rates is essential for economists no matter where they 
work. Suppose you are about to finish your PhD and are cited for a job interview 
with the IMF to enter its Economist Program. You know from the invitation letter 
that the economists conducting the interview are going to ask you questions about 
the state of the world economy. Quite likely, they will also quiz you on the hot 
topic of exchange rates. Helping countries with currency problems is the daily busi­
ness of your interview partners. After all, what the IMF has been doing since being 
founded in 1944 is to oversee exchange arrangements of its member countries and 
to lend foreign currency reserves to members with balance of payment problems.
How should you prepare for the interview? In the invitation letter, you are given 
the following advice:
Insofar as one can prepare for the interview, some possible methods are 
to:
• review a good undergraduate text in open economy macroeco­
nomics,
24
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• read the latest issues of the World Economic Outlook, published 
twice a year by the IMF,
• read the last few issues of the Economist magazine.
The last two recommendations make sense, yet the first one is surprising. To 
enter the Economist Program, you should normally have a PhD in macroeconomics 
and be familiar with the frontier of macroeconomic research. Now you are told to 
switch back to introductory macro for your job interview. Maybe, it is just that the 
IMF wants you to get the basics straight, rather than to get caught up in technical 
models when you have limited time for your interview preparation. But the advice 
to review your old undergraduate textbooks could also have a deeper reason. It may 
simply be that graduate textbooks on macroeconomics are of too little practical use 
as they are silent on some of the key topics of international economics.
2.1.1 Exchange rates in the financial press
You do not agree? Well, let us consider an example. Busy with your interview 
preparation, you follow the IMF recruiters’ advice and start reading the back issues 
of the Economist. You quickly find relevant articles, such as the following one, 
which appeared in an issue of September 2003:
The average homeowner in Peoria has probably never heard of Toshi- 
hiko Fukui, Zhou Xiachuan, Joseph Yam, Pemg Fai-nan or Park Seung.
But he has a lot to thank them for. These men, respectively bosses of 
the central banks of Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Ko­
rea, have become the world’s most enthusiastic purchasers of American 
government debt, including that of the mortgage giants, Freddie Mac 
and Fannie Mae. Their appetite for Freddie’s and Fannie’s bonds keeps 
the dollar relatively strong, and mortgage rates in Peoria down.
Between them, these five Asian central banks hold around $1.3 trillion 
in official reserves (or over half of the global total), most of them in 
dollar assets. Since December 2001, Japan’s reserves have shot up by 
36%, China’s by 65% and Taiwan’s by 49%.
25
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The Asians’ passion for American bonds is explained by their desire 
to stop their currencies appreciating against the dollar. China and 
Hong Kong fix their currencies against the dollar, in Hong Kong’s case 
through a currency board. That means a current-account surplus or big 
capital inflows automatically translate into higher reserves. The other 
countries ostensibly let their currencies float, but heavy intervention by 
central banks has ensured that Japan’s yen and South Korea’s won have 
risen by over 13% against the dollar since the beginning of 2002, com­
pared with a 25% increase for the euro, another floating currency.
For the man from Peoria (and for America’s economy), this has brought 
a short-term benefit. The dollar’s fall over the past 18 months has been 
smaller and more gradual than it would have been without the Asians’ 
intervention. The trouble is that the Asian dollar binge is putting off 
the inevitable adjustment to America’s current-account deficit. Amer­
ica continues to accumulate foreign debt at an ever faster rate, so the 
eventual adjustment will be correspondingly bigger. At the same time a 
disproportionate share of whatever decline in the dollar does material­
ize falls on those countries that let their currencies float, especially the 
euro. [...]
Were Mr Fukui and his friends to give up on American bonds overnight, 
the dollar would plummet and bond prices would soar. To help the 
world economy, the adjustment needs to be gradual—a point that is 
often lost on the shrillest foreign critics. [...]
Rising foreign-exchange reserves are not necessarily a bad thing. 
Countries need reserves to guard against sudden shocks; say, a big 
drop in exports or an unexpected drying-up of foreign lending. As 
economies grow, so the level of reserves tends to rise. In general, more 
open economies need more reserves than those where foreign trade is 
less important; and those with a fixed currency, such as China, need 
more reserves than those with a floating one.
Reserves are particularly important for emerging economies. As these 
countries open up to foreign capital, they need relatively more reserves. 
That was one painful lesson of the 1997-98 Asian financial crises, when
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several emerging Asian economies turned out to have insufficient re­
serves given their level of short-term foreign debt. [...]
The suspicion, therefore, is that Messrs Fukui, Zhou, Fai-nan and com­
pany have been buying dollars for nefarious reasons: to keep their 
exports artificially cheap and hold on to their traditional export-led 
growth. [...]
Japan is by far the region’s biggest economy. Unlike the others, it is a 
rich industrial country which has been running a current-account sur­
plus since 1981. It already has the largest dollar reserves in the world, 
and is accumulating more at a rapid clip. All this suggests that Japan 
should take the biggest share of any dollar adjustment in Asia. Yet, as 
the previous section explained, the country suffers from chronic defla­
tion. A sharp appreciation in its currency right now could undermine 
any hope of boosting growth in the short term. [...]
Collectively, the other dollar-buyers in Asia pack an even bigger eco­
nomic punch than Japan. China, South Korea, Taiwan and the region’s 
other emerging economies together account for 20% of world trade, 
compared with Japan’s 5%. Their combined current-account surplus 
in 2002 was $133 billion, larger than Japan’s ($113 billion) or the euro 
zone’s ($72 billion). That is why they must play a big part in any global 
economic adjustment, [...]*
The article was published in the Economist as part of a survey of the world 
economy. It has been quoted here at some length since it provides a lucid account of 
an important development of recent years—the emergence of large current account 
imbalances between America and Asia—and its implications for global financial 
stability. It also provides a good example of the economic model of international 
adjustment underlying much of the daily writing in the financial press. We shall 
now look at the key components of this model and examine what role it plays, if 
any, in modem economic textbooks. We shall then look at some of the countries 
mentioned in the article and ask whether the proposed adjustment mechanism is 
bome out by the data.
1 "Oriental mercantilists: Asia’s addiction to cheap currencies must end. But not overnight", The 
Economist, 18 September 2003.
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The main assumptions guiding the author of the above article could be described 
as follows (where quotes are taken from the same article):
• International payment flows are a major driving force behind countries’ nom­
inal exchange rates: "Like trade surpluses, large capital inflows should push 
up the currency".
• Central banks can take pressure off their currencies by accumulating foreign 
reserves: In China for instance, "the huge and accelerating build-up of re­
serves suggests that, left to its own devices, the yuan would appreciate".
• More generally, by buying bonds from deficit countries, surplus countries can 
stop their currencies from appreciating. However, foreign lending can only 
be a temporaiy solution. Sooner or later, a deficit country has to service its 
debt. The longer it postpones its payments, the more debt it will accumulate 
and the larger will be the eventual exchange rate adjustment.
• Finally, cheap currencies help promote exports. Current account deficits carry 
the seed of their own elimination, as they create payment outflows, putting 
downward pressure on the exchange rate. The mechanism works best in the 
absence of official intervention or compensating debt flows.
It is also interesting to note what kind of economic factors did not play a role in 
the author’s analysis.
• The exchange rate is mentioned as the only economic force to bring the 
US current account back to balance. The author does not spend time dis­
cussing other current account fundamentals, such as for instance intertempo­
ral savings decisions, on which the academic literature puts much emphasis 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).
• There is no mention of money growth differentials or interest differentials as 
determinants of exchange rates. The likely reason is that these factors are 
dwarfed by exchange rate pressures from global balance of payments imbal­
ances.
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• The author does not distinguish nominal and real exchange rates. This means 
he finds inflation differentials nowadays are modest and not worth further 
consideration.
• Finally, while exchange rate movements are in fact predictable according to 
the article, speculators do not take advantage of it. Either they do not forecast 
exchange rates well, or their weight in foreign exchange markets is small 
compared to transaction-driven currency flows.
There are two key lessons then. The first will be familiar to you from Eco­
nomics 101: Just as the market price of a given commodity depends on the forces 
of supply and demand, the rate at which currencies are exchanged in the foreign ex­
change market is determined by the supply and demand conditions in that market. 
Economists call this the flow market model of exchange rate determination, or flow 
approach for short. Since the demand for currencies is linked to goods and capital 
flows, there have been many efforts to specify the elasticities of those flows with 
respect to their determinants, such as the real exchange rate and international return 
differentials, and to figure out the resulting equilibrium in the foreign exchange mar­
ket. This kind of analysis, at times also referred to as the balance of payments flow 
approach, goes back to the studies of Machlup (1939), Machlup (1940) and Robin­
son (1937&). Up to the 1970s, the flow market model was presented in virtually 
every textbook on international economics (Mussa, 1979, footnote 17).
The other important lesson emerging from the article is that a deficit country 
can delay exchange rate adjustment by borrowing from abroad. By adding to its 
foreign liabilities, however, keeping the currency strong for too long carries the risk 
of an even larger adjustment in the future. Although the reasoning is simple, the im­
plications of accumulated foreign claims and liabilities for cross-country currency 
flows were never really considered by the proponents of the traditional flow market 
model.
2.1.2 Exchange rates in the academic literature
Today, academic economists almost completely ignore the role of international cur­
rency flows in the determination of exchange rates (Rosenberg, 1996). (Exceptions
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prove the rule, and I will talk about them later.) Ask an academic what she or he 
thinks of the idea that international payment flows drive exchange rates in the for­
eign exchange markets, and you are likely to get one of two responses: "Yes, but 
that’s something we already know." Or: "No, that’s too simple, take a good textbook 
and read about the existing models, which make much more sense."
To assess the relative truth of both responses, it is probably best to simply look at 
available textbooks to find out what they have to say about exchange rates in general 
and about the model of flow demand and flow supply in particular. For this purpose, 
I have compiled a list of macroeconomics textbooks at both the undergraduate and 
graduate levels, of textbooks of international economics and of some survey arti­
cles on exchange rates. In the list, I have also included a book on development 
macroeconomics and one on FX market microstructure.
Next, I looked up which kind of exchange rate models or assumptions about 
exchange rate determinants are discussed in each of those texts. The results are 
shown in table 2.1 on page 70 and table 2.2 on page 71.
The outcome is striking. No macro text, whether for beginning or advanced 
students, mentions trade and capital flows as a potential source of exchange rate 
movements. The only exception among macro textbooks is the undergraduate text 
by Abel and Bemanke (2003), who cover the flow market model of exchange rate 
determination in their chapter on the open economy. The widely used graduate text 
by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), however, while aiming to give a comprehensive 
account of the "foundations of international macroeconomics", makes no mention 
whatsoever of the link between international payment flows and the setting of ex­
change rates in the foreign exchange market. Neither does Agenor and Montiel’s 
(1999) authoritative book on development macroeconomics acknowledge a direct 
connection.
Naturally, all of the textbooks on international economics present models of 
exchange rates. While some texts discuss the role of flow demands and flow supplies 
in the setting of exchange rates, others, including the bestselling undergraduate text 
by Krugman and Obstfeld (2003), leave out the topic completely. However, even 
the books that cover the flow approach present it in a half-hearted fashion: Although 
the flow model of exchange rate determination is explained at some point in those
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texts, the notion that exchange rates are linked to currency flows plays virtually no 
role in the models of the open economy that are subsequently discussed.
Rather surprisingly, none of the survey articles on exchange rates or books on 
exchange rate economics consider the role of the balance of payments as an ex­
change rate determinant. The book by Samo and Taylor (2002) for instance dis­
cusses numerous studies on exchange rates, and yet it has nothing to say about 
possible effects of currency flows on exchange rates. One is left to conclude that 
the flow approach played virtually no role in the theoretical and empirical modelling 
of exchange rates in the past two or three decades.
In contrast to most macro texts, the book by Lyons (2001) on the microstructure 
approach to exchange rates discusses the balance of payments approach in some 
detail. According to the microstructure approach, exchange rate movements are 
significantly influenced by order flows in the foreign exchange markets. The mi­
crostructure approach and the flow market model are thus related to each other, an 
issue to which we will return later.
To sum up, most authors of economics textbooks consider the flow approach as 
premodem and thus either skip it or use it as a straw man to make case for other, 
more widely accepted models. Most texts discuss for example the monetary model 
of exchange rate determination or the Mundell-Fleming model. The fact that many 
authors do not study the influence of balance of payments transactions on the de­
mand and supply conditions in foreign exchange markets is particularly surprising 
given that they readily take the opposite hypothesis for granted, namely that the real 
exchange rate affects countries’ trade performance and that the Marshall-Lemer 
condition holds.
2.1.3 Global financial imbalances and the adjustment delay
The claim that "we already know" that exchange rates are driven by the movements 
of the balance of payments is thus an exaggeration. If true, it remains a puzzle why 
the flow approach continues to be largely ignored in the academic literature.
An important reason for the flow approach’s lacking persuasiveness is the way 
the theory has traditionally been presented. According to the approach, demand for
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Demand
Supply
►
Flow of foreign 
money
Figure 2.1: Flow market model o f the exchange rate. In the traditional flow market
model, the exchange rate is determined by forces o f demand and supply in the foreign 
exchange markets. The equilibrium exchange rate corresponds to point A, where the flow 
supply and flow demand of the foreign money coincide. However, when the flow supply 
of foreign money exceeds the flow demand (point B versus point C), the domestic currency 
appreciates, bringing the exchange rate back to equilibrium.
currencies comes from purchases and sales of goods and assets. Once the factors 
underlying good and asset flows are specified, the exchange rate is determined in 
a simple model of demand and supply. Diagrams such as the one in figure 2.1 
are conventionally used to show the equilibrium outcome in the foreign exchange 
market, and practically the same diagrams were used in the early works by Machlup 
(1939), Machlup (1940) and Robinson (19376).
What makes the flow approach in its traditional form unconvincing is its static 
nature. Recall the second big lesson from the Economist's article: Asia ships one 
million dollar worth of goods to America and buys American bonds of the same 
value. Today’s current account and capital account balances leave the exchange rate 
unchanged as they exactly net each other out. Yet over time the exchange rate will 
be affected, namely when America starts paying off its debt.
The upshot is that capital flows can retain exchange rate pressure arising from 
current account transactions for a certain period of time. Consequently, the ex­
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change rate will adjust to current account imbalances with a time lag. This lag 
can be substantial and depends, among other things, on the ease with which, say, a 
deficit country can finance its current account deficit.
As we will see in the following section, the mechanism whereby the capital 
account can temporarily offset the pressure caused by current account imbalances 
is empirically important. It deserves to have a name. I shall call it the adjustment 
delay.
Current account Real exchange rate |
\
Cash flow
(unobserved) Foreign exchange 
market
\
Nominal
exchange
rate
Debt balance
Balance of payments
Figure 2.2: Cash flow and exchange rate determination. The internal behaviour of
the balance o f payments determines how international payment flows evolve over time. 
The effect o f those cross-border cash flows on the foreign exchange market can result in 
important interactions between the balance of payments and the nominal and real exchange 
rates.
The adjustment delay can be conveniently summarized by means of the diagram 
in figure 2.2. As the arrows leading from the current account via the cash flow to the 
nominal exchange rate indicate, current account movements imply changing flows 
of foreign exchange. However, the flows of international payments induced by the 
movements of the current account may not always occur immediately. First, current 
account transactions may lead to deferred payments, for example when goods are 
shipped abroad and the foreign importer does not have to pay for them immediately, 
due to a trade credit for instance.
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Second, and more importantly, a country-wide current account surplus may in­
duce banks and other economic agents to lend more extensively abroad. The ad­
ditional supply of the domestic currency in the foreign exchange markets helps to 
contain part of the exchange rate appreciation. To the extent that the exchange rate 
does not appreciate right away, it may do so at a later stage when loans received 
by foreigners have to be repaid—say, after a few months or even years. The con­
sequence is that current account imbalances can have a prolonged impact on the 
demand and supply conditions in the foreign exchange markets.2 As the diagram in 
figure 2.2 shows, the way that current account imbalances are financed—whether 
directly or via the debt balance—matters for how these imbalances affect interna­
tional cash flow and thus the exchange rate.
The diagram in figure 2.2 highlights also the potential feedback from a coun­
try’s real exchange rate on its international competitiveness and thus its trade per­
formance. It is important to recognize the influence of exchange rate movements 
on the trade balance and current account in order to fully understand the dynamic 
interaction of trade and capital flows with the behaviour of exchange rates. We will 
take a closer empirical look at this issue in chapter 6.
2.2 Do currency flows drive exchange rates?
Now that we have discussed the flow approach and the important role of the ad­
justment delay, it is the right moment to confront theory with data. Much of the 
discussion so far has centered on the economic and financial asymmetry between 
Asia and the United States, which is increasingly seen as a threat to global financial 
stability. The question remains whether this situation is special or whether similar 
phenomena can be encountered more often, both across countries and through time.
In this section, we will examine long-term time series data from four coun­
tries: Japan, Germany, the United States and Korea. All countries considered give
2Evans and Lyons (2003) have recently analyzed the price impact of end-user order flows on 
exchange rates. Interestingly, they find that currency trades originating from non-ftnancial corpora­
tions have more persistent price effects than, say, trades originating from leveraged traders (such as 
hedge funds), and that their explanatory power increases with the horizon. These findings appear 
consistent with the arguments presented here.
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clear empirical support to our two conjectures: first, that currency flows drive ex­
change rates; and second, that current account imbalances translate into exchange 
rate changes after some time. Further, it appears that the adjustment delay has in­
creased over the past three or four decades as countries have opened up their capital 
markets allowing current account imbalances to persist over longer periods.
2.2.1 Japan
Let us first look at balance of payments and exchange rate data from Japan, consid­
ering the floating period of the yen that started in the early 1970s. As we will see, 
the fluctuations of the yen over the years appear closely related to corresponding 
movements in the Japanese balance of payments. The empirical relation has been 
remarkably stable over more than three decades, which is why I consider Japan to be 
the example par excellence of the way exchange rates adjust to balance of payments 
imbalances.
The close and strikingly regular relationship between Japan’s current account 
and the yen is also the reason why this thesis focuses to a large extent on this par­
ticular country. The discussion of the Japanese data in this section provides the 
motivation for all of the following chapters of the thesis. Chapter 3 shows how the 
empirical regularities observed in the data can be deduced from the balance of pay­
ments accounting identity along with a very small set of theoretical assumptions. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will look at ways to econometrically model and better understand 
the empirical observations. Finally, chapter 6 will move away from the flow ap­
proach and look at the more traditional, reverse question of how the exchange rate 
affects the current account.
Time series spanning three decades
Along with its rise in the post-war period to one of the world’s largest economies, 
Japan has experienced a sustained appreciation of its currency, the yen. Less of­
ten noticed—but just as remarkable—is the fact that the yen’s value has fluctuated 
widely over the years, both in nominal and real terms, since it started to float in the 
early 1970s.
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Table 2.3 on page 72 shows the substantial rises and declines of the yen’s nom­
inal effective exchange rate during the last three decades. For instance, between 
1985Q3 and 1988Q4, the yen’s value shot up by 61% in trade-weighted terms (39% 
in the year from 1985Q3 through 1986Q3 alone). Later, during the 1990s, the yen 
rose by 52% from 1992Q3 through 1995Q2, then dropped by 35% in the following 
three years through 1998Q3, only to be pushed up once more by 40% in the two 
years thereafter. Fluctuations of these magnitudes can be observed all the way back 
to the early 1970s when the yen started to float.
How much did the performance of Japan’s real exchange rate differ from that 
of its nominal counterpart? The sizeable and prolonged swings of Japan’s nomi­
nal exchange rate translated into very similar movements of the real exchange rate 
throughout the floating period. The yen appreciated less in real terms than in nom­
inal terms, however. From 1980Q1 to 2000Q1, Japan’s annual inflation rate re­
mained 1.7% below the weighted inflation rates of its trading partners on average, 
with little variation. By contrast, Japan’s nominal effective exchange rate rose 4.5% 
per year on average, implying a substantial real appreciation of the yen over the 
years. Clearly, purchasing power parity has been the exception rather than the rule 
in Japan.
Figure 2.3 plots Japan’s current account and nominal effective exchange rate for 
the period from 1977Q1 to 2001Q4. Here and in the rest of the thesis, the nominal 
exchange rate is defined as the foreign-currency price of the domestic currency, that 
is, a rise in the nominal exchange rate implies an appreciation of the domestic cur­
rency. One can observe that the current account went through four big swings. The 
nominal exchange rate followed these movements quite closely. It similarly experi­
enced large, protracted swings, which seem related to those of the current account. 
In chapter 4 ,1 will show that both variables, after appropriate normalizations, are 
indeed cointegrated over this period.
The relationship is less clear only after 1981, when the yen suddenly weakened 
for several quarters. At that time, the current account was rising. This may be 
partly explained by the fact that large capital outflows occurred at that time due to 
the liberalization of Japan’s capital account. (Note that the US dollar experienced a 
sharp appreciation during the pre-1985 period even after US interest rates had fallen 
from their record levels of the early 1980s.)
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Figure 2.3: Japanese current account and exchange rate (1980s and 1990s). Japanese 
current account (left scale, in trillions of yen) and nominal effective exchange rate (right 
scale, in logarithms), period from 1977Q1 to 2001 Q l. Source: International Financial 
Statistics (IMF).
Quarterly data are available only from 1977. Before that year, data exist for 
both variables only at a biannual frequency. Consider figure 2.4, which again plots 
the same variables as figure 2.3, this time for the period from 1970 until the end 
of 1979, allowing for a little time overlap in both plots. Figure 2.4 shows another 
swing of the current account in the first half of the 1970s, with a corresponding 
up-and-down movement of the exchange rate. Again, one can observe a short lag 
between both variables. As in figure 2.3, the yen appreciates very strongly at a time 
when the current account reaches a temporary peak, namely in the years 1971 and 
1972.
Finally, consider figure 2.5 on page 39, which now plots the Japanese current 
account and nominal exchange rate for the whole period from the late 1960s to the 
late 1990s, combining the sample periods of figures 2.3 and 2.4. The current ac­
count data used in figure 2.5 are originally of biannual frequency and have been 
transformed to quarterly frequency by replacing the missing observations with esti­
mates from a natural cubic spline smooth. With the longer overall sample, the five 
historic swings of the Japanese current account are now clearly discernible, as is the 
gradual adjustment of the exchange rate to those swings.
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Figure 2.4: Japanese current account and exchange rate (1970s). Japanese current
account (left scale, in millions of yen) and nominal effective exchange rate (right scale, in 
logarithms), period from 1970H1 to 1979H2. Source: Economic Outlook (OECD).
Japan’s performance over the last three and a half decades suggests that the 
Economist's story on the disequilibrium between Asia and its trading partners de­
scribes a recurring international phenomenon and not just an isolated event. Perhaps 
the author of the article would herself be surprised to see such a regular pattern in 
the data over such a long period. To a man from Mars or a woman from the electrical 
engineering department, it is the apparent stability of the relationship between the 
current account and the exchange rate, not the drift and errors in that relationship, 
that would surely seem most remarkable.
Japan’s lending abroad
As already noted, an important feature of the time series plotted in figures 2.3 
and 2.4 is that the exchange rate responds to the current account movements with 
a substantial lag, here referred to as the adjustment delay. Note that the yen appre­
ciated most heavily during periods when the current account was in strong surplus. 
The years in which the current account reached temporary peaks—that is, 1971, 
1978, 1986, 1992 and 1998—were the very same years during which the yen’s 
value increased most dramatically.
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Figure 2.5: Japanese current account and exchange rate. Japanese current account (left 
scale, in trillions of yen, transformed from biannual to quarterly frequency using a natural 
cubic spline smooth) and nominal effective exchange rate (right scale, in logarithms), period 
from 1968Q1 to 1999Q4. Source: Economic Outlook (OECD), IFS (IMF).
It appears that the adjustment delay was relatively short in the 1970s, that is, 
before Japan started to open up its financial markets to foreigners in 1979-1980 
(Frankel, 1984, pages 19 ff.). In later years, however, the lag between the current 
account and the exchange rate increased substantially, particularly after the US had 
pushed successfully for a further liberalization of Japanese capital markets in 1984- 
1985 (Frankel, 1984, pages 26 ff.).
After the financial liberalization of the late 1970s and early 1980s, Japanese 
investors began to invest heavily in foreign debt securities, mainly in the United 
States. Such lending helped to keep the yen low, or at least to make its appreciation 
less steep. However, since foreign lending tended to be temporary, current account 
movements fed into the exchange rate sooner or later.
Consider figure 2.6 on the following page, which plots the Japanese current ac­
count together with the debt securities balance. Debt securities are part of the port­
folio investment balance and have arguably been the most important item in Japan’s 
financial account. From figure 2.6, it is clear that Japan’s investments in debt secu­
rities abroad were mirroring the evolution of its current account surplus for a long 
time. That the lag between the current account and exchange rate series in figure 2.3
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Figure 2.6: Japan’s lending abroad. Japanese current account and debt securities bal­
ance. Both variables in US-$. Debt securities balance as a moving average with two leads 
and lags. Period from 1977Q3 to 1999Q2. Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
started to become much more sizeable after the liberalization of Japan’s financial ac­
count is clearly consistent with the notion of the adjustment delay, whereby capital 
flows help to temporarily buffer the exchange rate pressure stemming from current 
account movements. As a result, once the Japanese could invest their savings more 
easily abroad, the exchange rate began to adjust more slowly to the fluctuations of 
the current account.
With so much emphasis on international payment flows, what about the effects 
of foreign exchange intervention? Japan has been accumulating vast reserves of 
foreign exchange over recent years. Purchases of foreign exchange reserves appear 
to have been particularly heavy during those years in which the nominal exchange 
rate appreciated most strongly. Although the Japanese authorities were never able 
to fully offset the appreciation of the yen, the interventions that took place appear 
to have had a moderating impact. We will revisit the issue of the effectiveness of 
official intervention in section 5.3.2. Altogether, it appears that reserves played 
more of an endogenous role, reacting whenever economic fundamentals put too 
strong upward pressure on the exchange rate. This view is also supported by Girton 
and Roper (1977) who suggest that both exchange rate adjustments and reserve 
changes serve as indicators of exchange market pressure.
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Alternative interpretations
One should expect many standard exchange rate theories to have difficulty to ex­
plain the massive upswings and downswings of the Japanese currency over the years 
that were illustrated above. For example, interest and return differentials of Japan 
vis a vis other industrial countries appear stationary in the data—in contrast to the 
exchange rate, which is found to be nonstationary—and they did not exhibit large 
swings over time as did the exchange rate. In addition, whereas interest and re­
turn differentials seem to have played an important role for the performance of the 
US dollar, possibly through their influence on capital flows, it is much harder to 
establish a similarly significant link for the yen. All of this suggests that return dif­
ferentials may only have had a temporary and rather weak impact on the Japanese 
exchange rate.
Balassa-Samuelson effect. For many economists, Japan is the showcase for the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect that predicts an appreciation of the real exchange rate in 
countries with high productivity growth (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964). This 
theory has the potential to explain large long-run movements of the real exchange 
rate. It is indeed the case that Japan experienced both strong productivity growth 
and a sustained increase in the real value of its currency over the past fifty years.
However, other implications of the theory are less well matched by the data. 
According to the theory, real exchange rate movements are brought about by move­
ments in the ratio of nontraded versus traded goods prices. However, Engel (1999) 
recently found that relative prices of nontraded goods account for almost none of 
the movements in real exchange rates in major industrial countries, irrespective of 
the time horizon (the method he used was based on a decomposition of the mean 
squared error of real exchange rate changes). As Engel points out, relative prices 
of nontraded goods in Japan increased by about 40 percent since the 1970s but the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate was 90 percent. However, since the rela­
tive price of nontradables in the United States closely mirrored the relative price 
of nontradables in Japan, the Balassa-Samuelson effect was effectively neutralized. 
Another problem with the Balassa-Samuelson theory is that it cannot explain those 
episodes when the yen depreciated strongly since there have not been any large 
downswings in the relative price of nontradable goods in Japan.
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Accumulation of foreign assets. Quite similar criticisms can be made with re­
gard to theories that suggest a long-run relationship between the real exchange rate 
and the accumulation of net foreign assets. These theories vary in their economic 
motivation. Some of them focus on the relative prices of nontradable goods, oth­
ers on the presence of a home preference for domestic tradables and again others 
on the impact of wealth effects on labour supply. The Japanese current account 
went into surplus in the early 1980s, and since then its overall foreign assets were 
constantly increasing. During the same period, the real value of the yen increased 
significantly, as predicted by those theories. However, apart from the trend, the 
stock of net foreign assets has shown very little variability and therefore cannot ac­
count for the large and protracted swings of the yen. Figure 2.7, which plots Japan’s 
nominal effective exchange rate along with its net foreign asset position (roughly 
approximated by the cumulative current account), makes this evident.
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Figure 2.7: Japan’s net foreign assets and exchange rate performance. Japan’s cu­
mulative current account (left scale, in trillions of yen) and nominal effective exchange rate 
(right scale, in logarithms), period from 1977Q1 to 2001Q1. Source: International Finan­
cial Statistics (IMF).
It is interesting to note that many of the prominent theories that set out to explain 
Japan’s exchange rate behaviour share the following characteristics: First, they seek 
to explain the yen’s real, rather than nominal, appreciation. Second, they are con­
cerned with the yen’s behaviour in the longer term. And third, they link the level of
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the exchange rate to stock variables, such as the relative level of productivity or the 
stock of foreign assets.
This thesis, in contrast, makes the case that a major factor behind the yen have 
been international payment flows and varying demand and supply conditions in the 
foreign exchange markets. Japan’s rising stocks of foreign assets may have mattered 
primarily insofar as they gave rise to ever increasing debt repayments and interest 
payments from abroad.
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Figure 2.8: Large current account surpluses. Current account balances of countries
with large current account surpluses (in billions of US dollar). Countries are selected and 
ordered according to the highest current account balance they have achieved in any single 
quarter in the period from 1977Q1 to 2001Q3. Source: International Financial Statistics 
(IMF).
When comparing Japan’s external performance to that of other countries, it 
should not be forgotten that Japan’s export boom in the 1980s and 1990s has been 
truly exceptional. Japan has for a long time been a world leader in electronics and 
automobile manufacture and ship building. As figure 2.8 demonstrates, Japan’s 
current account surpluses during recent decades were far greater than the surpluses 
of any other country; balance of payments fluctuations were also much greater in 
magnitude than in other countries. On the other hand, Japan began to open up 
its financial markets relatively late. On a number of measures, the country ex­
hibited a stronger home bias in investment than comparable countries (Tesar and
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Werner, 1995). At the same time, the country has not been confronted to strong cap­
ital inflows. As the examples of the United States and Korea below will illustrate, 
such inflows can have important implications for the adjustment of the exchange 
rate to balance of payments movements.
2.2.2 Germany
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Figure 2.9: German current account and nominal exchange rate in the 1980s. German 
current account (left scale, in German mark) and nominal effective exchange rate (right 
scale, in logarithms), period from 1977Q1 to 1990Q4. Source: International Financial 
Statistics (IMF).
Japan allows us to study the impact of trade and capital flows on exchange rate 
behaviour under more stable conditions. Since Japan has been running large export 
surpluses for a long time, the country only needed to decide on how to fend off the 
upward pressure on its exchange rate and how to invest its export revenues. As fig­
ure 2.8 shows, Germany is the only country to have run current account surpluses on 
a comparable scale during the 1980s (before German unification). And strikingly, 
as figure 2.9 demonstrates, the German exchange rate responded to current account 
movements in much the same way as the yen did in Japan.
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2.2.3 United States
In the United states, the predictions of the flow approach seem to be borne out by 
the data, too. Consider figure 2.10, which plots the evolution of the US current 
account (as a proportion of world trade) and the dollar’s multilateral exchange rate 
during the last four decades.
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Figure 2.10: US current account and exchange rate. US current account and nominal 
and CPI-based real effective exchange rates, period from 1960 to 2004. The current account 
variable is measured as a percentage of world trade. Source: Taylor (2002), International 
Financial Statistics (IMF), Main Economic Indicators (OECD).
The United States were running a substantial current account surplus through­
out the 1960s when the Bretton Woods system—whereby different currencies were 
pegged to the US dollar and the US dollar was freely convertible into gold—was 
still in place and working. During that decade, the dollar was stable and even ap­
preciating with respect to other major currencies. Towards the end of the 1960s, 
the current account started to deteriorate. As a result, the US currency started to 
weaken. The current account balance turned into deficit in 1971, for the first time in 
more than a decade. In the same year, the Bretton Woods system collapsed, leading 
to a sharp fall in the US dollar.
The weak dollar now helped to bring the US current account back into surplus, 
where it remained from 1973 to 1976, helping the currency to recover from its 
lowered value. Yet in 1977 and 1978, another current account deficit emerged, 
concurring with a second substantial depreciation of the dollar.
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1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
45
The ignored exchange rate fundamental
Current account (percentage o f world trade)
 I___ .___ .___ I___ I___ I___ .___ I___ I___ L__ I___ .___ .___ .___ t___ I___ .___ .___ -1___ .___ I__
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
5.00
4.75
5.0  
4.8 
4.6
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Figure 2.11: US current account and exchange rate. US current account and nominal 
and CPI-based real effective exchange rates, period from 1980Q1 to 2003Q3. The current 
account variable is measured as a percentage of world trade. Source: International Finan­
cial Statistics (IMF) and Main Economic Indicators (OECD).
The pattern of interaction between the current account and the exchange rate 
during the 1980s and 1990s was different from the 1960s and 1970s (see fig­
ure 2.11). In the first half of the 1980s, the United States experienced a very substan­
tial deterioration of the current account. This time, however, rather than weakening, 
the exchange rate appreciated strongly during several years. It was not until 1985 
that the dollar began to depreciate, but the following slide of the currency, which 
continued until 1987, was dramatic.
An even larger deficit developed in the latter half of the 1990s, which again did 
not seem to harm the dollar, which not only stayed strong but kept on appreciat­
ing. Yet things eventually changed in early 2002 when the dollar again started to 
depreciate rapidly and in a sustained manner.
What then had changed before 1980? After the Bretton Woods system was aban­
doned in 1973, the United States—along with Canada, Germany and Switzerland— 
one by one abandoned their capital controls. The United Kingdom followed suit in 
1979. Japan at that time still retained formidable barriers to both inflow and outflow, 
but it began to remove controls in the years thereafter.
Real effective exchange rate (CPI)
   Nominal effective exchange rate
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
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The opening-up of capital markets during the 1970s was a crucial development. 
Without access to other countries’ savings, the United States would hardly have 
been able to run persistent current account deficits in excess of 5, 6 and even 7 
percent of world trade in recent years. Albeit for different reasons, the United States 
were subject to large inflows of foreign capital both during the early 1980s and again 
during the 1990s. In both episodes, foreign lending and investment resulted in a 
substantial adjustment delay: initially, the dollar kept on appreciating for several 
years despite the fact that the current account was worsening. Yet in both cases, the 
final outcome was a slump in the dollar’s value.
2.2.4 Korea
Let us finally look at the performance of Korea, a country long admired for its 
export-led growth that recently fell victim to a formidable attack on its currency, 
the won. Figure 2.12 on the following page plots the evolution of the country’s 
current account over the last two and a half decades, along with its real effective 
exchange rate and the US-Korean bilateral exchange rate.
Even prior to the currency crisis of 1997, there had been a significant interac­
tion between the current account and the Korean won. The won depreciated con­
tinuously during the first half of the 1980s when the Korean current account was in 
deficit. Following the depreciation, the current account recorded a strong surplus in 
the latter half of the decade, pushing up the exchange rate throughout that period. 
Now, the surplus soon disappeared again and turned into a deficit in 1990, which 
persisted until the Asian crisis.
By 1996, Korea’s current account, measured as a percentage of world trade, 
had already reached record levels and the question of sustainability started to be­
come an issue; domestic investment had for a long time been very high in the East 
Asian economies, placing doubts on its quality, as for instance McKinnon and Pill 
(1997) pointed out at the time. Although the current account declined somewhat in 
early 1997, this was not enough to prevent the subsequent collapse of the won and 
several neighbouring currencies. The rather dramatic devaluation of the exchange 
rate helped to boost the trade balance and the current account, which wrote record 
surpluses only a few months after.
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Figure 2.12: Korea’s current account and exchange rate. South Korean current ac­
count, South Korean real effective exchange rate and US-Korean bilateral exchange rate, 
period from 1980Q1 to 2003Q3. The current account variable is measured as a percent­
age of world trade. Source: Economic Outlook (OECD) and Main Economic Indicators 
(OECD).
Like other emerging markets, Korea witnessed strong net private capital inflows 
during the early and mid-1990s. In most cases, those inflows followed liberalization 
measures in those countries (for details on the liberalization steps undertaken by 
Korea, see Wang, 2002). Capital flows to Asia as a region totalled $15.8 billion in 
1977-1982 and $16.7 billion in 1983-1989. Their volume rose to $40.1 billion in 
1990-1994 and shot up further to $95.8 billion in 1995 and $110.4 billion in 1996 
(Grenville, 1998). In several Asian economies, capital inflows were twice as large as 
the current account deficits in 1988-1994 (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1996).
In Korea, the funds were not only used to increase domestic investment; they 
also served to accumulate reserves and keep the won strong. Ultimately though, the 
current account deficit became unsustainable, and with it the Korean exchange rate. 
That foreign investors lost faith at some point and started to pull out their capital 
only precipitated the collapse.
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2.3 What is missing in mainstream exchange rate 
models?
The previous section offered considerable empirical evidence supporting the flow 
approach, and the adjustment delay in the response of the exchange rate to current 
account surpluses or deficits in particular. No matter how many years one traces 
back the data, the theory helps to explain current account and exchange rate move­
ments both in developed and developing countries. Yet as was noted before, such 
evidence hardly impresses the ordinary economist who prefers the models she or he 
knows from today’s mainstream literature.
What is it then that the literature offers instead? Let us look at some of the fre­
quently used models, such as the monetary model of exchange rate determination, 
the Mundell-Fleming model and the class of models that emphasize the role of trad­
ables and nontradables prices in the determination of the exchange rate. Later, we 
shall also discuss how the microstructure approach is linked to the flow approach. 
Finally, it shall be interesting to consider whether the flow approach could help to 
explain currency crises and whether it features, or should feature, in standard mod­
els of those crises.
2.3.1 Monetary approach to exchange rate determination
Since the exchange rate is the price of one country’s national money in terms of 
another country’s money, it seems that monetary conditions must, in one way or an­
other, play a vital role in the determination of exchange rates. Although Meese and 
Rogoff (1983a) astonished the academic community in the early 1980s by showing 
that monetary exchange rate models fail to forecast major-cuixency exchange rates 
better than a simple "no change" model (see also Meese and Rogoff, 1983b; Ro­
goff, 2002), and despite the fact that economists find it tremendously hard to over­
turn this negative result (Frankel and Rose, 1995), the monetary approach to the ex­
change rate continues to be taught, day by day, at universities and business schools 
around the world.
Despite Meese and Rogoffs (1983a) findings, there are good reasons why the 
model should be taught. Over longer periods, inflation rates show a close correlation
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with exchange rate movements. And in high-inflation episodes, the relationship is 
evident even in the short run. Nevertheless, the fact that the link between monetary 
variables and exchange rates is so poor in the short and medium run under normal 
circumstances is disquieting. Something important appears to be missing in the 
model. The only question is, what?
A common feature of monetary models of exchange rate determination is that 
they organize the analysis around the demands and supplies of national monies. Let 
there be two countries indexed by i, where i = 1,2; we may regard country 1 as the 
home country, country 2 as the foreign country. Using an exponential specification, 
the monetary equilibrium condition for country i can be written as:
Mi(t) =  supply of base money issued by the central bank of country z, 
Pi(t) =  price level,
Yi(t) =  real income, 
ti(t) =  nominal interest rate, 
ai(t) = income elasticity (> 0), 
j3i(t) = interest rate coefficient (> 0).
In logarithmic terms, equation (2.1) can be written as follows:
Base money is created against the purchase of foreign reserves and by domestic 
credit expansion. The balance sheet of country € s central bank is given by:
(2.1)
where
(2.2)
(2.3)
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where
1Zi(t) =  foreign assets,
T>i(t) = domestic credit.
For later use, it can be convenient to state equation (2.3) in terms of percentage 
changes:
rhi(t) = ri(t)+di(t),  (2.4)
where
mj( t ) = l o g ^ w ) ,  m  =  M t)  =
We now turn to the determination of the exchange rate. By definition, the nom­
inal exchange rate of, say, country 1, Si\2(t), equals its purchasing power parity 
value, Pi\2 (t), times the real exchange rate, Qi\2 {t):
Si\2(t) = Pi\2(t) x Qi\2{t), (2.5)
where
P2{t)
Pl\2 {t) = Pi( ty
The flexible-price monetary model focuses on the purchasing power parity value 
of the exchange rate, Pi\2 (t), and assumes that national price levels are determined 
by countries’ money markets:
O M  y i(i)“ exp(/5n(t)) M2(t) _
Si'aW=— m —  x Q i '2{t)■ ( 2 -6 )
Taking logarithms and substituting the base money equation (2.3) yields:
si|2(*) =  -  m2{t)} +  oi[y\{t) -  y2{t)\
-  P[i\(t) -  i2{t)} +  qipit), (2.7)
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where
Si(t) = log (S»(i)), yi{t) = log {Yi{t)), qi{t) =  log(Q4(t)).
The monetary approach does not model the real exchange rate, Qi\2(t). It is 
either assumed constant and thus set to one (absolute purchasing power parity) or 
to some other value (relative purchasing power parity). Sometimes, it is allowed to 
fluctuate, but even then it plays, if at all, a secondary role.
Two variants of the flexible-price monetary model are used in theoretical and 
empirical work. Some authors apply equation (2.7) directly (for instance, Girton 
and Roper, 1977). Relative exchange rate changes are then given as follows:
5i|2(£) =  - [ n (t) -  r2(t)\ -  [di(t) -  d2(t)\ +  a[yi(t) -  y2(t)\
-  p[k(t) -  i2(t)] +  qi\2(t). (2.8)
The equation says that contemporaneous movements in foreign reserves, domestic 
credit, output and interest rates, as well as in the real exchange rate, influence the 
movement of the nominal exchange rate.
Others substitute the uncovered interest parity condition, ii(t) — i2(t) =  
—Si\2(t), into equation (2.7) and solve the resulting differential equation forward 
(for instance, Engel and West, 2004):
1 f ° °
Si|2W  =  p  J  { - [ m i ( r )  -  t o 2( t ) ]  +  q [ j / i ( t )  -  jfe(r)]
+ 9 i|2 (t)} x e-'3_1(T- t)<ir. (2.9)
This forward-looking equation says that today’s exchange rate is driven by its future 
fundamentals. As Engel and West (2004) point out, some recent exchange rate 
models from the new open economy macroeconomics literature yield very similar 
relationships to the one in equation (2.9).
In both variants of the monetary model, the fundamentals of the nominal ex­
change rate are essentially the same: foreign reserves, domestic credit, output 
growth, interest rates and the real exchange rate. For convenience, we shall from
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now on only use the former version, stated in equations (2.7) and (2.8), in which the 
exchange rate moves only in response to its contemporaneous determinants.
International payment flows
Over the last decades, inflation rates have come down in many countries from their 
high level of the 1970s, and there is also much less variability of inflation rates 
among major countries now than there used to be. Similar things could be said 
about monetary or output growth rates. On the other hand, it is probably the case 
that nominal exchange rates remain about as volatile as before. In terms of equa­
tion (2.5), all of this suggests that the purchasing power parity value of the nominal 
exchange rate, Pl(t), has become more stable and that the extent to which it ac­
counts for the movements of nominal exchange rates is declining.
The logical consequence is that there are other, unrelated factors driving the 
nominal and, simultaneously, the real exchange rate. We can think of many things 
here. From the list of exchange rate determinants that play a role in the short and 
medium run, one could mention: order flow conveying price information to deal­
ers, overshooting effects, chartist approaches, technical trading rules, herding be­
haviour, band-waggon effects, multiple equilibria, higher order beliefs, uncertainty 
about the future, risk premia, public announcement effects, over-reaction to news, 
speculative forces and irrational exuberance. Relevant in the long and very long run 
may be for instance the relative movements of tradables and nontradables prices, 
long-term productivity differentials and wealth effects.
Some relevance of all those factors notwithstanding, I venture to suggest in this 
thesis that there is another economic fundamental with an even more important 
influence on exchange rates in the short, medium and long run—namely the flows 
of international payments resulting from balance of payments transactions.
As chapter 3 will show, many empirical phenomena regarding the dynamic be­
haviour of exchange rates can be explained in a model in which international pay­
ment flows play a central role. It is natural to think of the nominal exchange rate of, 
say, country l ’s currency in terms of country 2’s currency as the purchasing power
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parity value times the demand for currency 1 relative to currency 2. Specifically, 
chapter 3 defines the nominal exchange rate as follows:
S 1|2(t) =  x ^ 0 ,  (2.10)
|W  Pi(t) C2(t)
where C\(t) and C2(t) are indices measuring the excess demand in the foreign ex­
change market for currency 1 and currency 2, respectively. As chapter 3 explains in 
detail, the relative demands for both currencies depend on both countries’ payment 
balances—that is, on international trade flows, debt flows, reserve flows, etc.—and 
their dynamic behaviour.
Substituting the money market equation (2.2) into equation (2.10), we can com­
bine the monetary model with the dynamic flow market model of chapter 3:
S112W =  -  m2(t)} + a[yi(t) -  y2(t)\
-  P[ii(t) -  i2(t)\ +  [ci(t) -  c2{t)], (2.11)
where
Ci(t) = log (Ci(t)).
Nominal exchange rate changes are then explained as follows:
S112W =  - [h( t )  -  r2(t)\ -  [di(t) -  d2{t)\ +  a[£i(t) -  y2(t)\
-  (3[Li{t) -  l2(t)] +  [ci(£) -  c2(t)]. (2.12)
Combining both models in this way shows how different forces can matter at dif­
ferent times: A country’s exchange rate may depreciate when there is high domestic 
inflation, say as a result of excessive domestic credit growth. Alternatively, it may 
depreciate when the country is running a large current account deficit. Depending 
on circumstances, either money market conditions or international payment flows 
may prevail in driving the exchange rate. What the facts seem to indicate, how­
ever, is that international payments often dwarf monetary variables when it comes 
to their influence on exchange rates. How else can we, for instance, make sense of 
the large swings of the Japanese exchange rate over recent decades (as documented
54
The ignored exchange rate fundamental
in table 2.3 on page 72), which no standard monetary model would predict? And 
how else can we explain that in many of the recent currency crises, monetary and 
fiscal indicators prior to the attacks looked sound in the countries concerned?
2.3.2 Mundell-Fleming model 
The US dollar during the 1980s
During the 1980s, a massive current account deficit emerged in the United States. 
As the time series in section 2.2.3 showed, the US dollar went through a large, 
prolonged swing. Between 1978Q4 and 1985Q1, its trade-weighted value first rose 
by 53% in nominal terms, resulting in a real appreciation of 46%. Then, between 
1985Q1 and 1988Q2, the dollar fell again steadily, losing 39% of its nominal and 
36% of its real value. Some spoke of the "dance of the dollar". For others, it was 
the episode of the "dazzling dollar" (Frankel, 1985).
As is always the case when extraordinary things happen, economists are quick 
to present their theories. By 1985, many economists believed that the US dollar was 
overvalued and that something was not normal. The reasons that were put forward 
varied considerably. It was argued, for instance, that the dollar experienced a bubble 
which had to burst sooner or later (Krugman, 1985).
An important question for international economists was whether their work­
horse, the Mundell-Fleming model, could explain the behaviour of the dollar. In an 
analysis of the events, Krugman (1991) argued eloquently that it did and that the 
mainstream view, as he called it, was still correct.
Two developments marked the US economic policy in the early 1980s. Soon af­
ter the appointment of Paul Volcker as the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 
1979 and Ronald Reagan’s election as president in 1980, interest rates in the United 
States were raised to unforeseen levels with the aim to bring inflation down from 
double digits. The Reagan administration pushed through large cuts in personal in­
come taxes and significant increases in military spending. Real interest rates, which 
had become negative on some measures during the late 1970s, increased spectacu­
larly in 1981. With the real interest rate rose the differential between domestic and 
foreign rates.
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The textbook explanation
The Mundell-Fleming model, which extends the IS-LM model to the case of an 
open economy, has little difficulty explaining the source of the increase in interest 
rates as well as the appreciation of the dollar during that initial phase (Eichengreen, 
1996). To illustrate, consider the following basic version of the model for two 
economies, indexed by i, i = 1,2:
Gi(t) =  government spending of country i, 
pi(t) = real interest rate,
Zi{t) = current account balance.
Equation (2.13a), the income identity, says that national income equals government 
spending, consumption, investment and the current account. Consumption and in­
vestment are assumed to depend only on the real interest rate. Equation (2.13b) 
states that the current account depends on the real exchange rate. Equation (2.13c) 
represents money market equilibrium. Equation (2.13d) states that one country’s 
surplus is the other country’s deficit. Equation (2.13e) says that to rule out arbi­
trage, domestic and foreign interest rates must equal.
The solution to the model is summarized in table 2.4 on page 72; analytical re­
sults are presented in appendix 2.A.I. According to the model, the combination of 
tight monetary and loose fiscal policy in the United States during the early 1980s 
leads unambiguously to a deterioration of the current account balance, an apprecia­
tion of the currency and an increase in the real interest rate, all in keeping with the 
historical evidence. It appears that the Mundell-Fleming model does a good job of 
explaining the facts.
y%(t) = Gi(t) -  <t>iPi(t) +  Zi(t) 
Z\ (t) = -<fe<7i|2(£) 
Mi(t) = <f>7Yi(t) -  4>%Pi(t) 
z2(t) =  ~ Z i { t )
P2(t) =  Pi ( t )
(2.13a)
(2.13b)
(2.13c)
(2.13d)
(2.13e)
where
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Who sets the exchange rate?
However, studying the episode in a bit more detail, two kind of doubts emerge. 
The first one has to do with the way the exchange rate is determined in the 
Mundell-Fleming framework. The real exchange rate enters the model only in equa­
tion (2.13b) as a determinant of the current account. However, how the exchange 
rate is itself set is not modelled explicitly. Essentially, what the model is telling us is 
that the exchange rate has to adjust itself at all times to obtain macroeconomic equi­
librium and to ensure that the current account reaches a level compatible with that 
equilibrium. The logic goes backward, not forward—similar to the argument one 
sometimes hears: "We have a current account deficit. A deficit cannot go on forever 
but must revert to balance (or to some long-run equilibrium) one day. Therefore, the 
exchange rate needs to depreciate."3 Most economics students find it hard to under­
stand why speculators in the foreign exchange market should at all be bothered to 
please macroeconomists and to restore macroeconomic equilibrium in this fashion. 
And they are probably not alone.
The second doubt has to do with the economic developments in the United States 
in the 1980s. The steep appreciation of the dollar in the first half of the decade and 
the rapid decline in the three years thereafter were exceptional. While there was a 
clear turning-point in the movement of the exchange rate in 1985, nothing indicated 
a similarly clear change of course in US economic policy. There has been much 
talk in later analyses of a secret meeting at the Plaza Hotel in New York in Septem­
ber 1985, where finance ministers and central bank governors from the five leading 
market economies agreed to coordinate a strategy for reducing current account im­
balances among leading industrial nations (Krugman, 1991). However, no change 
in monetary or fiscal policy had been discussed at the gathering. This and the fact 
that the dollar had already started appreciating six months earlier make it difficult 
to explain why the joint statement of the desirability of an "orderly appreciation of 
the non-dollar currencies" issued at the meeting should have set a new trend for the 
dollar (Eichengreen, 1996).
3An example is the model by Hooper and Morten (1982), which is one of the models Meese and 
Rogoff (19836) used in their original out-of-sample forecasting contest. In this context, one should 
also mention the FEER approach by Williamson (1985), which defines a so-called Fundamental 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate as the real exchange rate consistent with internal and external balance 
in the medium run (see MacDonald, 1999a).
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Modelling exchange rate pressure
However, the Mundell-Fleming framework can be modified in a simple way to make 
it both more intuitive and realistic. The following model extends the standard, one- 
country Mundell-Fleming model by a foreign exchange market in which interna­
tional payment flows drive the exchange rate:
d(t) = debt balance (capital account) 
c(t) = money balance (capital account)
D(t) — cumulative foreign debt 
J(t) = newly liberalized foreign capital (Japan)
Equations (2.14a), (2.14b) and (2.14g) are as in the previous model. Equa­
tion (2.14c) states that net debt inflows, measured by the debt balance, increase 
with the level of the domestic interest rate, which stands as a proxy for the differ­
ential between domestic and foreign interest rates. Debt flows are also driven by 
the amortization payments, assumed to be a fraction of the existing stock of foreign 
debt. Moreover, debt flows increase with the availability of foreign capital from 
countries that are opening up their capital accounts, the example in the present con­
text being Japan. Equation (2.14d) is the accumulation constraint for foreign debt 
between the previous and the current period. Equation (2.14e) represents the bal­
ance of payments identity. Equation (2.14f) states that the exchange rate is driven 
by international money flows in the foreign exchange market.
Y(t) = G(t) -  <j)ip(t) +  z(t) 
z(t) =
d(t) =  c/>3p(t) -  (f>4D(t) +  (t>5J(t) 
D(t) = D(t -  1) +  d(t) 
z(t) +  d(t) +  c(t) = 0 
q(t) = -<hc(t)
M(t) = <j)7y(t)  -  <hp(t)
(2.14a)
(2.14b)
(2.14c)
(2.14d)
(2.14e)
(2.14f)
(2.14g)
where
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The model yields a number of clear predictions. The effects of the exogenous 
variables on the equilibrium outcome are summarized in table 2.5 on page 72. The 
analytical results can be found in appendix 2.A.2.
The model has a dynamic component since foreign debt is accumulating. For 
better intuition, assume that in period 1, the inherited debt stock, D(0), and the 
stock of liberalized foreign capital, J ( l) , are both zero. In the example of the United 
States, period 1 corresponds to the beginning of the 1980s, up until early 1985 say. 
The assumptions regarding D(0) and «/(1) are quite realistic: At the start of the 
1980s, the United States was still a net foreign lender and the inflow of Japanese 
capital was modest compared to subsequent years.
The effects of a joint monetary contraction and fiscal expansion are largely as in 
the previous model. However, the mechanism is different in important ways. Both 
the reduction in the money supply and the increase in government spending drive 
up the interest rate. As a result, the country is able to attract foreign lending flows, 
and the debt balance rises. For itself, the capital inflow implies an inflow of foreign 
money, which pushes up the exchange rate. However, the appreciated exchange rate 
forces the current account into deficit. While the current account deficit implies an 
outflow of the domestic currency, the outflow is not so strong as to offset the initial 
appreciation of the exchange rate.
Now consider the situation arising in the United States around 1985. Encour­
aged by strong capital inflows, which mostly take the form of debt securities flows, 
the country is running a massive current account deficit and is piling up a large 
amount of foreign debt. Although the United States’ total foreign liabilities start to 
exceed its foreign assets only one or two years later, amortization payments on its 
existing debt are already mounting.
In terms of the model, suppose we are now entering period 2. The stock of for­
eign debt inherited from the previous period, D( 1), is now much higher than in the 
previous period. As a consequence, foreign debt service increases, pushing down 
the debt balance. At the same time, as monetary and fiscal policy turn normal, the 
interest rate differential declines. This reduces the debt balance further. All those 
factors contribute to an outflow of money, provoking a substantial depreciation of 
the dollar. Although the weak dollar encourages exports, the rise in export proceeds 
is not sufficient to prevent the fall of the exchange rate.
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Another development that contributed to the "dance of the dollar" was the surge 
in capital inflows from Japan (Frankel, 1984; Isard and Stekler, 1985). As recently 
as 1979, Japan still retained formidable barriers on capital flows into and out of 
the country. With very low interest rates in the rest of the world, capital controls 
prevented the yen, which hit an all-time high against the dollar in 1978, to rise fur­
ther. When the yen depreciated in 1979, the Japanese authorities moved quickly to 
reduce some of the restrictions on capital inflows and even started to promote those 
inflows. However, liberalization measures taking effect in 1980 also facilitated cap­
ital outflows. Not surprisingly then, Japanese claims on the rest of the world began 
to increase sharply from 1981 onwards when US interest rates rose strongly. As a 
consequence, the yen remained weak vis-a-vis the dollar throughout the early 1980s 
(Frankel, 1984, page 20).
By the end of 1983, American export industries started to complain about the 
dollar’s strength and the adverse effect on their international competitiveness. This 
lead to an initiative by the US Treasury Department to pressure Japan to further 
open up its financial markets. The negotiations between the United States and Japan 
that took place in 1983-1984 were indeed successful in the sense that they lead the 
Japanese authorities to implement a series of further liberalization measures. The 
basic purpose of the US campaign was to make it easier for foreigners to acquire 
Japanese assets and thus to prevent a further appreciation of the dollar. Ironically 
however, the idea backfired: Instead of a rise in investments by foreigners in Japan, 
even more Japanese capital left the country, with the result of a further weakening 
of the yen.
In the modified Mundell-Fleming model presented in equations (2.14), the 
newly available capital from Japan, 7(1), enters as an additional factor determining 
the debt flows into the United States. This variable, as we have seen, takes on a high 
value in the 1980s, thus contributing further to the steep appreciation of the dollar 
during that period.
To sum up, then, we now have two new variables, J(t) and D(t), that can ac­
count for the bubble-like behaviour of the dollar during the mid-1980s, in addition 
to the two policy variables, G(t) and M(t), carried over from the standard model. 
There is reason to believe that capital flows and debt repayments played an impor­
tant role for the dollar’s dance, as in particular the comparison with the following
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decade shows. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the US current account recorded 
once more a massive deficit. Again, strong capital inflows helped to sustain the 
deficit and to allow for a strong appreciation of the dollar through 2001. In the 
following three years, however, the currency weakened considerably, as the United 
States were facing record levels of indebtedness.
The pattern of interaction between the US current account, capital account and 
exchange rate was thus very similar in the 1990s and early 2000s to what it had 
been in the 1980s. However, the fact that there was no comparable monetary and 
fiscal policy mix in the 1990s, such as there had been during the early 1980s, is 
remarkable. It indicates that the modified Mundell-Fleming model can explain the 
recent developments better than the old approach.
2.3.3 The real exchange rate in general equilibrium
As it had happened in the 1980s, the huge current account deficit of the United 
States that emerged in the 1990s lead to a debate about the possible macroeconomic 
consequences. As before, economists agreed that a large depreciation of the dollar 
was inevitable. However, once more the reasons differed. Here, we consider the 
analyses by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), who 
base their arguments on a popular idea with a long tradition, namely that major 
shifts in real exchange rates come about through changes in the relative prices of 
tradable and nontradable goods, rather than through nominal exchange rate changes.
It is useful here to represent the real exchange rate as the product of the nomi­
nal exchange rate, the ratio of domestic and foreign tradable goods prices,
P12 (£)» and the ratio of the ratios of nontradable and tradable prices in both coun­
tries, P i T ( t )  — P 2 T ( t ) '
gip(t) =  sipCO +  + P i T(t) - p $ T(t)
= Sl|2W +  [p f( i) -P 2 (t)] (215>
+  7 K ( t )  -  Pi ( t ) I - 7 \Pi (t) -  p%(t)]
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Here, the domestic price index is a geometric average of the price indices of traded 
and nontraded goods:
P i ( t )  =  (1 -  7  ) p j  (t )  +  7 P ? ( t ) ,  i  = 1,2. (2.16)
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000(2) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) argue that the US 
current account deficit is becoming unsustainable. Therefore, they consider it likely 
that it will suddenly revert towards balance. When the current account improves, 
consumption of traded goods has to fall. Consequently, the relative prices of non­
traded goods, P i T(t), must drop significantly; the reverse must happen abroad, that 
is, P2 T(t) needs to rise. To maintain price stability in both countries, the nomi­
nal exchange rate, Si|2 (f), would have to depreciate, and the ratio of traded goods 
prices, p ^ f  ( t ) ,  would have to rise. The latter effects would have to be rather large, 
given that the pass-through of exchange rates to import prices is very slow.
The logic seems straightforward, yet there is one problem: As the compelling, 
much-cited and yet still often ignored paper by Engel (1999) has recently demon­
strated, relative prices of nontraded goods appear to account for almost none of the 
movements of US real exchange rate, no matter which horizon one looks at (the 
study considers all horizons from one month to thirty years). This strongly suggests 
that the source of real exchange rate changes has less to do with the variability of 
relative prices of traded and nontraded goods, but with the nominal exchange rate, 
precisely as the flow approach would have it.
2.4 What is missing in models of currency crises?
2.4.1 Short-term versus long-term causes
Starting with the survey article by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), it has 
become standard to distinguish different generations of currency crisis models. The 
first generation of models explains crises as the outcome of macroeconomic policies 
that are incompatible with a currency peg. A seminal model was developed by 
Krugman (1979), who extended ideas from Salant and Henderson’s (1978) analysis 
of speculation in the gold market to the foreign exchange market, using the then
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popular model by Kouri (1976) as his macroeconomic framework. Later, Flood and 
Garber (1984) proposed simplified versions of the model. In all of the models of 
this first generation, the efforts of investors to avoid capital losses when a collapse 
occurs provoke a speculative attack when foreign exchange reserves fall below a 
critical level.
The second generation of models explain currency crises as the result of a con­
flict between different goals of policy makers—to pursue more expansionary do­
mestic policies on the one hand and to maintain exchange rate stability on the other. 
These models show that when investors realize that the government might abandon 
the currency peg, the resulting speculative pressure can by itself provoke the col­
lapse of the exchange rate. Key contributions were those of Obstfeld (1994) and 
Obstfeld (1986).
The currency crises of the 1990s, in particular the Asian crisis, provoked yet an­
other wave of currency crisis models (among many others Krugman, 1999). Third- 
generation models have focused on how, for example, state guarantees and poor 
banking systems spill over to the financial system and hence to the exchange rate 
(see Samo and Taylor, 2002, chapter 8).
What all models of currency crises have in common is that they focus on the 
immediate causes of those crises, rather than on the long-term ones. This is espe­
cially true for the first two generations of models, but also for the third generation. 
For the models of the first and second generation, the question of what moves a 
country to the edge of a crisis was really of secondary importance. This is why 
Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984), Obstfeld (1994) and Obstfeld (1986), 
among others, all take the monetary model of exchange rate determination as their 
starting-point. Domestic credit growth, arising for instance out of the need of the 
government to finance its budget deficit, bring the economy into a situation where it 
becomes vulnerable to a speculative attack. The behaviour of investors, possibly in 
interaction with the incentive structure of the government, then give the final kick.
2.4.2 The balance of payments
This thesis argues in contrast that the dynamic flow approach presented in this and 
the following chapter are crucial for a proper understanding of the longer-term
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causes of currency crises. As will be shown in more detail in section 3.4.4, one 
can look at the attacks on the British, Italian and Spanish currencies during the 
ERM crisis, at the Mexican peso during tequila crisis, at the currencies affected by 
the Asian crises, at the Brazilian real in 1998-1999 and at quite a few other national 
monies hit by speculative attacks in the past: In each of those examples, currencies 
became vulnerable because the countries concerned had run large and persistent 
current account deficits in the years prior to the crises (see also figure 3.13). At the 
same time, the countries were usually recipients of large capital inflows that helped 
to keep the exchange rate from depreciating. But as soon as the capital inflows 
dried up or reversed in sign, or that debt had to be repaid, the national currencies 
got into trouble. Eichengreen (2003, chapter 8) and Bussiere and Mulder (1999) for 
instance have recently shown that a small set of variables—including the current ac­
count as a percentage of GDP, export growth, international reserves and short-term 
foreign debt relative to reserves—do a very good job in predicting the EMS crisis 
in 1992-1993, the Mexican crisis in 1994-1995 as well as the Asian crisis in 1997.
These examples explain is why it is important to acknowledge the role of in­
ternational currency flows, and the role of the adjustment delay in particular, in the 
determination of the exchange rate. As mentioned before, many papers on currency 
crises base their analyses on monetary models, which yield exchange rate equations 
similar to the one in equation 2.8. Let us rewrite this equation here for convenience:
si|2W =  - [h i t )  -  r2(t)} -  [di(t) -  d2(t)\ +  a.[yi{t) -  y2(t)\
-  P[ii{t) -  l2{t)\ +  qi\2(t). (2.17)
Flood and Garber (1984)—who provide a very clear and instructive analysis, strip­
ping Krugman’s (1979) model of some inessentials—assume that domestic credit 
growth, di(t), is given and constant, say that d\(t) =  —fi. Further, they suppose 
that foreign variables are constant and that output and the real exchange rate do not 
change:
si\2(t) = - f ^ t )  - \ l -  /3Li(t). (2.18)
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It is immediately clear that the exchange rate can be temporarily stabilized by 
raising the domestic interest rate above the foreign level. As domestic credit ex­
pands, however, reserves must sooner or later be sold, implying that:
f  =  —d =  —ji. (2.19)
Eventually—when reserves are exhausted, or even before—the currency collapses.
All of this makes sense, and there are recent and historic examples where ex­
cessive domestic credit expansion indeed resulted in speculative pressures. Nev­
ertheless, particularly during the 1990s, it has become more and more clear that 
monetary and fiscal indicators are often not as bad before currency crises as one 
would imagine.
There is also another important problem with the theory, which follows from 
the balance of payments identity. When the outflow of reserves is predetermined, 
what is implicitly assumed is that the trade balance, the FDI balance, the portfolio 
balance etc. all adjust to the flow of reserves. This is, however, highly unrealistic 
since each of those balance of payments components normally live a life of their 
own. What the available evidence seems to indicate instead is that trade flows, 
transfers, FDI flows, portfolio flows etc. jointly determine international payment 
and reserve flows, rather than vice versa (see chapter 3).
In section 2.3.1, we modified the monetary model through the addition of in­
ternational payment flows, leading to equations 2.7 and 2.20. If we again assume 
that foreign variables are constant and that domestic output is stable, equation 2.20 
becomes:
si\2 (t) = ~h{t)  -  di(t) -  P[k{t) -  i2(t)] +  [ci(t) -  c2(t)\. (2.20)
As I will argue in the next chapter, it is often the fluctuations of different balance of 
payments components, such as trade and capital flows, that determine the behaviour 
of ri(f), ci(t) and c2(t) over time. The precise nature of the relationship depends, 
among other things, on whether the exchange is fixed or flexible, on the nature 
and volatility of capital flows and on the sensitivity of trade flows to exchange rate 
movements. Thus although it is also possible for domestic credit growth, d\ (t) to in­
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fluence the balance of payments, the reverse mechanism is, in my view, empirically 
far more relevant in many cases.
To see why all of this matters, consider the book by Agenor and Montiel (1999). 
Although the authors present excellent case studies of exchange rate crises, they 
tend to jump very quickly to the conclusion that excessive domestic credit growth is 
the major cause of the problem in the countries concerned, rather than considering 
the effect of balance of payments movements on currency outflows in those coun­
tries. By doing so, however, they are only following the habit of the literature. The 
considerations above also explain for example the often heated debates between the 
IMF and its critics over the extent to which credit expansion should be curbed in a 
crisis or whether it is the government’s fault when a currency comes under attack.
2.5 The revival of the flow perspective
While macroeconomists are in general sceptical of the idea that currency flows mat­
ter for exchange rates, the proponents of the microstructure approach to exchange 
rate determination find it only natural to think about exchange rates in this way. 
Recently, some macroeconomists start to rethink their attitude, too.
2.5.1 The microstructure approach to exchange rates
The microstructure approach is closely related to the field of microstructure finance. 
The approach considers how exchange rates are set in the foreign exchange market. 
Its focus is on the dispersed information in that market and how this information is 
aggregated in the market and impounded in exchange rates. The information that 
is relevant to market participants concerns both macroeconomic variables (such as 
money demands, risk preferences, future inflation and so on) as well as the actions 
of other participants in the market. The key variable in the approach—which also 
plays a key role in transmitting information—is currency order flow. Order flow 
is defined as the cumulative flow of signed transactions, in other words the sum 
of buyer-initiated transactions minus the sum of seller-initiated transaction. The 
literature on the microstructure approach is surveyed, for instance, by Lyons (2001) 
and Samo and Taylor (2002).
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The microstructure approach and the flow approach are different because order 
flow conveys information to market participants whereas information plays no sig­
nificant role in the flow approach (Lyons, 2001, section 7.2). Nevertheless, both 
approaches can be seen as complements to each other. The microstructure approach 
is important in that it can explain why participants in the foreign exchange market 
have limited information and how they aggregate this information into exchange 
rates. Typically, the microstructure approach focuses on intraday, daily and weekly 
horizons.
The flow approach, on the other hand, explains how balance of payments com­
ponents determine currency flows. Under fairly general conditions, currency flows 
can be considered to influence the order flow in the foreign exchange market over 
different horizons. As section 3.2 will demonstrate, international payment flows 
should be correlated with contemporaneous exchange rate changes. Similarly, em­
pirical studies in the microstructure literature have shown that foreign exchange 
order flow has a high correlation with those flows.
2.5.2 Macroeconomic studies
Encouraged by the findings of the microstructure literature, macroeconomists have 
recently started to reconsider the relationship between balance of payments flows 
and exchange rates. Hau and Rey (2003), for instance, have developed a model 
in which capital flows and exchange rates are jointly determined. The model es­
sentially consists of two components. First, there are investors from two countries 
investing in the stock markets of both countries and maximizing their profits. Both 
stock markets provide exogenous stochastic dividend flows in local currency. Sec­
ond, investors only hold their own currency and thus for example convert currencies 
when they buy shares abroad or receive dividends from abroad. Excess demand for 
a currency implies an appreciation of that currency.
The second component of the model captures main elements of the flow ap­
proach discussed in this chapter. The main findings of the paper are thus to be 
anticipated: Dividend inflows (which correspond to credit items in the current ac­
count of the balance of payments) and equity inflows (which correspond to credit 
items in the financial account of the balance of payments) lead to the appreciation
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of the domestic currency. The task of the first component of the model is to gen­
erate the flows of equities and dividends between both countries. Since investors 
are risk-averse, the exchange rate risk feeds back on their decisions, which gives 
the model an interesting twist. In general though, the model’s predictions are pretty 
much in line with the flow market model.
Nevertheless, a major shortcoming of the model is that it does not consider 
trade flows. In the short and medium run, exchange rates are certainly strongly 
influenced by capital flows, which are much larger and more volatile than trade 
flows. As this chapter has demonstrated, however, as soon as one looks at longer 
horizons, exchange rates are tied to current account movements, rather than capital 
account fluctuations. As a consequence of the failure to incorporate trade flows, 
Hau and Rey’s (2003) model does not feature the adjustment delay, which was of 
considerable empirical importance in all the countries we looked at in this chapter. 
The adjustment delay occurs when current account deficits are financed by portfolio 
flows, particularly debt flows, which are later withdrawn.
Appendix 2.A Solving the Mundell-Fleming model
2.A.1 Two-country Mundell-Fleming model
In the two-country Mundell-Fleming model presented in equations (2.13), the en­
dogenous variables take the following values in equilibrium:
* = 2(JW Gl + G2)
+    m 2
+ i ’ii'i) 207(</>8 +
z\ = — G2) + i —
-  G -  M ») <202 20207
Pl = 2 ( & t W Gl +  G2) “  2W8 +  W Ml +  M2)-
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2.A.2 Mundell-Fleming model with foreign exchange market
In the modified Mundell-Fleming model in equations (2.14), the equilibrium solu­
tion is as follows:
W+\ _  08 +  080206 , 010206 +  030602 +  01 f  ^
W “ ------|A| G(t) + ------------ |A|------------  W
, 08020604 08020605
+  |A| { )  |A| { ) ’
2{t) = _ M 0 t G(t) + ^ m
, 0206(0804 +  040107) 0206(050107 +  0805) 7/jA
+  |A | [ )  |A | 1
d(t) = ( l + ^ * W 7 G(t) _ ( l + g S ^ j i f (f)
_  (1 +  0206)(0804 +  040107) n /,x 
|A| U
( (1 +  0206)(050107 +  0805) 7/iA 
|A|
cW =  - ^ G W + A M (i)
, 0804 +  040107 050107 +  0805 rAA
+ |A| |A|
9(t) =  * j ^ G ( i )  -  ^ M ( t )
06(0804 +  040107) 7^ ^  , 06(050107 +  0805) 7/^
[A] 1 j |Aj 1
PW =  W
, 02070604 02070605 7/+^
|A | 1 j |A | 1
A =  —(03060207 +  08 +  080206 +  0107 +  01070206)-
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Nominal Nominal Nominal Trade
exchange exchange exchange balance
rate driven rate driven rate driven driven by
by current by capital by FX real
account flows order flow exchange
rate
Macro (undergraduate)
- Abel / Bemanke (2003)
- Blanchard (2003)
- Burda / Wyplosz (2001)
- Mankiw (2002)
Macro (graduate)
- Adda / Cooper (2003)
- Blanchard / Fischer (1989)
- Heijdra / van der Ploeg (2002)
- Ljungqvist / Sargent (2004) 
-Obstfeld/Rogoff (1996)
- Romer (1996)
- Sargent (1987a)
- Sargent (1987/?)
- Tumovsky (2000) 
Development macro
- Agdnor / Montiel (1999) 
International economics
- Appleyard / Field (2001)
- Copeland (2004)
- Hailwood / MacDonald (2000)
- Kenen (2000)
- Krugman / Obstfeld (2003) 
Exchange rates
- Cheung et al. (n.d.)
- Frankel /  Rose (1995)
- MacDonald (1999a)
- MacDonald (1999ft)
- Meese / Rogoff (1983a)
- Samo / Taylor (2002)
- Taylor (1995)
FX microstructure
- Lyons (2001)
Table 2.1: Exchange rate determinants in economics textbooks. The table lists 
several assumptions on exchange rate determinants and shows in which economics 
textbooks and survey articles on exchange rates they are discussed.
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Flow Flexible- Open- Sticky- Real
market price economy price exchange
model of monetary IS-LM monetary rate
exchange model model model driven by
rate (Mundell- (ex­ prices of
determi­ Fleming change tradables
nation model) rate over­ vs. non­
shooting) tradables
Macro (undergraduate)
- Abel / Bemanke (2003) • •
- Blanchard (2003) •
- Burda / Wyplosz (2001) • • •
- Mankiw (2002) •
Macro (graduate)
- Adda / Cooper (2003)
- Blanchard / Fischer (1989) • •
- Heijdra / van der Ploeg (2002) • •
- Ljungqvist / Sargent (2004)
-Obstfeld /Rogoff (1996) • • • •
- Romer (1996) • •
- Sargent (1987a)
- Sargent (1987b)
- Tumovsky (2000) •
Development macro
- Agdnor / Montiel (1999) • •
International economics
- Appleyard / Field (2001) • • • •
- Copeland (2004) • • • •
- Hailwood / MacDonald (2000) • • •
- Kenen (2000) • • •
- Krugman / Obstfeld (2003) • • • •
Exchange rates
- Cheung et al. (n.d.) • • •
- Frankel / Rose (1995) • •
- MacDonald (1999a) • • •
- MacDonald (19996) • • •
- Meese / Rogoff (1983a) • • •
- Samo / Taylor (2002) • • •
- Taylor (1995) • •
FX microstructure
- Lyons(2001) • • • • •
Table 2.2: Exchange rate models in economics textbooks. The table lists several 
models of exchange rate determination and shows in which economics textbooks 
and survey articles on exchange rates they are discussed.
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Period Change Period Change
1971Q2-1973Q2 +24% 1985Q3-1988Q4 +61%
1973Q2-1975Q1 -13% 1988Q4-1990Q2 -20%
1975Q1-1976Q4 +6% 1990Q2-1992Q3 +18%
1976Q4—1978Q3 +45% 1992Q3-1995Q2 +52%
1978Q3-1980Q1 -24% 1995Q2-1998Q3 -35%
1980Q1-1981Q1 +25% 1998Q3-2000Q3 +40%
1981Q1-1985Q3 +5%
Table 2.3: Large exchange rate movements in Japan. Movements of Japan’s
nominal effective exchange rate. Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
Equilibrium effect US: early 1980s US: mid-1980s
G M G T M j G I M T
Y + + T i I T
z — + 1 i T T
Q + — T T 1 1
P + — T T 1 1
Table 2.4: Mundell-Fleming model. Effects of changes in exogenous variables on 
the equilibrium outcome in a simple, two-economy version of the Mundell-Fleming 
model.
Equilibrium effect US: early 1980s US: mid-1980s
G M D J G T M j  D  1 J  T G 1 M t D T J 1
Y + + + 1 4’ 4" 4> 4* 1 1 i
z — + + Ar *4 4' 4< 1 1 1 1
d + — — + T T T T 1 1 1 1
c — + + 4- 4^ 4' 4" 1 1 1 1
Q + — — + T T T T l i l l
P + — + 1 1 4* 4" 4' 4- 1 1
Table 2.5: Mundell-Fleming model with foreign exchange market. Effects of 
changes in exogenous variables on the equilibrium outcome in the Mundell-Fleming 
model. The model is modified in that it features a foreign exchange market, in which 
the exchange rate is set in response to currency demands. Accumulating foreign 
debt becomes an important source of exchange rate pressure.
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Chapter 3
Balance of payments accounting and 
exchange rate dynamics
In this chapter, I analyze in detail the implications of the balance of payments 
accounting identity for the dynamics of international payment flows and exchange 
rates. To my knowledge, no other study has ever looked at the effects of trade and 
capital flows on currency movements in a comparable fashion. As the previous 
chapter showed, mainstream exchange rate models ignore the role of trade and cap­
ital flows for exchange rate determination altogether. But even the traditional flow 
market model of the exchange rate has significant shortcomings as it lacks a dy­
namic perspective and fails to recognize the dynamic interrelatedness—due to the 
balance of payments accounting identity—of the movements of the current account, 
the capital account and international payments.
3.1 Introduction
The chapter aims to demonstrate how balance of payments imbalances influence 
the demands for different currencies in the foreign exchange market over time. To 
this end, a dynamical system approach is developed, which allows to assess how
The paper on which this chapter is based has been presented at the International Financial Sta­
bility Programme at the CEP (LSE).
79
Balance of payments accounting and exchange rate dynamics
international payments evolve for different sets of assumptions regarding the joint 
dynamic behaviour of various balance of payments components. This chapter fo­
cuses in particular on the adjustment delay, a phenomenon that, as the previous 
chapter has demonstrated, is of considerable empirical importance.
Specifically, the following scenarios are analyzed in this chapter: First, the sit­
uation is studied where current account transactions, such as exports and imports, 
are paid for directly, assuming away other capital account transactions such as trade 
credits or debt and equity flows. These assumptions serve as a benchmark to illus­
trate the limited amount of capital mobility between major industrialized economies 
before the removal of capital controls in the 1970s and 1980s. In this and all follow­
ing setups, or scenarios, I assume that the real exchange rate depends on the excess 
holdings of different currencies in the foreign exchange markets. In addition, I as­
sume that the Marshall-Lemer condition holds and that the current account adjusts 
over time to changes in the real exchange rate. Under these very basic and realis­
tic assumptions, I demonstrate how initial current account imbalances can lead to 
long-lasting swings in both the current account and the real exchange rate.
In a second setup, I analyze the situation where current account transactions are 
in part financed by debt. This carries the implication that payment flows are delayed, 
with the result that the impact of current account movements on the exchange rate is 
spread out over a longer horizon. Whereas the current account and the exchange rate 
still move in a cyclical fashion, the lag between both variables becomes longer. It 
is shown that this setup represents very well the experience of the Japanese balance 
of payments and exchange rate over the past three and a half decades, as well as for 
instance Germany’s performance during its volatile export boom of the 1980s.
A third constellation studied in the chapter examines the effect of temporary, 
autonomous capital inflows into a country. I show that under sensible assumptions, 
such inflows provoke a temporary appreciation of the currency even when the cur­
rent account is strongly deteriorating. The model replicates the experience of the 
United States during the 1980s when the US dollar appreciated massively despite 
the fact that the US external deficit was reaching record levels (similar to the devel­
opments there in the late 1990s and early 2000s).
In a further variation of the model, the chapter considers the case of a coun­
try with a fixed exchange rate. It analyzes how payment flows into and out of the
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country evolve in response to trade and capital flows, and how the stock of for­
eign exchange reserves of the country is affected. It is then shown in a simulation 
how temporary inflows of foreign capital can lead to a deterioration of the current 
account balance and a build-up of foreign claims, which eventually leads to the 
depletion of reserves and a breakdown of the currency. This dynamic pattern can 
be generated under rather simple assumptions within the dynamical system frame­
work described above. It corresponds well with anecdotal evidence from countries 
hit by currency crises. This is illustrated by a case study of the Korean economic 
performance before and during the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.
Finally, the same framework is used to demonstrate how a crawling peg can help 
to avoid a currency crisis and to maintain relative exchange rate stability. Particu­
larly in countries suffering from high inflation, introducing an exchange rate anchor 
can be a promising strategy to reduce inflation. However, adopting a hard peg also 
carries its risks, in particular if it takes time for inflation to fall. The chapter shows 
why it has made sense for countries such as Israel, Poland and Turkey to opt for 
crawling pegs or bands in the past (possibly as an intermediate step before moving 
on to a full float of the currency).
Plan of the chapter. The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 explores 
how currency supplies in the foreign exchange market evolve over time and how the 
excess demands and supplies in that market affect the exchange rate. Section 3.3 
makes further assumptions regarding the impact of the exchange rate on the current 
account and the way in which trade and capital flows react to movements of each 
other. Based on the theoretical framework, section 3.4 shows how current account 
and exchange rate movements evolve jointly over time. This section then analyzes 
how debt flows and other capital flows affect the dynamic pattern of the current 
account and the exchange rate. It also takes a closer look at currency crises and the 
capacity of crawling pegs to prevent such crises. Section 3.5 discusses the wider 
implications of the model for some central issues in international economics.
Notation. In the course of this chapter, we will need to refer to a number of vari­
ables, as we will be concerned not only with balance of payments flows, but also 
with the time derivatives of those flows and with accumulated stocks of foreign as­
sets. We will also need to refer to variables that can be denominated in different
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currencies. So as to make it easier for the reader to get familiar with the notation 
in this chapter, table 3.1 on page 126 provides an overview of the relevant variables 
and subscripts.
In our analysis, we employ five variables to represent different types of balance 
of payments flows: a current account variable, z(t), which matches the usual cur­
rent account definition; a variable capturing autonomous capital flows, k(t), which 
will be defined in more detail later on; a debt flow variable, d(t); a variable repre­
senting international cash flow, c(t); and finally, a variable corresponding to flows 
of international reserves, r(t). Table 3.2 on page 127 indicates how each of these 
variables relate to the published balance of payments statistics.
3.2 Exchange rate determination
How are exchange rates determined? The hypothesis that we shall adopt here is 
possibly the most simple and intuitive: The exchange rate is driven by the demands 
and supplies of currencies in the foreign exchange market, which depend on the 
need of foreign and domestic agents to obtain each others’ currencies. Currency 
demands, in turn, are influenced by the different types of transactions that economic 
agents undertake.
3.2.1 The balance of payments and international cash flow
A natural way to start is by looking at examples that show how balance of payments 
transactions influence international currency flows.
Example: Exports and imports
Consider the case in which country 1 (Home) exports goods to country 2 (Foreign) 
that are paid for immediately. In the accounting framework of table 3.3 on page 128, 
this transaction is labelled T1. The value of those exports equals their volume times 
their price, denoted Pi2 \iZi2 - Country 1 therefore receives a cash payment of a 
corresponding amount from country 2, denoted C2 \\\. In the balance of payments
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of country 2, the same transaction T1 is recorded as an import of value S2\iP2 i\2 ^2 i 
and the associated payment is denoted as S211C1212. Note that we decide to record 
the balance of payments transactions of each country in its own respective currency.
Table 3.3 also records a second transaction, T2, which corresponds to imports 
by country 1 from country 2. Of course, the entries in the balance of payments of 
both countries are quite analogous.
The interesting part of table 3.3 is the third one, which records the flows of 
assets and liabilities in the foreign exchange market. The foreign exchange market 
is the place where currencies are exchanged at their respective exchange rate. It can 
be located in country 1 or country 2 or elsewhere.
When the foreign exchange market supplies currency of a given country to eco­
nomic agents, this is recorded as a credit item in the accounts of table 3.3. Similarly, 
when the foreign exchange market receives payments, this is recorded as a debit 
item. Considering therefore our two examples, the export transaction (Tl) leads to 
an decrease in the net holdings of currency 1 and to an increase in the net holdings 
of currency 2 in the foreign exchange market. The import transaction (T2), on the 
other hand, has just the opposite effects.
Now we make an important assumption:
Assumption 1 (Home bias in money holdings). Economic agents hold only the 
currency o f their own country. They convert foreign currency into domestic currency 
immediately.
A very similar assumption is made for instance by Hau and Rey (2003) in their 
study of exchange rate effects of capital flows. It is not entirely realistic, though, 
given that for instance the US dollar is widely held abroad. In recent decades, there 
has also been an increase in the international demand for other major currencies, 
including the yen (Das, 1993). Nevertheless, assumption 1 can be justified by the 
fact that, by and large, the home bias for currency holdings remains very significant 
for most currencies.
Assumption 1 implies that the export transaction Tl will lead to an increase in 
the demand for currency 1 and in the supply of currency 2 in the foreign exchange 
market. Conversely, the import transaction T2 will lead to an increase in the supply
83
Balance of payments accounting and exchange rate dynamics
of currency 1 and in the demand for currency 2. Note that each transaction has two 
separate effects since it affects the demand conditions of each of the two currencies.
In the above, we have made one implicit assumption:
Assumption 2 (Currency denomination of balance of payments transactions).
Balance of payments transactions are denominated in the currency of the country 
receiving the associated payment. Exports for example are invoiced in the currency 
of the exporter. Foreign debt is denominated in the currency o f the borrower.
This assumption is made for convenience to avoid having to consider different 
currency denominations. However, it should not be overlooked that in the following 
analysis currency denomination generally matters.
Example: Foreign borrowing and lending
Capital flows generate international payment flows, too. As an example, table 3.4 
on page 128 displays the transactions associated with international debt flows. With 
transaction T3, country 1 borrows money from country 2, and this leads to an in­
crease in the demand for currency 1 and in the supply of currency 2 in the foreign 
exchange market. Transaction T4, on the other hand, implies that country 1 lends 
money to country 2, which increases the supply of currency 1 as well as the demand 
for currency 2.
3.2.2 The foreign exchange market
Now that we have seen how the demands and supplies for currencies in the foreign 
exchange market are affected by countries’ commercial and financial dealings, we 
can turn to the question of how the foreign exchange market sets the exchange 
rate. Since the market carries out all currency conversions resulting from countries’ 
balance of payments transactions, its currency holdings generally do not balance to 
zero; in other words, the market does not clear. We shall assume that the price, or 
value, of a currency falls with the foreign exchange market’s net holdings of that 
currency and vice versa. The exchange rate between two currencies is given by the 
ratio of the two currencies’ prices.
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More specifically, suppose that the value of country l ’s currency, Vi(t), is given 
by the inverse of the country’s price level—that is, its domestic value in the absence 
of exchange market pressure—times an index measuring the excess demand for 
currency 1 in the foreign exchange market:
The demand index is modelled as an exponential function of the exchange market’s 
cumulative holdings of country l ’s currency, after normalization of the latter by 
country 1 ’s price level. A proportional increase in the demand for currency 1 has 
thus the same effect as a decrease in the supply of the same proportion. The normal­
ization by the price level ensures the comparability of the index across currencies.
Currency 2’s value, V2 (t), is determined analogously:
(3.1a)
where
(3.1b)
where
The nominal exchange rate between both countries, Si 12(f), is then given by the 
ratio of V\ (t) and V ^):
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The real exchange rate is therefore given by:
«'»<•>
Ci(t)
C2(t)
=  exp J  ((PiW )-1 +  (-P2(«))_15i|2(r)) c2i|i(r)dr^
X 6XP ( _ I  /  ((■PlW )~1,S2l1(r ) +  (A W )-1) Ci2|2(i-)<ir  ^ .
(3.3)
To see how the real exchange rate, Qi|2(£)> changes over time, we take the time 
derivative:
2 Q l|2 ft)
£ X Q l|2(«)
=  [(A W )-1 +  (A W )- i SipW] C2H1W (3 4)
-  [(A W )-1SiiiW +  (A W )"1] cupW
A W  r  M  I A W  r  M 
2 (PiW )2 1 2(Pb(t))2 12
International cash flow—here given by c2\\\(t) and Ci2|2 (^)—is thus a central deter­
minant of the exchange rate. The price levels of both countries matter for the ex­
change rate, too, since they directly influence the value of each respective currency. 
Finally, note that equation (3.4) implies that exchange rate fluctuations reinforce 
themselves: When the exchange rate appreciates, foreign demand for the domestic 
currency rises whereas domestic demand for the foreign currency falls, pushing the 
home currency up even further. This could for instance help to explain the fact that 
currencies tend to fall precipitously following the breakdown of exchange rate pegs.
For later purposes, it will be useful to work with a simplified version of equa­
tion (3.4). Since our main interest is to analyze the effects of currency flows on
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exchange rates, we assume that P\(t) =  P2 M =  1- Equation (3.4) thus simplifies 
to:
Consequently, assuming that S^2(t) = S2^ (t) = 1 and c\(t) = c*12\2(t) — c21^ (t) =  
0, the change of the real exchange rate depends simply on international cash flow:
<7l|2(f) «  (Cl2|2(f) -  C2l|l(f))
=  -eci(f).
Expectations
The foreign exchange market tends to be highly speculative. Market participants 
make strong efforts to forecast future economic developments, but this does not 
mean that they are by and large successful. Here, we are making the following 
assumption:
Assumption 3 (No knowledge of the future). Economic agents are ignorant of the 
future.
Assumption 3 is but a good description of reality. Cheung and Wong (2000) 
have recently carried out a survey of foreign exchange traders’ views on exchange 
rate dynamics. According to the survey, four out of five practitioners in the inter­
bank foreign exchange markets in Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo considered 
economic fundamentals to be a significant determining factor of exchange rates in 
the long run (over an horizon of more than six months). Nevertheless, only between
-  X qi\2(t) — [ l  +  S l |2 ( t ) ]  C21|l(£) — [ l  +  *] Ci2|2(£)- (3.5)
Equation 3.5 can be linearized around 5Jj2(t), c\212 and c21^v  to yield:
«  [1 + SJ|2(£)] (P2i|i(t) -  4i\i(t))
~  t1 +  (STpW)-1] (C12|2 W -  c*12l2{t))
+  [C21|lW  — C12|2(^)( ^112W ) 2] —  jS'i|2(£)) •
(3.6)
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22% (Tokyo) and 27% (Singapore) of the respondents believed that exchange rates 
were at all predictable over that horizon.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that well-known papers in the macroeconomic 
literature are based on hypotheses that are very similar to assumption 3. For exam­
ple, in the seminal currency crisis models by Krugman (1979) and Hood and Garber 
(1984), the future path of the economy is certain. The rate of domestic credit growth 
is given and speculators with perfect foresight can foresee with precision the mo­
ment in which the country will run out of reserves and in which the currency will 
collapse. Selling the currency and waiting for the collapse is a one-way bet, even if 
the shadow exchange rate moves above the fixed rate in the meantime, since it must 
eventually fall below the peg. However, Krugman and Hood and Garber rule out 
the possibility of an anticipated attack. What they are (implicitly) assuming is that 
speculators can only foresee the very next instant.
3.3 Balance of payments dynamics
We have so far specified how balance of payments transactions determine inter­
national cash flow and how international cash flow drives the exchange rate. To 
complete our model, we need to describe how the various balance of payments 
components evolve over time and, in particular, how they are affected by exchange 
rate movements.
3.3.1 Current account
Regarding the movements of the current account, we make a fundamental assump­
tion:
Assumption 4 (Gradual current account adjustments). Current account adjust­
ments occur gradually over time.
To many, this assumption would immediately seem plausible. Therefore, I leave 
it with an elegant quote from Keynes’s (1929) article on the Transfer Problem:
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My own view is that at a given time the economic structure of a country, 
in relation to the economic structures of its neighbours, permits of a 
certain "natural" level of exports, and that arbitrarily to effect a material 
alteration of this level by deliberate devices is extremely difficult. [...]
In the case of German Reparations, on the other hand, we are trying to 
fix the volume of foreign remittance and compel the balance of trade 
to adjust itself thereto. Those who see no difficulty in this [...] are 
applying the theory of liquids to what is, if not a solid, at least a sticky 
mass with strong internal resistances.
Real exchange rate
We shall assume that the real exchange rate is the major driving force behind the 
trade balance and therefore behind the current account. An appreciated real ex­
change rate leads to a deterioration of a country’s international competitiveness and 
thus puts a downward pressure on the trade balance; a weak real exchange rate, on 
the other hand, strengthens the trade balance:
z(t) =  -4>iz(t) -  faq1]2(t)
(3.oa)
=  -<t> 1 (z(t) -  z( t ) ) ,
where
=  -^ 9 l |2 (0 -
The variable z(t) is the equilibrium value of the current account, which depends on 
the real exchange rate, qi\2 (t).
The parameter (j>i determines the speed with which the current account reverts 
to equilibrium, whereas the parameter ratio measures the exchange rate sen­
sitivity of the current account. As we will see in chapter 6, exchange rate fluctu­
ations can influence the current account’s trend significantly. By comparison, the 
economic forces that push the current account towards equilibrium appear to be 
relatively small in general. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, page 67) mention the exam­
ples of Australia and Canada, two countries that have run persistent current account
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deficits over the last one and a half centuries for which data exist (see figure 3.13). 
Between 1950 and 1994 for instance, Australia’s current account was in deficit in all 
but four years, while Canada’s was in deficit in all but five. This example illustrates 
why we shall choose the parameter fa to be rather small in our later simulations.
Foreign investment
International capital flows are another important driving force behind the current 
account. Worldwide, there are many examples of countries that experienced large 
international capital inflows in the past—say, after successful stabilization measures 
or as a result of promising investment opportunities—and who subsequently ob­
served substantial declines in their current account balances (Grenville, 1998; Mon- 
tiel and Reinhart, 2001; Eichengreen, 1990). In many cases, capital inflows resulted 
in domestic consumption and investment booms, widening the gap between national 
savings and investment.
McKinnon and Pill (1997) provide some such examples:
The policy reforms favouring free trade, privatization, deregulation of 
domestic industry, and fiscal consolidation pursued by Chile in the mid- 
1970s led to massive capital inflows through 1981, followed by a fi­
nancial crash and economic downturn during 1982-1983. In Mexico 
after 1988, similarly comprehensive real-side reforms attracted large 
capital inflows, which suddenly reversed during the December 1994 fi­
nancial panic and steep 1995 downturn. Argentina currently faces the 
depressed aftermath of a reform program during which it borrowed too 
much and subsequently had to retrench.
This pattern is not confined to developing countries. After a dismal pe­
riod of high inflation and public intervention in Britain in the 1970s, 
the Thatcher government undertook apparently successful industrial 
restructuring and fiscal consolidation in the early 1980s. Enthusiasm 
for Britain’s changed economic prospects attracted capital inflows, in­
creased consumption, and triggered a boom in residential and commer­
cial real estate in the late 1980s that culminated in the bust of the early 
1990s.
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And finally comes the exception, which turns out not to be one (the article by McK­
innon and Pill (1997) was published in May 1997, just before the outbreak of the 
Asian crisis):
Nevertheless, not all liberalizing countries attracting large capital in­
flows need experience this boom-and-bust cycle. Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand have all had current-account deficits of 5-8 percent of 
GNP (similar to Mexico before the fall) for almost a decade, without a 
Mexico- or Chile-type debacle. These East Asian economies achieved 
virtual steady-state growth with high saving and very high investment, 
although doubts about its quality could yet provoke a cutback in lend­
ing.
In all the examples mentioned, the recipients of capital inflows—that is, Chile, 
Mexico, Britain, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand—were all experiencing large and 
increasing current account deficits.
Such boom-and-bust cycles, in which the current account gradually worsens in 
response to a surge in capital inflows, can be readily derived from standard open 
economy models (Calvo et al., 1996). In an intertemporal model of consumption 
and saving in an open economy with capital mobility, a fall in the world interest rate 
will induce substitution and (in the case of a debtor country) income effects, which 
will result in a consumption boom and a widening current account deficit. These 
effects could become even stronger if the country was initially credit rationed, or if 
it owed debt with a variable interest rate. In a model with endogenous investment, 
the interest rate shock could also translate to a rise in investment, widening the 
current account further.
We shall refer to such foreign investment flows as autonomous capital flows, de­
noted as k(t), to distinguish them from other capital flows, discussed below, whose 
purpose it is just to finance existing current account imbalances. To incorporate au­
tonomous capital flows into our dynamic framework, we can rewrite the differential 
equation describing the behaviour of the current account:
z(t) = -</>iz(t) -  </>2<7i|2(£) -  faKt)- (3-8b)
91
Balance of payments accounting and exchange rate dynamics
For models in which autonomous capital flows play a role, we will use equa­
tion (3.8b) rather than equation (3.8a).
3.3.2 Capital account
Whereas the current account is set to evolve gradually, we assume that the ad­
justment on the financial side of the balance of payments has two components, 
respectively labelled "accommodating" and "autonomous". Under normal circum­
stances, current account imbalances are financed by "accommodating" capital flows. 
However, there may be times when a country attracts more or capital flows than 
strictly needed, as in the examples above of countries that experienced overborrow­
ing episodes in the past. In this case, we shall talk of "autonomous" capital flows.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 5 (Accommodating capital flows). Accommodating financial flows 
that are needed to finance current account imbalances occur instantaneously.
This assumption really just follows from the definition of accommodating and 
autonomous capital flows above. Nevertheless, this is a good opportunity to quote 
Keynes (1929) once more, who said:
Historically, the volume of foreign investment has tended, I think, to 
adjust itself—at least to a certain extent—to the balance of trade, rather 
than the other way round, the former being the sensitive and the latter 
the insensitive factor.
However, this leaves us with the question: How does a country finance a deficit 
in its balance on current account; or conversely, how does it invest a balance of pay­
ments surplus? What we shall assume here is that current account imbalances are 
financed mainly through international debt and lending and to some extent through 
direct monetary payments.
There is considerable empirical evidence indicating that countries’ international 
portfolios are in large part made up by fixed-income investments. For instance, 
Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000) have recently shown that gross foreign
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asset positions in a worldwide cross section of countries consist mostly of foreign 
loans rather than foreign equity. This implies that deficit countries cover their for­
eign investment needs primarily by means of borrowing from abroad; surplus coun­
tries, on the other hand, choose lending over other forms of foreign investment. 
Probably the best example for the latter is Japan, the world’s largest creditor nation, 
as we already saw in section 2.2.1: Starting with the opening of its capital account 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the country has over a long time been investing 
a relatively stable fraction of its surpluses in debt securities abroad, mainly in the 
United States. The strong correlation between Japan’s current account and its debt 
securities balance, which we observed in figure 2 .6 , implies that the fluctuations of 
other components of the Japanese capital account effectively cancelled each other 
out over many years.
The debt balance in the balance of payments, which we denote as d(t), is thus 
determined as follows:
d(t) =  — (1 — oi)(z(t) +  k(t)) — 7 f  e_7^_T^ d(r)dr. (3.9)
Jo
This equation says that international lending always covers a fraction (1 — a) of 
a country’s external financing requirement, which is defined here as the current 
account net of autonomous capital flows. The debt balance also includes all repay­
ments of previously incurred debt in the current period, which are captured by the 
integral in equation (3.9).
Note that the maturity structure of foreign debt is assumed constant over time; 
it is given by an exponential function, which turns out to be analytically conve­
nient since it allows us to easily calculate the Laplace transform of the integral in 
equation (3.9) . 1
!Let f ( t )  =  exp(—7 (f)) and let h(t) denote the integral in equation (3.9). Notice that h(t) is 
the convolution of f ( t ) and d(t), denoted ( /  * d)(t). Then by the convolution theorem (Kreyszig, 
1999; Stroud and Booth, 2003), the Laplace transform H( s ) =  L{h(t ) }  of the convolution h(t) 
is the product of the Laplace transforms F(s)  =  L { f ( t ) }  and D( s ) =  L{d( t ) }  of f ( t ) and d(t) 
respectively. In our case therefore, H( s ) reduces to the simple expression 7 D(s) / ( s  +  7 ), which 
facilitates our further analysis considerably.
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3.3.3 Cash flow
Note that the balance of payments identity in our model can be stated as:
z(t) +  k(t) +  d(t) +  c(t) +  r(t) =  0 , (3.10)
where r(t) denotes the official sales of foreign reserves. Absent official intervention 
in the foreign exchange market, international payment flows, c(t), are driven by the 
sum of a country’s current account and its financial balance:
However, when a country wants to stabilize its exchange rate, it needs to offset any 
cross-border payment flows since these would, according to equation (3.7), affect 
the exchange rate. The net quantity of foreign reserves that the authorities need to 
sell in this case is therefore:
Again, assumption 3 is quite important here. Since people are ignorant regard­
ing the future, they cannot foresee the effect of their international payments on the 
exchange rate and all its possible macroeconomic consequences. Instead, they sim­
ply make their payments for individual balance of payments transactions when they 
are due. For example, when people buy cars abroad or invest in foreign bonds, 
they normally just pay the money and worry little about the timing of the required 
currency conversion. Firms and banks, who have better macroeconomic oversight, 
might be more rational when carrying out currency transactions. However, even 
their behaviour is likely far from forward-looking or optimal. According to the sur­
vey by Cheung and Wong (2000) that has already been mentioned, even foreign 
exchange traders, who tend to believe that exchange rates are driven by economic 
fundamentals over the longer term, consider exchange rates to be by and large un­
predictable. Therefore, even if economic agents tried to optimize their international 
cash flow by making forward-looking decisions, they would probably miss their 
own objective most of the time.
c(t) =  — z(t) — k(t) — d(t). (3.11)
r(t) =  — z(t) — k(t) — d(t). (3.12)
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3.4 Explaining patterns of exchange rate behaviour
In this section, we will study the interaction of balance of payments and exchange 
rate movements under different economic conditions. We will analyze different 
economic models, which all share the common assumptions that were laid out in 
the previous two sections.
The models that we study consist of systems of differential equations, which are 
solved using Laplace transforms. As a consequence, we are able to derive solutions 
in analytic form for all our models. However, even rather simple-looking dynamical 
systems turn out to have solutions that look quite overwhelming; those solutions are 
typically of little use for understanding the dynamic evolution of the system. Instead 
of writing down the explicit solutions, we shall prefer to plot the variables of the 
solved systems over time, based on an appropriate choice of parameters and initial 
conditions. Unless stated otherwise, we assume s(0) =  0 and 2 (0 ) =  0 as our initial 
conditions. For all of our models, we adopt the following parameter specification:
The choice of parameters is certainly ad-hoc and somewhat subjective. However, 
the values were chosen so as to produce plausible economic interactions and there 
is reason to believe that the conclusions to which they lead are quite representative.
3.4.1 International cash flow
Let us start with a setup in which current account transactions, such as exports and 
imports, are paid for straight away in cash, that is, by direct monetary payments. 
Any other capital account transactions, including trade credits or purchases of for­
eign debt or equity securities, are excluded from the model; they either do not take 
place or net out to zero.
£ =  0.1,
0 3  =  0.1,
0i =  0.03, 
a  =  0 . 1,
02 =  0.06, 
7 =  0.05.
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Model
As discussed above, the cash flow variable, c(t), drives the nominal exchange rate, 
s(t), and thus the real exchange rate, q(t) (since it is assumed that price levels at 
home and abroad are constant and normalized to one):
Q1\2 (t) = -£c(t). (3.13a)
The movements of the current account and the exchange rate simply mirror each 
other in this model:
z(t) = -<j>!z(t) -  ^29l|2(t),
(3.13b)
c{t) = -z( t ) .
In this particular setup, a different initial condition is chosen for the current account 
variable, namely z(0) =  1. This is necessary in order to set the system in motion.
Simulation
Figure 3.1 shows that this model produces long, cyclical current account move­
ments, whose amplitude declines over time.2 The graph reminds of the long swings 
in the balance of payments and exchange rate data from Japan and Germany, which 
we saw in earlier chapters.
In this model, the cyclical fluctuations come about since current account im­
balances immediately produce offsetting payment flows, which push the exchange 
rate either up or down, depending on whether the current account is in surplus or in 
deficit. Any current account imbalance thus carries with it the seed of its own re­
versal. The interaction between the current account and the exchange rate is plotted 
in figure 3.2, and one can easily spot the lagged adjustment of the exchange rate, 
which is similarly encountered in the real-world examples of the earlier chapters.
2Note that in this and all the following models, a unit of time, t, corresponds to a period of, say, 
a week and a month.
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Figure 3.1: A basic model of cash flow: balance of payments dynamics. Simulation of 
the joint dynamic behaviour of the current account and cash balances in a model in which 
exports and imports are paid for in cash, for chosen parameters and initial values.
Foreign exchange intervention
In the real world, it is unlikely that official authorities would simply stand by and 
watch when the current account and exchange rate start to fluctuate strongly. To 
counteract a current account imbalance is not an easy matter. However, as far as 
exchange rate movements are concerned, the most obvious remedy is to intervene 
in the foreign exchange market.
When we look again at our example of Japan, we see that this is indeed what 
has been going on there over the past three decades. Figure 3.3 on page 99 plots 
the purchases of official reserves against the real effective exchange rate as well as 
against the percentage changes of the exchange rate. In the upper panel, official 
intervention appears to be rather uncorrelated with the level of the exchange rate. 
However, in the lower panel, we can observe a considerable correlation between 
the official acquisition of reserves and the contemporaneous appreciation of the 
Japanese exchange rate. According to the model above, any appreciation of the
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Figure 3.2: A basic model of cash flow: current account and exchange rate. Simula­
tion of the interaction between current account and exchange rate movements in a model in 
which exports and imports are paid for in cash, for chosen parameters and initial values.
yen must stem from Japan’s incoming payments, and this suggests that in the past 
Japan’s authorities have continually been trying to offset some of those payment 
flows by purchasing foreign reserves from abroad.
It is rather straightforward to adapt the above model in order to include official 
intervention. Suppose the authorities followed a rule whereby they always buy for­
eign exchange reserves so as to offset a constant fraction of the cash flow that would 
occur in the absence of intervention. The cash flow variable in the model would then 
become accordingly lower. However, the swings in the balance of payments and in 
the exchange rate would continue to occur, only that exchange rate changes would 
come about more slowly and that the cycle period would become longer.
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Figure 3.3: Japan’s foreign exchange intervention. Cross plots of Japanese official
reserve intervention (in billions of US dollar) and, respectively, Japan’s real effective ex­
change rate (based on the WPI, upper panel) and its real effective exchange rate appreciation 
(based on the WPI, in percentage terms, lower panel).
3.4.2 Debt flows
Let us now turn to the question of what happens when part of the current account 
transactions are financed by debt. This has the effect that payment flows are delayed 
with the result that the impact of current account movements on the exchange rate 
is spread out over a longer horizon. Whereas the current account and the exchange 
rate still move in a cyclical fashion, the lag between both variables becomes longer.
Model
The real exchange rate is determined as in the previous model:
Qi\2 (t) =  -£ c (t) . (3.14a)
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However, after introducing the debt balance, d(t), we now have three interrelated 
balance of payments components:
As in the previous setup, we assume that the current account is different from zero 
initially; specifically, we assume that ^(0 ) =  1 .
Simulation
Figure 3.4: The role of debt: balance of payments dynamics. Simulation of the joint
dynamic behaviour of the current account, debt and cash balances in a model in which 
current account imbalances are partly financed by debt, for chosen parameters and initial 
values.
The time series generated by this model are plotted in figures 3.4 and 3.5 on the 
following page. These two plots confirm our previous conjectures, namely that the
z(t) =  -<faz(t) ~  <faqi\2 (t),
(1  — oi)z(t) — 7  f  e r ^d(r)dr.
Jo
(3.14b)
c(t) =  — z(t) — d(t).
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Figure 3.5: The role of debt: current account and exchange rate. Simulation of the
current account and exchange rate in a model in which current account imbalances are partly 
financed by debt, for chosen parameters and initial values.
frequency of the swings in the current account and the exchange rate declines and 
that the lag between the two variables increases.
There is reason to believe that debt flows have played an important role in the 
economic performance of Japan over the past decades. Flows of debt securities to 
and from Japan were minimal prior to the country’s financial liberalization in the 
late 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s. Starting in the mid-1980s, these flows 
became much more sizable, reflecting primarily Japan’s large financial investments 
in the United States (see figure 2.6 on page 40 as well as figure 3.20 on page 129). 
On the other hand, the lag between the current account and the yen exchange rate, 
which was not very large in the 1970s, became much larger in the 1980s and 1990s 
(see figure 2.5). This is exactly what one would expect on the basis of the two 
models we have looked at so far.
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3.4.3 Autonomous capital flows
During the latter half of the twentieth century, countries have increasingly opened 
up their capital markets to the outside world. Many countries have been able to 
attract foreign investments. However, inflows of foreign capital proved to be of lim­
ited duration in many cases, particularly in recent years when international capital 
flows became increasingly volatile.
We shall now analyze the effect of temporary, autonomous capital inflows on 
a country’s exchange rate. Under sensible assumptions, such flows can provoke a 
temporary appreciation of the currency even when the current account is strongly 
deteriorating.
Model
We make no changes regarding the determination of the exchange rate:
(3.15a)
However, we now add autonomous capital flows, k(t), to our balance of payments 
equations:
Z(t) =  -</> iZ(t) ~ <fe<?l|2W,
0.05* 0 < t < 20,
k(t) = 2 -  0.05* 20 < t < 40,
0 40 < t, (3.15b)
d(t) = — (1  — a){z(t) +  k(t)) — 7  f  e T^ d(r)dr,
Jo
c(t) =  — z(t) — d(t) — k(t).
Note that the equation determining the capital flows, k(t), can be written in terms 
of the Heaviside unit step function:
k(t) =  0.05£ Heaviside(t) +  (2 — 0.10£) Heaviside(£ — 20)
— (2 — 0.051) Heaviside(£ — 40)
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Using the Laplace transform of the Heaviside unit step function, it thus becomes 
possible to solve the model using the Laplace method.
Simulation
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Figure 3.6: Capital inflows: balance of payments dynamics. Simulation of the joint
dynamic behaviour of the balance of payments in response to an autonomous inflow of 
capital, for chosen parameters and initial values.
The time series that are generated by this model can be seen in figures 3.6 
and 3.7. As capital inflows surge, foreign cash starts to flow into the country, push­
ing up the demand for the domestic currency. In this situation, the current account 
deteriorates, as it often occurs in countries experiencing foreign investment booms. 
The emerging current account deficit will sooner or later exceed the autonomous 
capital inflows as these are only temporary. The country may still be able to attract 
loans from abroad to close its financing gap. Yet as the deficit persists and foreign 
loans have to be paid off, the country finds itself at some point sending more money 
abroad than it itself receives. At this moment, the exchange rate, which had been 
appreciating continuously from the very start, starts to fall. However, it takes some
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Figure 3.7: Capital inflows: current account and exchange rate. Simulation showing
the reaction of the current account and exchange rate to an autonomous inflow of capital, 
for chosen parameters and initial values.
time until it has depreciated sufficiently to bring about a turnaround in the current 
account.
Example: US external performance during the 1980s
The model replicates the experience of the United States during the 1980s when 
the US dollar appreciated massively despite the fact that the US external deficit was 
reaching record levels. This can be seen by comparing figures 3.7 with figure 3.8.
3.4.4 Currency crises
Let us now turn to countries with a fixed exchange rate and analyze how payment 
flows into and out of those countries evolve in response to trade and capital flows, 
and how the stock of foreign exchange reserves of those countries is affected. Our
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Figure 3.8: US current account and exchange rate during the 1980s. US current
account and nominal and CPI-based real effective exchange rates, period from 1980Q1 to 
1992Q4. The current account variable is measured as a percentage of world trade. Source: 
International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Main Economic Indicators (OECD).
goal is to model the incidence of a currency crisis, in a way that is consistent with 
the typical anecdotal evidence from countries hit by currency crises. It turns out 
that our modelling framework lends itself naturally to such a task, quite in contrast 
to many other models of exchange rate determination.
In the model we construct, temporary inflows of foreign capital lead to a deteriora­
tion of the current account balance and a build-up of foreign claims, which even­
tually results in the depletion of reserves and a breakdown of the currency. For 
simplicity, we shall continue to assume that price levels at home and abroad are 
fixed. The real exchange rate is determined as before:
Under the fixed exchange rate regime, reserve flows, r{t), neutralize any payments 
between foreign and domestic nationals; however, we assume that the available 
stock of reserves is limited to an arbitrary, but not too high, value, say 15. Once 
devaluation occurs, no more foreign exchange intervention takes place. As in the
Model
tfl|2 (t) = ~£c(f). (3.16a)
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previous model, the country, which starts off without any debt, receives capital 
inflows over an initial period.
z(t)
k(t)
d(t) 
c(4)
r(t) =
4>iz(t) -  <hqip(t) -  </>sk(t),
0.054 0 < 4 <  20,
=  < 2 -  0.054 20 < 4 < 40,
0 40 < 4,
- (1  -  a)(z(4) + k(t)) -  7 .0 (4),
0  before devaluation,
—z(t) — d{t) — k(t) after devaluation,
—z(t) — d(t) — k(t) before devaluation,
0  after devaluation,
(3.16b)
=  <
where
m  = f  d{r)dr. Jo
Note that we assume here that debt repayments are simply a fraction of total out­
standing debt, namely 7 D(t). Debt repayments thus have the Markov property, in 
the sense that they only depend on the current stock of debt. This simplification 
makes little change to the economic outcome and is adopted here to facilitate the 
solution of the model after the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate regime.
Simulation
Figure 3.9 on the next page shows how the balance of payments evolves under the 
made assumptions. As in the previous model of a flexible exchange rate, the ini­
tial capital inflows contribute to a gradual worsening of the current account, for 
instance by encouraging domestic consumption and investment. The current ac­
count declines even though we have ruled out any real appreciation of the currency 
since we assumed that the foreign and domestic inflation differential is zero. Ini­
tially, the country is able to build up reserves since the sum of capital flows exceeds
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the emerging current account deficit. Capital inflows are temporary, however, and 
foreign lenders are unwilling to finance the entire deficit. At some moment, the 
country’s authorities have to start selling reserves to keep the exchange rate from 
falling. The current account will now improve to adjust itself to the lack of foreign 
capital but the adjustment process is set to be rather gradual.
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Figure 3.9: Currency crisis: balance of payments dynamics. Simulation of the joint
dynamic behaviour of the balance of payments in a model of a currency crisis, for chosen 
parameters and initial values.
Figure 3.10 on the following page plots the cumulative losses of foreign re­
serves together with the total level of reserves available to the country. Since 
the model is solved analytically, we can calculate the time, say t\> at which the 
available reserves are exhausted and the exchange rate peg has to be abandoned; 
in our specific example, t\ — 54.78.
Following the removal of the fixed exchange rate regime at time t\,  the currency 
falls precipitously. The country’s exports become more competitive in global mar­
kets, whereas imports become more expensive for domestic residents. The current
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Figure 3.10: Currency crisis: reserve losses under fixed exchange rate. Simulation
of the cumulative losses of foreign exchange reserves in a model of a currency crisis, for 
chosen parameters and initial values.
account, which was already on its way up, thus receives another strong impetus 
from the low currency and moves rather quickly towards a strong surplus, which in 
turn helps the domestic currency to gain ground.
Example: Korea during the Asian crisis
As an example for how our model’s fits reality, consider South Korea’s economic 
experience during the Asian crisis. Together with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thai­
land, Korea was among the countries most affected by the Asian crisis of 1997. The 
comparison of figure 3.11 on the next page with figure 3.12 on page 110 shows 
that the model can replicate the interaction between Korea’s current account and 
exchange rate very well.
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Figure 3.11: Currency crisis: current account and exchange rate. Simulation of the
current account and real exchange rate in a model of a currency crisis, for chosen parameters 
and initial values.
Evidence from other countries
It thus appears that our model is able to explain Korea’s currency crisis quite well, 
which we could just as well refer to as a balance of payments crisis. But the model 
offers a realistic account of similar episodes in other countries, too. Consider fig­
ure 3.13 on page 111, which shows the current account series of countries that 
experienced large deficits during the last two and a half decades for which cross­
country data are readily available. How our modelling framework applies to Japan 
and the United States, which recorded the largest external imbalances over this pe­
riod, has already been discussed. Similarly, we saw that Germany’s current account 
and exchange rate have interacted in the way postulated here (see section 2.2.2 as 
well as chapter 6).
Regarding the remaining countries, notice that the British sterling and the Italian 
lira were driven from the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary 
System in September 1992. The Spanish peseta suffered the same fate two months
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Figure 3.12: Korea’s currency crisis. South Korean current account, South Korean
real effective exchange rate and US-Korean bilateral exchange rate, period from 1994Q2 to 
2001Q4. The current account variable is measured as a percentage of world trade. Source: 
Economic Outlook (OECD) and Main Economic Indicators (OECD).
later, before being devalued again in early 1993. Mexico suffered its own severe 
currency crisis in 1994-1995, and so did Brazil in 1998-1999. It takes no more 
than a glance at figure 3.13 on the following page to see that in each of the affected 
countries, there had been large and persistent current account deficits in the run-up 
to those crises.
There are important aspects of currency crises that have not been mentioned so 
far but could be incorporated into our model relatively easily. For example, currency 
crises often imply sudden outflows of capital, which could have been taken into 
account more explicitly in our model. Some countries try to protect themselves 
by imposing controls on capital outflows or, as a measure to prevent a crisis, try 
to restrict capital inflows right from the start. Chile for instance adopted measures 
of the latter type, trying in particular to discourage short-term foreign investments; 
Chile’s controls were recently removed, however, after they appeared to have lost 
their effectiveness (Fischer, 2001).
The maturity structure and currency denomination of foreign debt also plays a 
significant role in currency crises, as we would expect given the way we modelled 
exchange rates in section 3.2. While the pressure on the Mexican peso mounted 
during the "tequila crisis" for instance, one of Mexico’s policy responses was to
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Figure 3.13: Large current account deficits. Current account balances of countries with 
large current account deficits (in billions of US dollar). Countries are selected and ordered 
according to the highest current account deficit they have experienced in the period from 
1977Q1 to 2001Q3. Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
change the composition of government debt. Before the crisis, most of Mexico’s 
government debt took the form of short-term, peso-denominated securities, such as 
the cetes. When the exchange rate came under pressure after the assassination of the 
presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, in March 1994, the government be­
gan issuing large amounts of a short-term, dollar-denominated securities, so-called 
tesobonos. Unsurprisingly, the dollar-denominated debt made matters only worse 
when the currency finally had to be devalued late in 1994 (Sachs, Tomell and Ve­
lasco, 1996).
3.4.5 Crawling peg
Particularly in countries suffering from high inflation, introducing an exchange rate 
anchor can be a promising strategy to reduce inflation. However, adopting a hard 
peg also carries its risks, as we have seen. This is why some countries, including 
Israel, Poland and Turkey for instance, have opted for crawling pegs or bands in 
the past (possibly as an intermediate step before moving on to a full float of the 
currency).
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Model
In the last model of this chapter, we examine how a crawling peg can help to main­
tain relative exchange rate stability. This time, we shall allow for a higher inflation 
rate at home than abroad, but we assume that the inflation differential is exponen­
tially decreasing over time:
Pi(t) - f a ( t )  =  th exp(-iM ),
and where r/i =  0.01 and 'ipi = 0.05 are chosen as appropriate parameters. To model 
the crawling peg, we assume that the authorities permit a net outflow of money from 
the country, c(t), which again is modelled as a negatively exponential function of 
time. In other words, they allow the exchange rate to depreciate strongly at the 
beginning but ensure that the rate of depreciation falls over time.
z(t) =  -<f>iz(t) -  </>2<Zl|2 (£) -
(3.17a)
where
0.05£ 0 < t < 20,
k(t) =  < 2 -  0.05t 20 <  4 < 40
0 40 <4.
V
=  “ (1 ~ ~  7D(t) (3.17b)
j]2 exp(—-0 2 1) before devaluation.
—z(t) — d(t) — k(t) after devaluation,
—z(t) — d(t) — kit) before devaluation.
after devaluation
where
112
Balance of payments accounting and exchange rate dynamics
and where 772 =  0.22 and ip2 =  0.05 are chosen as parameters.
Simulation
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Figure 3.14: Crawling peg: balance of payments dynamics. Simulation of the joint
dynamic behaviour of the balance of payments in a model of a crawling peg, for chosen 
parameters and initial values.
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show how the balance of payments components and the 
exchange rate interact in this model, and figure 3.16 plots the cumulative reserve 
losses of the intervening authorities. As the exchange rate-based stabilization mea­
sures take effect, the country receives temporary capital inflows, which drive the 
current account into a deficit. In contrast to the previous models, however, the real 
exchange rate keeps on appreciating due to the high and persistent inflation at home, 
and this is a second factor that contributes to the worsening of the current account.
It would be straightforward to avoid the real appreciation by simply setting 
rj2 = rji and ip2 =  the inflation differential would then be exactly offset by 
the nominal depreciation of the currency. However, this would leave us in the same
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Figure 3.15: Crawling peg: current account and exchange rate. Simulation of the
current account and real exchange rate in a model of a crawling peg, for chosen parameters 
and initial values.
situation as in the previous model, since there would still be a current account deficit 
putting pressure on reserves. The solution is to aim for a sufficient real deprecia­
tion of the currency to avoid a too massive current account deficit. The way this is 
achieved here is by increasing r/2 sufficiently, while leaving ^ 2  at the same value 
as rpi. By choosing the policy parameters 772 and t/>2 in this way, the real exchange 
rate depreciates enough to encourage exports, thus lowering the rate at which the 
government loses its reserves. In our example, the cumulative reserve losses remain 
below the amount available for intervention and a currency crisis can be avoided. 
Once inflation has stabilized and the current account has moved again into surplus, 
the government may contemplate moving the real exchange rate back to its original, 
more appreciated, level, although this is not shown here.
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Figure 3.16: Crawling peg: reserve losses. Simulation of the cumulative losses of
foreign exchange reserves in a model of a crawling peg, for chosen parameters and initial 
values.
3.5 A new perspective on exchange rates
The goal of this and the previous chapters was to demonstrate that balance of pay­
ments flows and exchange rates are jointed determined. The analysis tried to stay 
close to the empirical facts and to promote a dynamic view of the economic rela­
tionships between trade and capital flows, international payments and the exchange 
rate.
The purpose of this section is to explain why the novel perspective matters 
and how it contributes to the subject of exchange rate economics and international 
macroeconomics in general. Section 3.5.1 looks at some often-cited correlations, 
and section 3.5.2 shows how the new approach can help to explain some of the so- 
called puzzles in international economics. The analysis in this section only touches 
upon the issues and does not attempt to go into much detail. The aim of this section
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is rather to demonstrate some of the wider lessons of the arguments put forward in 
this thesis.
3.5.1 Basic correlations in international economics 
Money and inflation
It is widely agreed that relative money supplies show relatively little correlation 
with exchange rates except in the long run or in situations in which money growth 
and inflation are very large. This is why it has proved difficult to explain or predict 
exchange rate movements based on monetary exchange rate models.
The previous sections presented a flow-oriented model of the exchange rate that 
can potentially explain why, say, in hyperinflations money growth differentials and 
exchange rate movements are closely linked and why the link breaks down when 
inflation is only moderate. In section 3.2.2, the exchange rate between country 1 
and country 2  was modelled as the ratio of the values of both countries’ currencies:
From equation (3.18), we see that the value of a country’s currency is driven both 
by the inverse of the price level of that country and by the cumulative demand and 
supply of that currency in the foreign exchange markets. Currency flows, which 
determine the latter, tend to move rather strongly, however, as we saw in previous 
chapters. Thus if money growth and inflation are low, we would expect that their
The value of currency 1 for instance was determined as follows:
v ^ = m x e i { t )
(3.18)
where
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impact on the exchange rate would be dwarfed by the much stronger fluctuations of 
the currency flows in the foreign exchange market. On the other hand, in situations 
where money growth and inflation are very large, currency flows will play less of 
a role in the determination of exchange rates. Instead, we would expect a high 
correlation between the relative speed at which the national money loses its value 
and the rate of depreciation of the country’s exchange rate.
Net foreign assets and real exchange rates
Another important correlation on which economists agree is that between the ac­
cumulation of net foreign assets and the level of the real exchange rate (see fig­
ure 2.7 on page 42). A reason why the stocks of net foreign assets matter for 
the exchange rate could lie in the fact that those asset stocks give rise to differ­
ent kinds of flows. For example, stocks of foreign debt give rise to amortisation 
and interest payments, whereas foreign equity holdings induce flows of dividends 
between countries. While theories that focus exclusively on the stock holdings of 
foreign assets often lack an explanation for the observed long swings in exchange 
rates, it is much easier to reconcile such fluctuations with the approach proposed 
here. We should also expect a strong and direct link between foreign debt and 
the exchange rate, given that foreign debt generates a relatively predictable flow of 
cross-border payments over time. In this context, it is interesting to note Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti’s (2000) empirical observation whereby the effect of net foreign as­
set holdings on real exchange rates is larger in the case of debt financing than in the 
case of equity financing (although it must be stressed that their theoretical approach 
is very different from the approach adopted here).
Commodity currencies
As a final example, consider the correlation between commodity prices and ex­
change rates. In countries in which one or a few primary commodities constitute 
a significant share of exports, real and nominal exchange rates tend to move with 
the relevant commodity prices in world commodity markets. Examples include 
Australia, New Zealand, Iceland and many developing countries (Chen and Ro- 
goff, 2003). In figure 3.17 on the following page, for instance, we can observe
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parallel movements between Canada’s trade-weighted commodity price index and 
the Canadian dollar since the mid-1990s. It should be mentioned, however, that 
the observed correlations between commodity prices and exchange rates varies 
across countries and periods and that it tends to depend on the specific commod­
ity price index used.
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Figure 3.17: Commodity prices and Canada’s exchange rate. Bank of Canada Com­
modity Price Index, based on all items (CN36387, upper panel) and on all items excluding 
energy (CN36388, middle panel), together with Canada’s nominal effective exchange rate 
(lower panel), period from 1995M1 - 2003M5.
Given our previous analysis, it is quite straightforward to explain those patterns. 
Assume for instance a situation in which international cash flow is determined by 
the countries’ exports and imports. Based on equation 3.2, the exchange would be 
determined as follows:
Q112M =  exp Q  J ((P^t))-1 + (P2(«))_1Si|2(t))
x exp J ((Pi(t))_1S2|i (t) + (P2(«))_1) S2|iP2i|2z2i (T)drj ,
where P i2|i and P2112 correspond to the price indices of country l ’s exports and 
imports, respectively. In the event that a country’s exports (or imports) depend on a 
given set of commodities, the price movements of those commodities would directly 
influence the country’s exchange rate according to the above equation. However, the
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relationship would also depend on the other variables influencing international cash 
flow; it might for instance be less stable when the volume of net exports fluctuates 
strongly.
3.5.2 Empirical puzzles in international economics 
Purchasing power parity puzzle
One important puzzle in international economics is the purchasing power parity 
puzzle, which concerns the question of why deviations from purchasing power par­
ity (PPP) are so persistent. The average half-life of a shock to PPP is estimated to 
be around three to five years (Rogoff, 1996), which seems rather long given that one 
would expect deviations from the law of one price to be eliminated swiftly, even in 
the presence of transaction costs in international trade. The slow mean reversion 
becomes less of a puzzle if one considers for instance the dynamics of disaggre­
gated price data, given that one should expect different goods to revert to parity at 
different speeds (Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn and Rey, 2002). Another argument that has 
been made is that the adjustment speed is actually much faster when the time path 
of equilibrium real exchange rates is taken into account (MacDonald, 1999a).
The analysis in this paper suggests that due to countries’ payments imbalances, 
nominal and real exchange rates can fluctuate widely. At the same time, countries’ 
inflation rates are in general quite persistent. In Japan for instance, the nominal ap­
preciation of the yen averaged 4.5% annually during the 1980s and 1990s, whereas 
Japan’s inflation rate was 1.7% lower on average than the weighted inflation rates 
of its trading partners. Consequently, Japan’s real exchange rate appreciated con­
siderably. What’s more, the nominal exchange rate went through five long swings 
since the early 1970s, and so did the real exchange rate. The flow-oriented approach 
put forward here can explain why deviations from PPP arise at all, and in particular 
why they are so persistent.
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle
The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle concerns the strong and positive association of coun­
tries’ saving and investment rates. Under capital mobility, countries are able to
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run unbalanced current accounts; in other words, saving and investment rates do 
not need to move so closely together as they do in the data (Feldstein and Ho- 
rioka, 1980).
The finding that current account imbalances tend to be limited can be made 
more comprehensible using the modelling approach of this chapter. One assump­
tion we made, namely in equation 3.8, was that the current account has a ten­
dency to revert to balance over time. However, even if we remove that assump­
tion and set the parameter fa  to zero, we find that the current account does not 
explode or fluctuate excessively. As current account imbalances emerge, they 
sooner or later generate exchange rate movements that contribute to the eventual 
removal of the current account imbalance. Indeed, as we can see from figures 3.1 
and 3.2, the current account goes through never-ending cycles with limited ampli­
tude, thus preventing the saving and investment rates to diverge.
O
— 1 H
8 0  1 O O  1 2 0  1 4 06 0
t
current account 
cash flow
Figure 3 .18 : Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: balance of payments dynamics. Simulation of 
the joint dynamic behaviour of the current account and cash balances in a model in which 
exports and imports are paid for in cash, for chosen parameters and initial values. Unlike 
the initial setup, no mean-reverting tendency is assumed for the current account.
120
Balance of payments accounting and exchange rate dynamics
O
—  1
6 0 8 0  1 O O  1 2 0  1 4 0
t
--------------------- current account
exchange rate
Figure 3.19: Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: current account and exchange rate. Simu­
lation of the current account and exchange rate in a model in which exports and imports 
are paid for in cash, for chosen parameters and initial values. Unlike the initial setup, no 
mean-reverting tendency is assumed for the current account.
Exchange rate volatility puzzle
A question of much concern to academic economists and practitioners alike is why 
it is that exchange rates are so volatile. MacDonald ( 1 9 9 9 a )  measures the monthly 
variability of exchange rates and fundamentals for a data set of five major economies 
for the period from 1980M1 to 1997M12. He finds that exchange rates are between 
two and eight times more volatile than relative prices. One should expect similar 
results when using money supplies or current accounts as a benchmark for the com­
parison. However, MacDonald ( 1 9 9 9 a )  stresses that interest rates are again much 
more volatile than exchange rates; here, he finds a ratio between two and ten.
The high variability of exchange rate is often cited as a justification for the asset 
approach to the exchange rate, which states that the exchange rate is essentially an 
asset price and thus inherently forward-looking. However, this is not a necessary
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conclusion. As we shall now see, the modelling approach of this chapter can easily 
be adapted to make sense of the cited volatility findings.
A fact that we have so far ignored in our modelling is that financial flows tend 
to be very volatile, not only at short horizons but also at monthly, quarterly or even 
annual horizons. Considering the evidence of Japan in figure 3.20 on page 129 
for instance, we see that the fluctuations of the Japan’s financial balance, which 
were relatively modest in the 1970s, have increased substantially in the 1980s and 
then again sharply in the mid-1990s. In particular, we note that portfolio and other
investment flows are much more volatile than the current account balance, which
seems consistent with the high variability of return differentials across countries.
Model Let us consider a model with the familiar exchange rate equation:
<7i|2 (£) =  (3.19a)
Now we shall introduce volatile, high-frequency capital flows, k ( t ), which we 
model using a simple trigonometric function:
Z( t )  =  -</>iZ{t )
k ( t )  =  2cos(0.9£),
rt ,  ^ (3.19b)
d ( t )  = — (1  — a)z(t) — 7  /  e r^d(r)dr,
Jo
c ( t )  =  —z ( t )  — k ( t )  — d ( t ) .
The capital flows, k(t), directly affect the international cash flow variable, 
c(t). Since financial flows, such as debt and equity flows, are primarily 
recorded in the portfolio investment balance whereas a large part of the other 
investment balance records monetary transactions, we should expect both bal­
ance of payments components to show a strong inverse relationship. In­
deed, this is what the cross plots in figure 3.21 on page 130 indicate.
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Simulation The results of our simulation exercise are shown in figures 3.22 
and 3.23. Although international capital flows are assumed to be much more volatile 
than the current account, and although this translates into a more volatile exchange 
rate, the longer-term dynamic relationship between the current account and the ex­
change rate remains essentially unchanged.
Exchange rate disconnect puzzle
Empirical evidence shows that macroeconomic fundamentals have little explanatory 
power for nominal exchange rates, a statement often referred to as the exchange rate 
disconnect puzzle (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000b). As shall now be demonstrated, 
the model of this chapter can generate swings in exchange rates that are seemingly 
unrelated to the movements of trade as well as capital flows.
Model Exchange rates are modelled in the familiar fashion:
We now assume, however, that there are additional forces influencing the current 
account, z(t), as well as capital flows, k(t). Those forces are modelled as trigono­
metric functions, reflecting for example the influence of the domestic business cycle 
or of boom-and-bust cycles in foreign investment.
c{t) - —z(t) — k(t) — d(t).
Simulation Since the cyclical forces influencing the current account and the capi­
tal account have different frequencies, the resulting cash flow can vary considerably, 
depending on whether those forces strengthen or offset each other. Thus it appears
qi\2 (t) = -£c(t). (3.20a)
z(t) = -(piz(t) -  </>2 qi\2 (t) +  0.2cos(0.2£), 
k(t) =  cos(0.13£),
(3.20b)
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that the exchange rate is not clearly linked to the current account anymore, and nei­
ther can we discern a direct relationship with capital flows. A more realistic model 
would feature stochastic variables, but this would make the exchange rate discon­
nect even stronger. Notice finally that this model provides just another potential 
explanation of the long swings in exchange rates that we observe in the data (Engel 
and Hamilton, 1990).
3.6 Conclusions
The model developed in the chapter can replicate the behaviour of exchange rates 
under different economic environments. According to this chapter, the balance of 
payments accounting identity has crucial implications for the dynamic evolution 
of international payment flows and thus for the movements of nominal and real ex­
change rates. Properly understood, the theory can help to understand many different 
exchange rate episodes both across countries and across time. For instance, I distin­
guish cases where exchange rates are either fixed or flexible and where capital flows 
are either accommodating current account imbalances or moving in an autonomous 
fashion, driven by pull or push factors. The predictions of the model regarding the 
joint movements of the current account, the capital account and the exchange rate 
are borne out by the empirical evidence of exchange rate fluctuations among major 
economies during the last four decades as well as by the experiences of countries 
that were hit by currency crises in the past or have used crawling pegs to avoid such 
crises.
After presenting the framework and results, the chapter discusses the potential 
relevance of its findings for our understanding of exchange rates. The chapter’s 
findings allow for a new perspective on several important issues and puzzles in 
the international economics literature. These include, for instance, the Feldstein- 
Horioka puzzle, the purchasing power parity puzzle as well as the observed close 
correlation between commodity prices and the real exchange rate of commodity 
exporters.
In the model of this chapter, it is the balance of payments identity that really 
matters. It is this identity which determines how balance of payments movements
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translate into international cash flow. In fact, what the different models in sec­
tion 3.4 have shown is that many of the other assumptions of the model can—and 
should—be altered to help us understand how the exchange rates have behaved dur­
ing different historical episodes.
Balance of payments accounting and exchange rate dynamics
Currency denomination
X | i A variable X denominated in currency i
Balance of payments flows
Zi (Real) current account balance of country i
Zij (Real) exports and transfers from country i to country j
Cij\. Cash flow from country i to country j
dij\. Debt flow (country i borrows from country j)
kij\. Autonomous investment flow (country j invests in country i)
ry |. Reserve flow from country i to country j
Cumulative flows
Zi Cumulative (real) current account balance of country i 
Ci\. Cumulative cash flow balance of country i
Di\. Cumulative debt flow balance
Ri\. Cumulative reserve flow balance
Price indices
Pi Price index of country i
Pij\- Price index of exports from country i to country j
Exchange rates
Si\. Nominal exchange rate of country i
(domestic currency in terms of foreign currency)
Qi\. Real exchange rate of country i
(domestic price level in terms of foreign price level) 
s<|. Logarithm of nominal exchange rate of country i
qt\. Logarithm of real exchange rate of country i
Table 3.1: Guide to notation. Notation for balance of payments flows and their 
cumulatives, allowing for different currency denominations.
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z(t) e(t) d(t) c(t) r(t)
CURRENT ACCOUNT
A. GOODS •
B. SERVICES •
C. INCOME •
D. CURRENT TRANSFERS •
CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNT
CAPITAL ACCOUNT •
FINANCIAL ACCOUNT
A. DIRECT INVESTMENT •
B. PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
Equity securities •
Debt securities
Bonds and notes • •
Money market instruments • •
C. FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES • •
D. OTHER INVESTMENT
Trade credits •
Loans •
Currency and deposits •
Other assets • • •
E. RESERVE ASSETS •
NET ERRORS AND OMISSIONS • • • • •
Table 3.2: Classification of balance of payments flows. An overview of the bal­
ance of payments indicating the variables to which the different balance of payments 
components belong.
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Country 1 (Home) Credit Debit
T1 Exports (212) P\2 \\Z\ 2 C2111
T2 Imports (z2\) S 2 \\C\2 \2 £ 211^2112221
Country 2 (Foreign) Credit Debit
T1 Imports (z12) £ l|2 Q 2 1 |l £l|2-Pl2|l2l2
T2 Exports (z2i) -P2112^ 21 Cl2|2
Foreign exchange market Credit Debit
T1 C21|l £ l |2 C 2 1 |l
T2 C\2 \2 £ 2 |lC l2 |2
Table 3.3: Exports, imports and currency flows. Determination of international 
payment flows and currency demands in the foreign exchange market as the result 
of exports and imports.
Country 1 (Home) Credit Debit
T3 Borrowing {d\2) d \ 2 C21|l
T4 Lending (d2 i) £ 2 |lC l2 |2 £211^2112^21
Country 2 (Foreign) Credit Debit
T3 Lending {d\2) £ l|2 C 2 1 |l £ l |2 ^ 1 2
T4 Borrowing (d2i) C?21 Cl2|2
Foreign exchange market Credit Debit
T3 C21|l £ l|2 C 2 1 |l
T4 Cl2|2 £ 2 |lC l2 |2
Table 3.4: Foreign debt and currency flows. Determination of international pay­
ment flows and currency demands in the foreign exchange market as the result of 
foreign debt flows.
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Figure 3.20: Investing Japan’s export surpluses. Time series plots of Japan’s current
account and of various components of its financial account (in billions of US dollar). Note 
that data on other investment is not available from 1985Q1 to 1990Q4; two missing obser­
vations in the equity securities balance were replaced by values computed from the data on 
the portfolio investment and debt securities balances.
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Figure 3.21: Japan’s portfolio and other investment flows. Upper panel: Cross plot
of Japan’s portfolio investment and other investment balances. Lower panel: Cross plot of 
Japan’s debt securities and other investment balances. All variables are in billions of US 
dollars. Note that cash flows, or international monetary payments, are mostly recorded in 
the other investment component of the balance of payments, but that other investment also 
includes debt-related items.
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o
— i  -
6 0 8 0 1OO 120 140
t
current account 
d e b t  b a l a n c e  
------------------- cash flow
Figure 3.22: Volatile capital flows: balance of payments dynamics. Simulation of
the joint dynamic behaviour of the current account, debt and cash balances in a model with 
volatile capital flows, for chosen parameters and initial values.
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Figure 3.23: Volatile capital flows: current account and exchange rate. Simulation
of the current account and exchange rate in a model with volatile capital flows, for chosen 
parameters and initial values.
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1
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t
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debt balance 
cash flow
Figure 3.24: Exchange rate disconnect: balance o f payments dynamics. Simulation
of the joint dynamic behaviour of the balance of payments in a model in which autonomous 
capital flows fluctuate independently of the current account, for chosen parameters and 
initial values.
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Figure 3.25: Exchange rate disconnect: current account and exchange rate. Simula­
tion of the current account and exchange rate in a model in which autonomous capital flows 
fluctuate independently of the current account, for chosen parameters and initial values.
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Chapter 4
Long swings in Japan’s current 
account and in the yen
4.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to build an econometric model that can capture the 
dynamic interaction of the Japanese balance of payments and exchange rate. The 
chapter introduces a nonlinear multivariate time series framework that is able to 
generate the long swings in the current account as well as the gradual response of 
the real exchange rate to those swings witnessed in the data.
As we saw in chapter 2, the Japanese current account has gone through five 
large swings during the last three to four decades. The Japanese exchange rate 
has followed those swings, albeit with some lag. As we saw in chapter 3, there 
are two reasons for this lag: First, current account surpluses that are temporarily re­
invested abroad generate a delayed cash flow (see section 3.4.2). Chapter 2 calls this 
phenomenon the adjustment delay and shows that it can be encountered not only in
The paper on which this chapter is based has been presented at the Macroeconomics PhD work­
shop at LSE, the International Financial Stability Programme at the CEP (LSE), the Economic Re­
search Department of the ECB, the 17th Annual Congress of the EEA in Venice and the Conference 
on Exchange Rates of the Applied Econometrics Association (AEA) in Marseille.
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Japan but in other countries, too. Moreover, the evidence seems to indicate that the 
adjustment delay—which depends for instance on the composition of capital flows 
and on the maturity structure of foreign debt—has increased in recent decades in 
many countries with the widespread removal of capital controls.
Second, the cash flow originating from current account imbalances adds incre­
mentally to the existing currency pressure in the foreign exchange market. We 
therefore expect the level of international cash flow to be related to the changes, 
rather than simply the level, of the exchange rate (see section 3.4.1).
On the other hand, as will be shown in chapter 6, large swings in the real ex­
change rate can provoke reversals in the trend of the current account. In the models 
in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, it is shown how the simultaneous, dynamic interaction 
between the current account and the real exchange rate can lead to long, recurrent 
cycles in the current account.
Theoretical considerations as well as empirical evidence thus suggest that the 
long up- and downward movements of the yen arise from, and at the same time give 
rise to, long swings in the current account. The aim of this chapter is to propose a 
methodology to estimate the relationship between both variables in a bivariate time 
series model.
The model in chapter 3 predicts that normalized international payment flows, 
arising from current account transactions, drive the real exchange rate. Correspond­
ingly, the model in this chapter consists of the real volume of the current account, 
defined as Japan’s nominal current account divided by the Japanese price level, and 
the real effective exchange rate. While being individually nonstationary, the two 
variables are found to be cointegrated. A vector error correction model is therefore 
chosen as an appropriate framework for modelling their joint dynamics. However, 
the model is modified in an important respect in that the intercept of the current 
account equation is allowed to switch between two states, or regimes, according to 
an unobservable Markov process. This is to take account of the recurrent structural 
breaks in the current account variable, which is upward-trending in certain periods 
and downward-trending in others.
In contrast, the exchange rate is not subject to regime changes. Instead, as the 
adjustment delay mechanism discussed in chapter 2 suggests, it is left to respond to
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the movements of the current account. In this way, the fluctuations of the current 
account—and in particular the reversals of its trend, which occur now and then— 
feed gradually into the exchange rate.
Another advantage of using a vector error correction model is that its lag struc­
ture can accommodate mutual feedback between the exchange rate and the current 
account. However, to keep the model tractable, the regime changes in the current 
account variable are assumed to have constant transition probabilities. Neverthe­
less, chapter 6 provides statistical evidence that the transition probabilities are in 
fact influenced by the real exchange rate.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 sets out the empirical model. 
Section 4.3 describes how Gibbs sampling can be applied for Bayesian inference 
on the model. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical results. Section 4.5 provides 
conclusions.
4.2 Empirical modelling
This section presents an empirical model based on the close relationship between 
the current account and real exchange rate in Japan. As already explained in the 
introduction, the model allows for large swings in the Japanese current account. 
At the same time, it takes into account the repercussions of these swings on the 
performance of the yen.
4.2.1 Cointegration of exchange rate and economic fundamental
The statistical analysis of Japan’s real effective exchange rate as well as its current 
account reveal that both variables are nonstationary. Table 4.1 reports the results of 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for both variables. The null hypothesis of a unit 
root cannot be rejected for either variable.
While we shall work on the assumption that both variables are 1(0), it should be 
kept in mind that shifts in levels of variables can lead to a failure to reject a unit root 
in a time series even though it is stationary (Garcia and Perron, 1996). However,
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Constant Trend Lags Coefficient Std. error t statistic 5% crit.
Real effective exchange rate (1978Q3-2001Q3)
No No 4 1.0001 0.04496 0.05417 -1.94
Yes No 3 0.94170 0.04460 -1.926 -2.89
Yes Yes 3 0.85491 0.04316 -3.300 -3.46
Current account (real volume) (1978Q3-2001Q3)
No No 6 0.99017 0.005188 -0.4861 -1.94
Yes No 5 0.91713 0.005106 -2.068 -2.89
Yes Yes 4 0.82356 0.005041 -3.456 -3.46
Table 4.1: Unit root tests. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Lag length selection 
based on Akaike information criterion.
here we are dealing with shifts in the trend of a time series, namely the current 
account, and it is less clear what kind of implications this has for unit root tests.
H0 Ha Trace test p-value
r = 0 r  > 0 19.143 [0.003] **
r < 1 r > 1 3.5246 [0.070]
Table 4.2: Testing for cointegration. Testing for the number of distinct cointe- 
grating vectors, using 5 lags. Double asterisks (**) mark significance at the 1% 
level.
While individually 1(1), I find the Japanese current account and real effective 
exchange rate to be cointegrated, that is, linear combinations of both variables exist 
that are 1(0). To test for cointegration, I apply Johansen’s (1988) methodology. 
Table 4.2 gives the results. I can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 
1% significance level (applying critical values as computed by PcGive).
Given that both variables are cointegrated, their joint dynamic behaviour can 
conveniently be represented by a vector error correction model. Estimation can 
proceed along traditional lines using maximum likelihood methods.
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4.2.2 A Markov-switching vector error-correction model
Motivated by the inspection of the data in section 2.2.1 and the theoretical findings 
of chapter 3, I seek to analyze a modified vector error correction model. I make 
two alterations to the conventional setup. First, the intercept of the current account 
equation is allowed to switch between two unknown values according to a two-state 
Markov process with constant, unknown transition probabilities. While the current 
account is nonstationary, the visual inspection of its time series in figures 2.3, 2.4 
and 2.5 suggests that it is subject to two kinds of drifts, an upward drift in some 
periods and a downward drift in other periods.
Second, seasonal dummies are present only in the current account equation, not 
in the exchange rate equation. This seems justified since the exchange rate, unlike 
the current account, does not appear to exhibit any seasonality. From an economic 
point of view, it is also hard to conceive why the exchange rate, by itself, should be 
fluctuating seasonally.
The model
The model I analyze takes the following form:
---
---
--
1
> C-+.
1
1
<1
1
0 0 0
1pz, 1 ^ z , 2  Ipz fi
+ 7T0,1
7T(),2
+
h - \
R t + ^ 2
i—1
d\ ,t 
d>2,t
L
Ki, 11
TTi, 21 Tti, 22
where
+
Qfi
[ 0 1  02  }
Qt- 1
+
£q,t
« 2 .  Zt~ l  . £ z,t
ax 
Oi<2 
Vz > 0
[Pi P2 } = aP’ =
7Tn 7Ti2 
7T21 7T22
A  qt- i  
Azt-i
Prob {Rt -  l\R t-i =  1) =  P, Prob {Rt = 0\Rt-i = 0) =  q
(4.1)
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In this representation, qt is the real effective exchange rate of Japan and zt is the 
Japanese current account (in the domestic currency). The vector [dljt, d2,t, d$j\' 
contains seasonal dummies.
In period t, the system is in one of two regimes, 0 or 1, according to the random 
variable Rt. The variable Rt follows a Markov process with transition probabilities 
p  and q. The regime affects the intercept of the current account equation, which 
switches between a lower level, 710,2 , and a higher level, 7t0,2 +  vz. The current 
account is drifting downward whenever the system is in regime 0; it is drifting 
upward whenever the system is in regime 1.
The transition probabilities are assumed constant here to avoid a too complex 
model, as is done in most applications of Markov-switching models. However, 
as Miiller-Plantenberg (2003a) demonstrates using a Markov-switching framework 
with time-varying probabilities, the frequent trend reversals of the Japanese and 
German current accounts during recent decades—when both countries experienced 
large export booms—were triggered by the often considerable movements of the 
real exchange rate in these two countries.
By collecting both variables in a vector yt =  [qt, zt]', the model can be written
as:
h-1
A yt =  ^ d t +  7To +  vRt +  Tit-i^yt-i +  n?/t_i +  et
i=1 
h-1
=  +  7To +  v R t  +  U t- i A y t- i  -1- a f i y t - 1 +  £t ( 4 - 2 )
i=l  
h-1
=  tydt +  7To + vR t +  E n «  - A y t-i +  arjt-i +  et
i=1
Et ~  i.i.d. N(0, £)
As equation (4.2) indicates, the matrix of long-run responses, II, is the product 
of the feedback vector, o; =  [<a i , a 2] a n d  the cointegrating vector, 0  =  [fiufo]- 
The vector a  is called feedback vector since it measures the system’s response to the 
error from the long-run equilibrium relation. This error is given by r)t- 1 =  P'Vt-1-
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The model may be written still more compactly as:
Y  =  DV' +  Rv' +  X T  +  ZPot +  E
(4.3)
=  D V  +  Rv' +  W B  +  E
where
' Aj/i ■ dl ‘ « i 1 A j/q AyLt 1
«*.<N<
A y'2 d,2 R2 1 Ay[ Ayo 1<
y  = D = R = X =
A yy . d'T . Rrp 1 A i/j ._2 A y'T~h+i .
Wo el
y[ e2
z  = E =
■ y'r- 1  ■ . e'T .
ni
n  L
ni
w = zp B =
4.3 Bayesian inference with Gibbs sampling
The model introduced in the previous section is nonlinear and difficult to estimate 
by classical statistical methods. This chapter demonstrates how Bayesian inference, 
and in particular the simulation tool of Gibbs sampling, can be used to estimate the 
model. The key of the approach taken here is that the unobserved regimes can be 
treated as additional unknown parameters (see Albert and Chib, 1993). They can 
then be analyzed along with the model’s unknown parameters via the simulation 
method of Gibbs sampling.
Applying the method of Gibbs sampling to time series has recently become 
increasingly popular in the literature. Examples can be found in Albert and Chib 
(1993) and Kim and Nelson (1998). Kim and Nelson (1999) survey the literature 
and provide many illustrations. However, I have not so far encountered a Bayesian 
treatment of a model such as the one presented in this chapter that combines a vector 
error correction model with Markov-switching elements.
For further use, define yt = \yu y2l. . . ,  yt\ and Rt =  [Ru R2, . . . ,  Rt] for t = 
1,2, . . . ,  T. The sample size is T, so yr is the vector of all observations and R t  is
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the vector of all regimes, or states. Let 6  denote the vector of all parameters of the 
model.
4.3.1 Bayesian estimation
Bayesian inference about 6  is based on the posterior distribution:
g(6 \yT) oc L(e\yr)g(d)  (4.5)
where g{6 ) is the prior and L(6\yr)  is the likelihood function. Direct inference 
would not be practical here due to the difficulties involved in computing the likeli­
hood function. The alternative is to simulate the posterior density using the Markov 
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method referred to as the Gibbs sampler. For an intro­
duction to MCMC methods and the Gibbs sampler, see for example Gelman, Carlin, 
Stem and Rubin (1995) and Kim and Nelson (1999). A brief review is also given in 
appendix 4.3.3.
4.3.2 Conditional structure of the model
My objective is to find a complete set of conditional distributions of all the param­
eters, on which the Gibbs sampling scheme can be run. It turns out that this task 
is facilitated once I treat the regimes R t  as additional unknown parameters and 
analyze them jointly with 6 , the vector of all other parameters. Given R t,  condi­
tional inference on 0  is basically equivalent to inference on a vector error correction 
model. Given 6  on the other hand, procedures are available that help us to retrieve 
the conditional distribution of the regimes.
I thus obtain a tractable conditional structure as a basis of the Gibbs simulations. 
Gibbs sampling proceeds by iteratively drawing from the following sequence of 
conditional distributions:
•  [ p , Q \ R t ]
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•  [ £ |  j»T, /?]
•  [B\ yr ,  Rt , ",/3]
•  W v t ]
I will now turn to the details of the Gibbs sampling scheme.
4.3.3 Simulation of parameters and regimes
Suppose the vector of all parameters, 6 , is partitioned into vector components, 6 1 , 6 2 , 
...,0k> There is thus a complete set of conditional distributions, g(0\\yT, 6 2 , 6 3 , 
• • • > 0*)» 9 {H v t, 6 1 , 6 3 , • • •, 0k), ... ,  g{6 k\VT, 0i, 02, , 0k- 1). Given some arbi­
trary starting values for the parameters, 6 ®, 6 § , . . . ,  0*?, the Gibbs algorithm involves 
iterating through the following cycle (with the current iteration denoted by i):
Step 1 Draw 6 { from #(0i|f/T, 02-1> • • • 5 0l~l)
Step 2 Draw 0} from g(6 2 \yT, 6 {, 6 f \  • • ■»^ _1)
Step k Draw 6 lk from g(0k\yT, 61,6 }, ■■■, 6 %k- 1)
Steps 1 through k can be iterated T  times, so as to obtain a full set of simulated 
parameters for every iteration. Under regularity conditions, the distribution of 6 % 
converges to the distribution of 6  as T goes to infinity (see references quoted in 
Albert and Chib, 1993; Kim and Nelson, 1999). This suggests setting T  — N  +  M, 
so that when N  initial simulations are discarded, the remaining M  drawings of all 
parameters can be used as an approximate simulated sample from g{6 \, 6 2 , ■ ■ ■, 6 k)•
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Generating the regimes, Rt
To generate the regimes, R t , I employ multi-move Gibbs sampling (see Kim and 
Nelson, 1999). Multi-move Gibbs sampling refers to the simulation of all the 
regimes as a block from the joint conditional distribution:
g(RT\e_RT,yT)
where 0 _rt  refers to all the parameters of the model other than R t  (which is 
treated here as a vector of parameters). It follows from the Markov property of St 
that the joint conditional density can be factorized as follows:
T—1
9 {R t\0 - r t ,Vt) = 9 (R t\v t) g{Rt\Rt+i,yt) (4.6)
t=1
Equation (4.6) shows that g(RT\6 _RT, Vt) can be evaluated once 9 {R t\vt) as 
well as g (R t \R T + i ,y t ) ,  t = T —1, T —2, . . . ,  1, are known. This suggests employing 
a two-step procedure to generate these conditional densities.
Step 1 Run Hamilton’s (1989) basic filter to get g(Rt\yt), t = 1 ,2, . . . ,  T. That 
is, iterate on the following pair of equations:
g(Rt  = i\yt) = g(Rt =
g{yt \yt- i)  
g(yt\Rt =  i, y t - 1) g{Rt =  i \y t- i )  
E i= i g(vt \Rt =  j, y t - 1) g(Rt  =  j \ y t - i )  ’
i = o, 1
g(Rt+1 — o|&)
i
►Q I—
1 1
1 1
to OK II O
1
.  g(Rt+i = i|jft) _ l - q  p _ g(Rt = l\yt) _
The last iteration of the filter provides us with ^(J?t|^t)> from which R t  is 
generated.
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Step 2 The following result, which follows from the Markov property of R t, 
provides us with the smoothed conditional densities g(R t \Rr+u  yt )’-
g{Rt\RT+i,yt )  =  -------------------------
_  g{Rt+i\Rt)g(Rt\yt) 
g(R t+i\yt) 
ex g(Rt+1 \Rt) g(Rt\yt)
(4.7)
where g(Rt+1 \Rt) is the transition probability and g(Rr\yT) is saved from 
step 1. The result in equation (4.7), can be used to recursively generate Rt 
from g (R t \RT+u Vt), for t = T  -  1, T  -  2 , . . . ,  1.
Generating the transition probabilities, p and q
Conditional on R t , the transition probabilities p and q are independent of the data 
set, yr, and the model’s other parameters. The conditional distribution p,q\Rr  
can be obtained from standard Bayesian results on Markov chains. Given, Rt , the 
transitions riij from state i to j , with i , j  =  0,1, provide sufficient statistics for p 
and q. The likelihood function for p and q is given by:
Likelihood
L{p,q\RT) = p nil(l - p ) nioqnoo(l -  q)n°l
The form of the likelihood suggests the use of the beta distribution as a conjugate 
prior for the transition probabilities.
Prior Assuming independent beta distributions for the priors of p and q, the prior 
is given by:
p ~  beta(un, uio)
q ~  beta(i/0o,^oi)
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with
g(p, q) oc pUll~1( 1 — p)Ul0-1gU00-1(i — g)U01_1
where Wy, i , j  =  0,1, are the hyperparameters of the prior.
Combining the prior and the likelihood, the following posterior is obtained:
Posterior
g(p, q\RT) = g(p, q)L{jp, g|tfT) 
oc puu-1(l -  p)Ul0-V 00-1(l -  tf)U01_1
pnn(1 -  p)niotfnoo(l -  g)no1 (4.8)
_  p«ii+ttn—1^  p'j'U’io+nio—lgUoo+noo—  ^uoi+noi—1
I have estimated the model using a non-informative, flat, prior as well as with an 
informative prior. For the non-informative prior, I set un  = u\o = w0i = u00 =  1. 
Using the formulas for the expected value and variance of a beta random variable, I 
obtain:
E(p) =  E(q) = i  Var(p) =  Var (q) =
Based on data prior to our sample, it appears that the upswings and downswings 
of the Japanese current account have an average duration of roughly ten to twelve 
quarters. This suggests choosing an informative prior for the transition probabilities 
with the following first and second moments:
E(p) =  E (q) =  Var(p) =  Var (q) =
Notice that the expected duration of regime 1, say, equals 1/(1 — p). The implied 
hyperparameters of the prior are:
tin =  Woo — 149, Wio =  Wqi =  14.9
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Generating v and ^
Conditional on all other parameters, ^ z>i, %jjZt2 , 'tpz,3 and vz may be generated as 
follows. Define C to be the Choleski decomposition of E. Since E is given, C  may 
be evaluated and the equation (4.2) may be multiplied through with the inverse of 
C. After rearranging, I obtain:
y* = y*dt +  V*Rt +  £* (4.9)
where
y" =  c _1 ^A y t -  7t0 -  n t_jAj/(_i -  nj/j_ij
V* =  C -1 * ,  v* = C~lv , ej =  C_1ee
Notice that a s s *  ~  N(0, /), equation (4.9) represents a system of two indepen­
dent equations. With all elements of y* given, the second equation—which contains 
the parameters that are of interest to us—may be estimated in isolation. Consider 
therefore the Bayesian estimation of the following linear regression model:
i>z, 1
’ 0  ' fpz, 2 + E* ' 0  "— [ D R ]
1 00
1
1
where E* [0,1]' ~  N(0, I t )-
Prior of ipz,2 , ?Pz,3 , v]' The natural conjugate prior for [ipz>1} ipZt2, ^ z>3, v)f is
the normal density:
[lpz,l V*z,2 1pz,3 ^ ] / ~N(7o,^o)
where 7 0  and £2 0 can be chosen appropriately (a non-informative prior may be ob­
tained by choosing Qq very large).
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The posterior distribution for ^ , 2 , ^ , 3 , v \  is given by the following nor­
mal distribution (Kim and Nelson, 1999, page 174):
Posterior of [^z,i, ipz,2 , i'}'
fi1 =  [n a 1 + tfD 'D R } - 1 
Generating E and B
Consider now the estimation of E and B  conditional on all the other parameters. 
The system in equation (4.2) then becomes:
st ~  i.i.d. N(0, E)
Since j3 as well as all the parameters contained in y™ are given, I can treat 
equation (4.10) as a multivariate linear regression model. Recalling the notation of 
equation (4.3), this model becomes:
Y** = Y - D V - R v '
=  W B  +  E
vec(E) ~  NTn(0, E (g> I t)
[ Ipz, 1 1pz,2 Ipz,3 V ]' ~  N(7 i , ^ i )
where
7 ! =  [n„ 1 +  R'D'DR] 1 Qol7o +  R'D'Y* °
Vt" =  Vt -  Vdt -  i/R t
h- 1
(4.10)
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This regression can be estimated using Theorem 9.1 (or Theorem 9.3) in 
Bauwens, Lubrano and Richard (1999).
Prior of B  and E A non-informative prior is applied: 
g(B, E) oc ISI-O'+'V2
Posterior of B  and E Let k equal the number of columns of W. The posterior 
densities of B  and E are given by:
B  ~  Mt kxn(B ,W 'W ,S ,T - k )  
e  ~  IW n(S,T)
where
B  -  ( W 'w y 'W Y  
s  = (Y  — W B )'(Y  — W B)
Mt and IW refer to the matricvariate Student and inverted Wishart distributions 
respectively.
Generating (3 using griddy Gibbs sampling
I now turn to the problem of estimating the cointegrating vector (3. Let g(P) be the 
prior for (3. Following Bauwens et al. (1999, Theorem 9.3), the kernel of (3 is given 
by:
g[p\vr) oc g {m 'V o P \iol\P'ViP\h (4.11)
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where
K0 =  Z ’MXZ
Vi =  Z'M y [It  ~  X (X 'M y X ) - 1X'}My Z  
=  Z'M x {It -  Y (Y 'M x Y ) - lY'}Mx Z
Mx  = I t - X ( X ,X ) ) - 1X ', My = I t - Y ( Y 'Y ) ) - 1 Y ' (4.12)
lo = ( T - k - n ) / 2 , h  = ( T - k ) / 2  (4.13)
Note that when the first element of {3 is normalized to one, the task reduces to 
sampling from the univariate conditional posterior distribution of /%• Some analyt­
ical results are available. Bauwens et al. (1999, Corollary 9.4) show that under a 
non-informative prior for (3—which is the simplest case—, the posterior density of 
(3 is a 1-1 poly-t density. However, the simulation of a 1-1 poly-t density is by no 
means easy and involves a substantial fixed cost in terms of programming (for an 
algorithm, see Bauwens and Richard, 1985).
For this reason, I apply the griddy Gibbs sampler as proposed by Ritter and 
Tanner (1992). The griddy Gibbs sampler is an attractive device whenever it is 
difficult to directly sample from g(0i\yr, 0-i),  the posterior density of a parameter 
Oi conditional on the data and all other parameters of the model. The idea is to form 
a simple approximation to the inverse cdf of this density based on the evaluation 
of g(0i\yT, 0-i) on a grid of points. The procedure consists of the following steps 
(letting j  denote the current Gibbs iteration):
Step 1 Specify a grid for Q{, say 0*,!, 0ij2, • • •, 0itn.
Step 2 Evaluate g(0i\yT, 0-i), using the most recently simulated values for 0-i, to 
obtain wi, W2 , . . . ,  wn.
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Step 3 Use wi,W 2 , .. - ,wn to obtain an approximation to the empirical inverse cdf 
of g(0i\yT, 0-i). Denote the approximate inverse cdf as F _1(>).
Step 4 Draw a uniformly distributed random variable on [0,1], to obtain 0 ^  =
To simulate (3, 1 use a piecewise linear approximation to the empirical inverse 
cdf based on the posterior density of /3 given in equation (4.11). Ritter and Tanner 
(1992) discuss a number of possible enhancements to the procedure, regarding for 
example the adjustment of the grid or the approximation to the inverse cdf. How­
ever, I find that already a simple approximation and a uniformly spaced, stable grid 
do a satisfactory job.
Design of the Gibbs sampler
The Gibbs sampling scheme is run over 5000 iterations, of which the first 2500 
simulations are discarded.
To start the sampling algorithm, initial values for the parameters are specified. 
As an starting value for the cointegrating vector, (3, 1 take the estimate from a stan­
dard vector error correction model with constant, non-switching intercepts. I further 
choose 0.5 as the initial value for the transition probabilities. E is set to equal the 
identity matrix. All other parameters are set to zero. The estimation results appear 
robust to changes in these specifications.
4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Parameter estimates
The model is estimated with two different assumptions regarding the prior for the 
transition probabilities. The exact way of choosing the prior is discussed in ap­
pendix 4.3.3. The estimations were carried out using a lag length, h, of 4.
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Using a non-informative prior
I first use a flat prior for p and q. The problem of using a non-informative prior is 
that during some periods during the sampling, the draws for p and q are unreason­
ably low. Even though most of the density mass of the posterior density for these 
parameters lies in the region between 0.8 and 0.9, there is still substantial mass in 
the lower tail of the density. This indicates that the transition probabilities occa­
sionally pick up seasonal and short-term fluctuations. Figure 4.1 plots the estimated 
probability of being in regime 1. However, the graph shows that even with a non- 
informative prior, the shifts of the model from one regime to another are clearly 
discernible.
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Figure 4.1: Regime probabilities (non-informative prior). Probability of regime with
high current account intercept, using a non-informative prior for transition probabilities.
Using an informative prior
Problems with non-informative priors similar to the one described here also arise in 
the literature that applies Bayesian Markov-switching models to business cycle data 
(see for instance Kim and Nelson, 1998). The usual approach in that literature is to 
specify informative priors for the parameters, in particular the transition probabili­
ties, incorporating what is known or believed about the average duration of business
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Posterior
Parameter Mean Median 95% interval
(h -8.1007 -8.0739 -12.959, -3.2084
vz 0.0087018 0.0088984 0.0052300, 0.011701
0.0014273 0.0015046 -0.0016909, 0.0043625
7ro,i 0.62112 0.62868 0.26509, 0.94602
7T0,2 -0.014415 -0.014345 -0.066190, 0.037404
7Tl,ll 0.31336 0.31591 0.14062, 0.47756
a i -0.13553 -0.13760 -0.20700, -0.057856
CM2 0.0018925 0.0018812 -0.0092233,0.012690
<4 0.0021501 0.0020339 0.0015372, 0.0030898
&SZ 1.1063e-005 1.1406e-005 -3.3642e-005, 5.5744e-005
q 0.90972 0.91071 0.87221, 0.94157
p 0.90668 0.90811 0.87208, 0.93748
Table 4.3: Parameter estimates. Posterior estimates of selected parameters.
Mean, median and 95% interval of the Gibbs simulations for each parameter, after 
discarding initial simulations (see section 4.3.3).
cycle phases. I proceed in a similar way here by choosing priors for p and q that 
give a low weight to transition probabilities that would imply very frequent current 
account reversals (details in appendix 4.3.3) . 1
Table 4.3 presents the estimation results for a subset of the parameters using 
these priors. Figure 4.2 plots the Gibbs simulations for several parameters, along 
with a correlogram indicating the degree of serial correlation of the drawings. Also 
drawn are the simulated posterior densities of the parameters, which all appear well­
shaped. Figure 4.3 plots the estimated probability of being in regime 1. Periods 
when the current account, and thus the exchange rate, are strengthening (regime 1), 
are again clearly distinguished from the other periods when the current account is 
downward-drifting (regime 0 ).
The reader might be surprised by the fact that the current account intercept in 
regime 1, which is given by the sum of 7To,2 and vz, is slightly negative. Since 
regime 1 corresponds to an upward-drifting current account, one might expect a 
positive sum of both intercept parameters here. However, it turns out that the lagged 
parameters by themselves already generate an upward drift in the current account.
1 Alternatively, one could smooth the current account to remove its short-term fluctuations and 
then estimate the model using a non-informative prior.
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In the upper-right panel of figure 4.4, we can see that the current account is upward- 
drifting when the regime-switching intercept is set to its time-invariant average. 
Since the latter must negative, it must be the lagged parameter matrices in the vector 
error correction model that account for the upward trend in the current account in 
regime 1.
Markov-switching models are popular since they provide a visual test of the 
structural breaks in time series. Figure 4.3 shows that the model presented in this 
chapter does an excellent job in distinguishing different regimes in Japan’s external 
performance. The quality of the results compares favourably with other Markov- 
switching studies, which in many cases present the reader economic booms and 
recessions she already knew exist. Moreover, both table 4.3 and figure 4.2 show 
that the posterior distributions of the transition probabilities p and q are clearly 
bounded away from 1, which is further confirms the cyclical nature of the Japan’s 
external surplus.
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Figure 4.2: Gibbs simulations (informative prior). Posterior distributions of selected
parameters, using an informative prior for transition probabilities.
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Figure 4.3: Regime probabilities (informative prior). Probability of regime with high
current account intercept, using an informative prior for transition probabilities.
4.4.2 Exchange rate simulations with and without current ac­
count shifts
I have carried out some simulations of the estimated model in order to assess the 
significance of its regime-switching component for the variability of the current ac­
count and the exchange rate. I simulate the model twice (with an identical sequence 
of random shocks hitting the variables in both cases). The simulation period is sixty 
years, not taking into account an initial warming-up period. In the first simulation, 
I generate artificial time series for the current account and exchange rate from the 
estimated model. In the second simulation, I set the regime-switching intercept of 
the current account to its time-invariant average, which I can evaluate on the basis 
of the estimated values for 7r0)2, vz% p and q. This exercise is meant to give us an 
idea of what would happen to the exchange rate once all structural breaks of its fun­
damental are eliminated. The results, which are shown in figure 4.4, indicate that 
without the long swings in the current account, exchange rate fluctuations over the 
longer term could be much smoother.
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Figure 4.4: Simulating exchange rate dynamics. Simulation of current account (top)
and nominal exchange rate (bottom) from the estimated model, over a period of 60 years. 
Simulations of the original model with switching regimes (panels on the left), and of a 
single-regime version of the model where the stochastic trend of the current account variable 
is set to its estimated average (panels on the right).
4.5 Conclusions
I have estimated a Markov-switching vector error correction model of the Japanese 
real effective exchange rate and current account. Two general observations are un­
derlying the model. First, Japan is a country where the exchange rate is predomi­
nantly influenced by a single economic fundamental, the current account. Second, 
the movement of the Japanese current account alters is direction from time to time. 
Taken together, these two findings imply that the current account exhibits large 
swings over the years, which translate into similarly large swings of the exchange 
rate.
In the model, the current account contains a stochastic trend that switches be­
tween two regimes, or states, according to an unobservable Markov process. The 
exchange rate itself is modelled as independent of the regimes. However, since it 
is cointegrated with the current account, it follows the movements of the current 
account and adjusts to current account reversals whenever they occur. A simula­
tion exercise demonstrates that the effect of the shifts between the regimes is rather
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large. The fluctuations of the exchange rate and its fundamental are large when 
regime switching is allowed for. They become much smaller once the model is 
simulated without the regime changes.
The econometric analysis in this chapter is motivated by the empirical, historical 
and theoretical arguments in favour of the flow market model in chapter 2. Its point 
of reference is the theoretical framework in chapter 3, which explores the implica­
tions of the balance of payments accounting identity for the dynamic behaviour of 
international payment flows, exchange rates and the current account. This theoret­
ical framework is not actually tested or proven. This does not mean, however, that 
the analysis is purely hypothetical. First, the fact that the current account and real 
exchange rate are positively (!) cointegrated is consistent with the flow approach, 
whereas it stands in clear conflict with the presumption of most economists that the 
real exchange rate is negatively related to the level of the trade balance. Moreover, 
both chapter 5 and chapter 6  provide compelling econometric evidence in favour of 
our theoretical hypotheses set out in chapter 3 concerning the bi-directional rela­
tionship between the Japanese current account and exchange rate.
The chapter provides a reflection on the data generation process driving Japan’s 
two key external variables. It seeks to explain the strong appreciation of the yen and 
its large variability, which have had important implications for Japan’s economic 
performance in recent years. But the motivation of this chapter goes even further. 
The more general intention is to highlight the issues on which empirical research 
on exchanges rates should focus in the future.
First, an often raised question in exchange rate economics is whether exchange 
rates are driven by economic fundamentals (MacDonald, 1999a). In an influential 
paper, Meese and Rogoff (1983a) demonstrated twenty years ago that a simple ran­
dom work can outperform many fundamentals-based exchange rate models in terms 
of out-of-sample forecasting performance. What the present study of Japan seeks to 
demonstrate is that fundamentals can be strongly relevant for medium- and long-run 
exchange rate fluctuations.2
2This is, by the way, just the view of market participants: Cheung and Wong (2000) have recently 
carried out a survey of practitioners in the interbank foreign exchange markets in Hong Kong, Tokyo, 
and Singapore. They report that at the medium-run horizon, between 29% (Tokyo) and 35% (Hong 
Kong) of the replies assert that exchange rate variation is determined by economic fundamentals. The 
proportion of respondents who hold the same opinion for exchange rates in the long run increases to 
76% from Hong Kong and 82% from Tokyo.
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Second, there has been a lot of controversy over the validity of purchasing power 
parity (PPP). The PPP puzzle (Rogoff, 1996) concerns the question of why devia­
tions from PPP are so persistent. The average half-life of a shock to PPP is estimated 
to be around three to five years, which is difficult to explain with nominal rigidities 
alone. By studying carefully the experience of an individual country, namely Japan, 
this chapter finds that long-lasting deviations of the real exchange rate from pur­
chasing power parity may be the result of large and persistent movements of the 
underlying economic fundamentals. Rather than asking why the law of one price 
does not lead to a faster adjustment towards PPP, the chapter suggests that research 
should focus on the economic forces that produce to deviations from PPP in the first 
place.
Third, partly as a consequence of the poor empirical performance of PPP mod­
els, researchers have recently turned to nonlinear exchange rate modelling (Michael, 
Nobay and Peel, 1997; Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997; Taylor and Peel, 2000). Non­
linear time series models of exchange rates are often motivated by the idea that 
transportation costs reduce arbitrage opportunities in international goods markets, 
implying that small deviations from PPP can be persistent. This chapter shows that 
what is unsatisfactory with existing nonlinear time series models of exchange rates 
is that they are generally univariate. Univariate models have difficulties to explain 
why exchange rates deviate from PPP or why deviations, even large ones, are so 
persistent.
A decade ago, Engel and Hamilton (1990) discovered "long swings in the US 
dollar". This chapter has demonstrated that the Japanese exchange rate exhibits long 
swings as well. In contrast to the study by Engel and Hamilton, the analysis in this 
chapter takes on a multivariate perspective, and it is suggesting that the large swings 
in the yen are linked to similar persistent movements of its economic fundamental.
The chapter also offers a technical innovation. The vector error correction model 
that has been estimated in this chapter contains a Markov-switching intercept only 
in the equation of the exchange rate fundamental. A model specified in this way has 
not been analyzed before. As the chapter demonstrates, estimation is feasible in a 
Bayesian context using a Gibbs sampling procedure.
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Appendix 4.A Software
The computations for this chapter were carried out using Ox, version 3.0 (see 
Doomik and Ooms, 2001), and PcFiml (see Doomik and Henry, 1997). The pro­
grams are available from the author upon request. Separate code was written for 
generating random numbers from the matricvariate Student and inverted Wishart 
distributions. In order to sample from the matricvariate Student distribution, I used 
the algorithm in Bauwens et al. (1999, Appendix B.4.5). As regards the inverted 
Wishart distribution, I translated to Ox a Gauss code that I kindly received from 
Luc Bauwens.
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Chapter 5 
Japan’s imbalance of payments
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter proposed a nonlinear vector error correction model as a means 
to empirically model the large balance of payments and exchange rate fluctuations 
of the Japanese economy. The model included only two variables, the current ac­
count and the exchange rate, so as to provide a parsimonious representation of the 
relationships between different balance of payments components, international cash 
flow and the exchange rate, which had been described in section 2 .2 .1  (see fig­
ure 2 .2 ).
This chapter takes a different approach and seeks to model international pay­
ment flows explicitly in order to give further support to the hypotheses of sec­
tion 2.2.1. Now aren’t international payment flows readily available from coun­
tries’ balance of payment statistics? One concern is that the published balance of 
payments statistics are notoriously poor in quality. However, a still more important 
problem is that international payment flows do not enter the published balance of 
payments statistics as a separate item, in Japan as little as elsewhere (Kenen, 2000). 
International payments comprise changes in bank balances and other cash flows
The chapter is a shortened version of a CESifo working paper (Miiller-Plantenberg, 20036). 
This paper has been presented at the Workshop on "Economic Stagnation in Japan" at the CESifo 
Venice Summer Institute 2003, the International Financial Stability Programme at the CEP (LSE), 
the 9th Spring Meeting for Young Economists (SMYE) in Warsaw and the 19th Annual Congress of 
the European Economic Association (EEA) in Madrid.
165
Japan’s imbalance of payments
and are scattered across the portfolio balance. There is no simple way to infer their 
movements from the fluctuations of the portfolio balance or its subcomponents.
This chapter proposes an indirect way to estimate international cash flow. It fo­
cuses on Japan’s current account and its debt securities balance. Current account 
transactions are in part debt-financed and therefore cause both immediate and de­
ferred payments. To assess the relative importance of the lags between current 
account transactions and the resulting payments, it is crucial to have an idea about 
the maturity structure of foreign lending and debt. As this chapter will demonstrate, 
the maturity structure of net foreign debt can be inferred from the joint evolution 
of the current account and the debt balance. Once an estimate of the debt maturity 
structure is obtained, it becomes possible to construct a simulated series of cash 
flow vis-a-vis Japan and to compare it to the movements of the Japanese exchange 
rate.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the empirical model 
for simulating cross-border payment flows for Japan. Section 5.3 considers eco­
nomic implications of the previous analysis for Japan’s current economic crisis. 
Section 5.4 provides overall conclusions.
The large share of the debt securities balance in Japan’s capital account is of 
great advantage as it enables us to determine the cash flow associated with the flow 
of debt securities to and from Japan. The next section will measure these cash flows 
and will show that the flows of payments resulting from the current account and the 
debt securities balance together can already explain a large part of the movements 
of the yen over the years.
5.2 Simulating currency flows
5.2.1 A cash flow model
This section attempts to empirically simulate the flows of payments between Japan 
and the rest of the world. For this purpose, the following model has been set up. 
Let zt denote the current account, dt the debt securities balance and c* the flow of 
cross-border payments, or cash flow (more specifically, the cash flow that arises
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from transactions that are recorded in the current account and the debt securities 
balance). Suppose that current account transactions in a given period are either 
immediately paid for or financed through debt of different maturities:
c°t =  -n o zt 
d] = - f i i z t
d\ =  (5.1)
d\ =  -IJL3Zt
where debt issued in period t is indexed by its maturity and denoted as d\, with 
i =  1,2, . . . ,  oo. Debt maturity is defined here as the actual, or ex-post, maturity. 
For example, if foreign debt held by Japanese investors has a 1-year maturity and is 
rolled over twice, the actual maturity is taken to be 3 years.
Consequently, cash payments in any given period have to be made for part of 
the current commercial transactions as well as for any debt falling due:
II= ~IM)Zt
=  <4-i
c(“2 =  <4-2
cr3 =  <4-3
Here, c^% represents that part of the cash flow in period t that results from debt 
issued i periods ago. It follows from equations (5.1) and (5.2) that the overall cash 
flow in period t depends on all the present and past current account balances:
oo oo oo
«  =  £  ci ‘ =  - r t )2* +  = ViZt-i- (5.3)
0 i= l  i=0
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The debt balance, dt, is the sum of the debt incurred in period t, less all debt 
settled in the that period:
The debt balance is thus also a function of present and past current account balances:
L  is the lag operator and a(L) = ao +  o l\L 1 +  a 2 ^ 2 +  • • •
The problem is that the cash flow variable, q , is not directly observed. The 
reason is that payment flows across international borders do not enter the balance 
of payments as a separate item. Instead, they enter various subcomponents. For 
example, some cash flows, such as changes in bank balances, appear in the "other 
investment" item in the financial account. However, "other investment" also in­
cludes trade credits and loans, thus making it difficult to infer cash flow movements 
from the movements of the "other investment" balance.
With knowledge of /x*, i = 0,1, . . . ,  however, ct can be indirectly obtained from 
equation (5.3). For i =  1,2,. . . ,  the parameters /x* coincide with the parameters a* 
of the infinite lag polynomial in equation (5.5).
The current account, zt, and the debt balance, dt, can theoretically fluctuate 
independently over time, as long as the gap between the two is made up by move­
ments in other components of the capital account. Figure 2.6 shows, however, that 
both the current account and the debt securities balance have moved quite closely 
together over time. This suggests that other balance of payment components can­
oo oo
(5.4)OO OO
oo
(5.5)
i= 0
where
oo
(5.6)
i= 1
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celled each other out, at least roughly; thus, to keep things simple, they are not 
further considered here.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (not reported) show that the null hypothesis of a 
unit root cannot be rejected for zt, nor for dt. While individually 1(1), the Japanese 
current account and debt securities balance appear to be cointegrated, that is, a 
linear combination of both variables exists that is 1(0). To test for cointegration, 
Johansen’s (1988) procedure is applied, and it is found that the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration can be rejected at the 1% significance level (see table 5.1).
Ho Ha Trace test p-value
r = 0 r > 0 22.750 [0.003] **
r < 1 r > 1 2.2928 [0.130]
Table 5.1: Testing for cointegration. Testing for the number o f distinct cointe- 
grating vectors, using 2 lags. Double asterisks (**) mark significance at the 1% 
level.
Based on these results, the relationship between the two balance of payments 
components can be modelled as an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model:
p q
dt — K +  7 jdt- j  +  PjZt-i  +  Eti ^  N(0, cr2 ) .  (5.7)
i=1 i= 0
The infinite lag polynomial in equation (5.5) can then be obtained by dividing 
the distributed lag polynomial by the autoregressive lag polynomial of the ARDL 
model:
a(L) = M  (5 .8 )
where 7 (L) =  1 -  7 1 L -  7 2 L 2 -  . . .  -  7 VU  and p(L) = /30  +  (3iL +  . . .  +  (3qLq.
Quarterly data from 1977 to 2002 were used in the estimation. The data were 
taken from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics. The lag lengths, p and q, in 
the ARDL model were both set to 3.
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5.2.2 Simulation results
The values of ct were now simulated, based on equations (5.3), (5.6) and (5.8). Note 
that we do not have an estimate of The solution adopted here is to simply set it 
equal to a 0, suggesting that current accounts are financed to one half by direct cash 
payments, to the other half by debt. This is but a convenient assumption, but it was 
found that raising /x0 above or below this value did not affect the results too much.
Quarterly data on the Japanese current account from 1968Q1 to 1999Q4 were 
used in the simulation; these had previously been constructed from a biannual cur­
rent account series contained in the OECD’s Economic Outlook database. Only the 
first 8 lags of the polynomial ol{L) were used for the simulation, which helped to 
avoid losing too many observations for the simulation.
  S im u la te d  in te rn a tio n a l p a y m e n ts
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Figure 5.1: Japan’s imbalance of payments. Simulated net international payments
to Japan, as an indicator of yen order flow, shown together with net sales of reserves (top 
panel, in trillions of yen, reserve sales drawn as index bars), and nominal effective exchange 
rate (bottom panel, in logarithms). Source: Economic Outlook (OECD), IFS (IMF), own 
calculations.
The outcome of the simulation is shown in figure ??. The movements of the 
international flows of payments across Japan’s borders coincide remarkably closely 
with those of the Japanese exchange rate. The mean lag of a(L),  which indicates 
the average maturity of foreign debt, is 1.653 quarters. The figure also plots net 
sales of Japanese reserve assets, which appear relatively small compared with the 
aggregate cash flow facing the Japanese economy.
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5.3 Japan’s economic stagnation
If the proposition underlying the previous two sections is correct—namely, that the 
yen’s nominal exchange rate was, by and large, driven by trade and capital flows 
over the years—what does this imply for the analysis of Japan’s current economic 
problems? And what should we think of proposals to devalue the yen to revive the 
Japanese economy?
5.3.1 The downside of success 
A hard landing
Japan has for a long time been admired across the globe for its economic perfor­
mance, in particular for its international competitiveness and export strength. The 
traditionally high saving rate helped Japan to become the largest creditor nation in 
the world. The unhappy end of this success story is now evident to everyone. The 
analysis of this chapter can shed some light on where the downside of success lies.
This chapter suggests that, notwithstanding other factors, Japan’s large and sus­
tained current account surpluses are at the root of its current economic problems. 
By pushing up the yen very strongly over decades, they have contributed to the 
deflationary pressures, from which the economy has been suffering from for quite 
some time.
Of course, removing the external surplus would fix the problem according to the 
logic applied here. Yet the current account is not a policy variable, and at any rate 
a strong demand for Japanese exports seems to provide a welcome stimulus for the 
economy at this moment. Policy-makers naturally look for other kinds of remedies, 
namely for measures they can control (at least in principle).
What scope for monetary policy?
Consider monetary policy. With interest rates hitting zero, the Bank of Japan’s only 
way to induce money growth is to keep printing money. But the bank has already 
bought government bonds, and thus created money, on a large scale. The monetary
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base has increased at an annual rate of almost 25% over the past two years (The 
Economist, 19 June 2003). Yet this has not led to higher growth in broad money. 
Instead, bank lending has continued to fall. Banks are reluctant to lend, as they are 
already piled up with bad loans. Moreover, indebted firms are unwilling to borrow 
in the present deflationary environment.
An equally important question is whether monetary policy has been too strict 
prior to the crisis, and thus to what extent it may have been contributing to the overly 
strong yen. This chapter cannot give a detailed answer to this question. However, 
an examination of the data suggests that money growth in Japan was actually quite 
strong in comparison with other countries. According to the OECD’s Economic 
Outlook, the money stock in Japan grew at an annual average of 9.1% from 1970 
to 2000, compared with 7.3% and 7.8% in the United States and Germany, respec­
tively. For comparison, the volume of GDP in Japan rose on average by 3.2% per 
year, whereas in the US and Germany, it increased by 2.9% and 2.7%, respectively.
There is an interesting parallel to currency crises. In the aftermath of such crises, 
it is tempting to put the blame on fiscal and monetary policies for being too loose. 
Yet during the currency crises of the 1990s, the macroeconomic policies prior to the 
crises had been considered sound in many of the countries affected. Instead, it has 
often been sharp withdrawals of foreign funds after long periods of foreign lending 
that made currencies collapse. There is thus a lesson for Japan. When external 
imbalances start to shift the relative demand for national monies, it can be just as 
hard to defend a currency as to keep it from rising.
5.3.2 Devalue the yen?
Many economists advocate a big depreciation of the yen through intervention in 
the foreign exchange markets in the current situation (see, for example, Svensson, 
2001). Japanese prices have been falling since 1995, and devaluation is viewed 
by many as one of the few policy tools left to fight deflation. First, a cheaper yen 
would boost exports, and this would stimulate the economy. Second, through higher 
import prices, it would presumably push up inflation, stimulating consumption and 
investment and decreasing the real value of debt in the economy. However, given
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that Japan’s imports account for only 10% of GDP, an ordinary devaluation wouldn’t 
suffice— it would have to be substantial.
The rest of this section will address two questions: Is a devaluation of the yen 
feasible? How much would it help, or might it even be harmful?
Magnitude of intervention
Using foreign exchange intervention to lower the yen seems straightforward. All 
there is to do for the Japanese authorities is to print large amounts of yen to buy 
dollar bonds. So isn’t this the point where the parallels with currency crises end? 
When a central bank tries to support a currency, it quickly runs out of reserves. In 
Japan, however, it would appear that intervention does not face similar limitations.
J a pan ........... Industrial countries-----------All countries
V \ /  \
~T'\ / •“V.A
- > - ~
Figure 5.2: Japan’s share of world reserves. Japan’s share of total reserves of all
countries, plotted alongside the industrial countries’ share of worldwide reserves (monthly 
data, excluding gold reserves). Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
Yet the facts are that Japan has been acquiring reserves on an unprecedented 
scale in recent years. What’s more, Japan’s share of all reserves held worldwide has 
risen substantially since 1993, as can be seen from figure ??. Interestingly, reserve 
holdings by other industrial countries have declined sharply over the same period. 
Out of industrial countries’ reserves, Japan now holds a share of 45.6% (2001M11), 
up from only 12.0% nine years back (1992M9).
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In the past, appreciations of the yen have almost always been associated with 
increases in reserves. Yet even large interventions do not appear to have helped 
much to prevent the yen from rising. From the empirical analysis in this chapter, it 
seems clear why. Consider once more figure ??, which plots the simulated cash flow 
together with the changes in Japanese reserves. The impression is that intervention 
has seldom been more than a small fraction of the economy-wide payments across 
the border. It is therefore not surprising that their impact should have been limited.
What do the actual market participants think? Cheung and Wong (2000) have 
recently carried out a survey of practitioners in the interbank foreign exchange mar­
kets of Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore. They find that the participants in the 
Tokyo market "have the most pessimistic views on intervention in terms of restoring 
equilibrium values, being conducted at the right moment, and achieving the goal". 
Of the respondents in the Tokyo market, 6 8 .1 % did not think that central bank inter­
vention achieved its goal, whereas in the Hong Kong and Singapore markets, 60.8% 
and 58.7%, respectively, believed that it did.
Undesired effects
When Japan hit an export boom in the past, it usually sent the inflowing proceeds 
abroad straightaway, for example by investing in US Treasury bonds. It was not 
until the foreign debt became due that the exchange rate appreciated. This is what 
needs to be kept in mind when contemplating a large-scale intervention to bring 
down the yen. Intervention needs to be perpetuated if it is to be effective; otherwise, 
interest and amortisation payments will soon undo its initial effects.
There is also another potential "boomerang" effect that could take effect after 
a devaluation and that one needs to take into account. If efforts to devalue the yen 
succeed, this may spur exports and thus create another wave of incoming cash flow. 
The relationship between the real exchange rate and current account is not a simple 
one for Japan—after all, its current account surplus has kept rising despite the long­
term appreciation of the yen. However, Muller-Plantenberg (2003a) has shown that 
large real exchange rate changes did tend to bring about reversals of the temporary 
trends of the current account (rather than its level). Thus once devaluation succeeds 
to create another export boom, an appreciation of the yen might soon follow. It 
would not have to come immediately—as we know by now. But it would come.
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5.4 Conclusions
Over a long period of time, the Japanese exchange rate has followed the movements 
of the current account quite closely. Long swings in the current account translated 
into similar swings in the exchange rate. In general, export booms pushed up the 
yen, while slumps in net exports made it fall. However, it often took some time— 
usually up to one or two years—until the exchange rate had fully adjusted.
This chapter suggests that flows of international payments between Japan and 
the rest of the world have been a crucial driving force behind the yen. Importantly, 
these flows are related to the balance of payments. For instance, current account 
transactions that have to be paid for straight away lead to an instantaneous flow of 
cash, whereas debt-financed transactions can give rise to a flow of payments that is 
spread-out over time.
Japan, the world’s largest creditor, has used the proceeds of its current account 
surpluses primarily to lend abroad, investing heavily in foreign debt securities. This 
chapter shows how it is possible to estimate the maturity structure of this lending 
based on the information contained in the current account and debt balances. It uses 
the maturity structure of foreign lending to simulate international payment flows 
and shows that their movements are remarkably similar to those of the Japanese 
exchange rate.
These findings lead directly to the question of whether the present economic 
crisis in Japan could have been averted or whether something can be done to over­
come it. Here, the answer is a cautious one. It is pointed out that the strong yen 
and the deflationary pressure to which it contributed are not necessarily the result of 
bad policy-making. A parallel is drawn to experiences in the 1990s when countries 
were hit by currency crises even though they had, in more than one instance, fol­
lowed sound fiscal and monetary policies. Likewise, it is found that the large-scale 
acquisition of reserves is unlikely to fix the problem. Japan has, as a matter of fact, 
amassed foreign exchange reserves on an unprecedented scale over recent years.
Going beyond Japan, the findings of this chapter point to a number of potential 
economic fallacies. They concern fundamental questions such as whether the real 
exchange rate is driven by the nominal exchange rate, particularly at longer hori­
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zons, or vice versa; whether and how exchange rates are linked to economic funda­
mentals (Meese and Rogoff, 1983a); or why it is that deviations from purchasing- 
power parity are so large and persistent (Rogoff, 1996).
In recent decades, the world has witnessed an ever greater integration of its na­
tional economies and financial markets. At the same time, industrial countries have 
reduced their inflation rates and committed themselves to inflation levels close to 
zero. A conclusion from this chapter is that large external imbalances can have 
a strong and persistent impact on the exchange rates of different monies. Differ­
ences in inflation rates are both an outcome of this—as a result of the pass-through 
of exchange rates on import prices—and a requirement to overcome lasting real 
exchange rate misalignments. Thus Japan’s inflation rate has stayed almost two 
percent below the weighted inflation rate of its trading partners for many years. 
While low international inflation rates are widely welcomed, one should not over­
look that they have likely contributed to Japan’s present condition, which is marked 
by deflation and stagnation.
Appendix 5.A Data
The data used in this chapter were taken from the Balance of Payments Statistics 
and International Financial Statistics of the IMF and from the Economic Outlook of 
the OECD.
Appendix 5.B Software
The computations for this chapter were carried out using Ox, version 3.0 (see 
Doomik and Ooms, 2001), and PcFiml (see Doomik and Henry, 1997). The pro­
grams are available from the author upon request.
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Chapter 6
Current account reversals triggered 
by exchange rate movements
6.1 Introduction
There is a puzzling aspect to the data presented in section 2.2.1 that merits attention: 
It is surprising that Japan’s current account surplus, the ever-largest in the world, has 
been on the rise for more than two decades in spite of a sustained real appreciation 
of the yen during this period (see figure 2.5). Similarly, Germany experienced a 
boom in exports throughout the 1980s, just until the German unification, despite 
the considerable strength of the German mark (figure 2.9). Japan’s and Germany’s 
current account surpluses far exceed in value the surplus of other any other country 
at any time (figure 2 .8 ).
Whatever made these two countries so competitive, it was not the exchange 
rate. From 1980Q1 to 1995Q1, the yen for instance appreciated by 56 percent in 
real terms (based on WPI-based price indices). Despite considerable fluctuations, 
the currency has remained very strong in recent years. Although the German mark 
appreciated substantially in nominal terms in the 1980s, the currency did not ex­
perience an equally impressive real appreciation as the yen. However, being at the
The paper on which this chapter is based has been presented at the Macroeconomics PhD work­
shop at LSE, the International Financial Stability Programme at the CEP (LSE), the 8th Spring 
Meeting of Young Economists in Leuven, Belgium, and the 59th European Meeting of the Econo­
metric Society in Madrid.
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time the anchor currency of the EMS, the German mark was widely perceived as a 
hard currency and as such not really conducive to Germany’s strong export growth.
This chapter argues that the trade performance of both countries was neverthe­
less affected by the exchange rate. Based on the empirical evidence, it is noted that 
export booms were subject to various setbacks that often lasted for several quar­
ters or even years. Almost all of these setbacks, however, were preceded by, or 
occurred simultaneously with, strong exchange rate appreciations around the same 
period. Subsequent recoveries usually took place whenever the exchange rate had 
once again become more competitive.
Based on these observations, the chapter analyzes a Markov-switching time se­
ries model of the current account designed to capture the recurrent swings of this 
economic variable. There are two regimes, one in which the current account is head­
ing upwards, another one in which it is declining. A crucial feature of the setup is 
that the transition probabilities are time-varying and in particular allowed to depend 
on the exchange rate.
To analyze the model, the chapter employs a Bayesian estimation strategy. For 
inference on the parameter posteriors and on the unobserved regimes, the simulation 
tool of Gibbs sampling is used. The Gibbs sampler—a method that is based on the 
idea of alternating conditional simulations—turns the complex conditional structure 
of the model to its advantage.
Of particular economic interest is the question to what extent regime changes are 
explained by movements of the exchange rate. To assess this question, this chapter 
applies the methodology of Kim and Nelson (1998), which those authors used to 
study the duration dependence of business cycles. The idea is to apply a variable 
selection procedure to a latent variable regression that determines the regime that 
the current account is in. The specific variable selection method adopted is that 
proposed by Geweke (1996) in the context of Bayesian regression.
The topic of this chapter is related to the empirical literature on the sensitivity 
of trade flows to exchange rate changes. A typical finding in this literature is that 
import and export demand elasticities are rather low and that the Marshall-Lemer 
condition does not hold. Some authors have called the link between the real ex­
change rate and the real trade balance altogether into question (see Rose, 1990).
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Nevertheless, a consensus seems to exist that devaluations do improve the trade 
balance of countries although the effect may take a long time due to the J-curve 
effect.
Of interest in our context is the study of Kim (1998) who fails to detect an effect 
of exchange rate variations on Germany’s international competitiveness when using 
aggregate trade data from 1982 to 1991 (he finds, however, some effects for disag­
gregated data). Sawyer and Sprinkle (1997) offer a survey on this type of literature 
for Japan. They explicitly only consider studies that do not produce estimates with 
the "wrong" sign; even so, they find that imports are quite insensitive to changes 
in the exchange rate on average while exports appear to respond somewhat more 
strongly to the exchange rate.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 examines the time series evi­
dence of both countries. Section 6.3 introduces the empirical model. Section 6.4 
reports on the data used and discusses the choice of priors. Section 6.5 presents the 
main empirical findings. Section 6 .6  provides conclusions.
6.2 External performance of Japan and Germany
This chapter looks at two countries that experienced remarkable export booms in the 
1980s and 1990s. Consider once again figure 2.8, which gives us an idea of just how 
large Japan’s and Germany’s export surpluses were in US-dollar terms compared to 
those of other countries. Japan’s current account balance recorded the world’s ever- 
largest surplus during the past two decades, and it was mirrored to a large extent by 
the unprecedented current account deficit run by the United States. Germany also 
achieved a considerable surplus in the 1980s, which then turned into deficit due to 
the German reunification. The objective of this chapter is to understand the role that 
exchange rates have played in the evolution of these large external imbalances.
6.2.1 Japan
Consider figure 2.5 and 6.1, which plot the time series of Japan’s current account 
and of its nominal and real effective exchange rates during the 1970s, 1980s and
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Figure 6.1: Japanese current account and exchange rates (1980s and 1990s). Japanese 
current account (left scale, in trillions of yen) and nominal and real effective exchange 
rates (right scale, in logarithms), period from 1977Q1 to 2001Q1. Source: International 
Financial Statistics (IMF).
1990s. As has been pointed out, the Japanese current account did not rise in a sta­
ble fashion but was rather subject to repeated setbacks with subsequent recoveries. 
Overall, the current account exhibited several large swings, all of which lasted for 
several years.
The other remarkable feature of the data is that all large turnarounds of the 
current account were preceded by large movements in the exchange rate. This is 
true for the export booms setting off in 1974, 1980, 1990 and 1996 with the aid of 
a depreciated yen. It is also true for the episodes starting in 1973, 1978, 1986 and 
1993 when the current account began to weaken following large appreciations of 
the yen.
6.2.2 Germany
Consider now figure 6.2 which shows the corresponding time series for Germany. 
Apparently, the German experience is quite similar to that of Japan. Germany’s 
current account was also going through several upward and downward swings. And 
like in Japan, the temporary strength of the domestic currency, or its temporary
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Figure 6.2: German current account and nominal and real exchange rates (1980s).
German current account (centered, yearly moving average, left scale, in million DM) and 
nominal and real effective exchange rate (monthly data, 1980s). Source: Economic Outlook 
(OECD), IFS (IMF).
weakness, appears to have triggered many of the turnarounds in net exports. The 
effect is particularly noticeable in 1978, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1986 and to a lesser 
extent in 1987. Note that Germany’s current account balance alternated more fre­
quently between booms and declines than that of Japan.
6.2.3 Current account adjustment under uncertainty
Before embarking on an empirical analysis, this may be a good moment to think 
about the underlying economic reasons for the observed empirical regularities in 
both the Japanese and German data. There are in fact a number of plausible stories 
that can explain why it is the trend, rather than the level, of the current account 
that adjusts to exchange rate shifts. In both countries considered in this chapter, 
the current account movements were largely mirroring the performance of the trade 
balance in the periods considered. One possible explanation is therefore that import 
demands in Japan and Germany as well as in their trading partners’ economies were 
adjusting relatively slowly to changes in the real exchange rate. An important reason
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for this could be the well-documented low rate of pass-through from exchange rate 
movements to import prices.
However, a potentially even more compelling economic argument would focus 
on the supply side rather than the demand side and be based on ideas from real 
options theory (see for instance Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). As noted above, the 
fluctuations of the current account have been rather large in Japan and Germany. 
Achieving higher external surpluses, and likewise reducing them, always involves 
considerable capacity adjustments and requires large-scale investment decisions. 
Since these adjustments take place under uncertainty about the movements of the 
exchange rate, it is difficult to predict their future payoff. At the same time, such 
adjustments involve large costs that may even increase with the rate at which they 
take place. The upshot is that firms in the export sectors need to decide not only 
whether and to what extent to alter their production scale but also at what time and 
for which horizons to take their decisions. If exchange rate movements are close 
to firms’ previous forecasts, little adjustment may be needed. If the exchange rate 
moves in unforeseen directions, however, then firms will react by changing their 
production capacities and carrying out the necessary investments; they may even 
move their production abroad, as Japanese and German car makers demonstrated 
during the period considered here. There are good reasons that the adjustments will 
be gradual rather than abrupt. First, it may pay off for firms to not to precipitate 
their actions but to act prudently and to wait and observe whether exchange rate 
movements turn out to be persistent. And as was already noticed, they may incur 
lower costs by carrying out changes in a smooth, rather than impatient, manner.
In summary, there are a variety of plausible explanations that can rationalize 
the pattern in which the current account adjusts in response to exchange rate move­
ments. This chapter does not take a definite view on which theoretical argument 
has the most merit. Instead, it takes a more empirical focus as it primarily aims 
to characterize and examine the statistical link between exchange rate and current 
account movements.
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6.3 Empirical framework
6.3.1 Model
In this section, a univariate Markov-switching time series model with time-varying 
probabilities is introduced, which makes it possible to analyze the recurrent trend 
reversals of the Japanese and German current account balances. The model helps to 
determine whether the occurrence of these reversals depends on, or is triggered by, 
the real exchange rate.
The current account is denoted as zt and its changes as zt, where zt =  ( l - L )  Zt- 
The current account is modelled as an ARIMA(p, 1,0) process with a Markov- 
switching intercept:
Zt = ol +  (3Rt +  4>iZt~\ +  . . .  + (f)pZt-p +  £f, £ =  1,2, . . . ,T, (6.1)
where (3 > 0 and et ~  N(0, a2). R t is an unobserved random variable that takes 
the values 0 or 1, depending on the current account’s trend in a given period. For 
instance, with a < 0  and b > 0 , the current account is downward-trending if Rt =  0 
and upward-trending if Rt = 1 . Suppose that regime 1 prevails whenever a latent 
variable, R*, is positive, such that the probability of being in regime 1 is:
Prob(Rt = 1) =  Prob(tf* > 0). (6.2)
The latent variable, R*, is determined by the following equation:
Rt =  7o(l — R t- i) +  j iR t- i  + 6 qt + ut , (6.3)
where u t ~  N(0,1). The variable qt is a measure of real exchange rate pressure, 
to be discussed below. Since in this specification R*t depends on the lagged values
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of Rt, the transition probabilities of Rt are time-varying and may be calculated as 
follows:
Prob{Rt = l\R t- i  =  1) =  Prob(^* > =  1)
= Prob(71 + 6 qt +  u t > 0) (6.4)
=  Prob(ttt > —71  — 5 qt):
Prob (Rt = 0|i^_i =  0) =  Prob {R*t < 0 |^ _ i  =  0)
=  Prob(70 + 6 qt + u t <  0) (6.5)
=  Prob(iit < - 7 0  -  6  Qt).
Note that the transition probabilities depend on qt and are therefore time- 
varying, except in the case in which 5 =  0  when they become constant (the case 
of the standard Markov-switching model). Notice also that if 5 < 0, a reversal of 
a current account balance that is worsening (R t = 0 ) becomes more likely when 
the exchange rate is weak and competitive, whereas a strong currency will sooner 
or later tend to bring about a turnaround when the current account balance is on the 
rise (Rt = 1).
6.3.2 Variable selection
To assess whether 5 is nonzero, and therefore whether the exchange rate helps to 
predict current account reversals, I apply the variable selection methodology pro­
posed by Geweke (1996) in the context of Bayesian regression analysis. The method 
assumes that the prior distribution of S is a mixture of a—possibly truncated— 
normal and a discrete mass at zero. Let d be an indicator variable taking the value 1 
whenever 5 is nonzero, then:
= 0  if d = 0 ,
(6.6)
~N (5,u;2)i[a<*<u] i fd =  1 ,
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where I[*] refers to an indicator function that serves to truncate the normal prior for 
(5 at A and at v. Since it is reasonable to assume here that 6  < 0, let A =  — oo and
v = 0 .
Now let p denote the prior probability that d is 1 and let p denote the correspond­
ing posterior probability. Then p tells us the probability that the exchange rate is 
useful in explaining the probability of different regimes and should be retained in 
the model. Appendix 6 .B describes how p is calculated.
The issue of time-varying transition probabilities has been examined by a num­
ber of studies in the context of business cycles (see for instance Filardo and Gor­
don, 1998). The analysis in this chapter has been inspired by the study of Kim and 
Nelson (1998) who test whether during a business cycle, the probability that a boom 
or recession comes to an end depends on the time it has persisted already.
6.3.3 Inference
Bayesian estimation of the model proceeds via the Gibbs sampler. The details are 
deferred to appendix 6 .A. Appendix 6 .B describes how p can be calculated from the 
information delivered by the Gibbs simulations.
6.4 Data and specification of priors
6.4.1 Data
The data for Japan are taken from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. 
A WPI-based real exchange rate is used in the estimations. The current account 
of Japan is deseasonalized using a centered, yearly moving average. The sample 
period of the Japanese data is from 1978Q4 to 1998Q2. The data for Germany are 
taken from the Economic Outlook of the OECD. The German current account is 
deseasonalized using a centered, 12-month moving average. The sample period of 
the German data is from 1979M12 to 1989M9.
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6.4.2 Defining exchange rate pressure
As mentioned in the introduction, many authors belief that large movements of 
the real exchange rate do have impact on the trade balance but that the adjustment 
may take some time (see also Krugman, 1991). In assessing how the exchange 
rate affects their competitiveness, exporters and importers compare the most recent 
level of the exchange rate with the exchange rate they were adjusting to over recent 
years. In this model, the measure of exchange rate pressure, qt, is defined as the log 
of the ratio between the average real exchange rate during the previous year and the 
average real exchange rate during the previous three years:
Qt = Qt—ii (6.7)
where
I =  <
3 for quarterly data (Japan),
11 for monthly data (Germany),
11 for quarterly data (Japan),
35 for monthly data (Germany).
The definition of qt is simple and intuitive and makes it easy to interpret the empir­
ical results.
6.4.3 Choice of priors
In general, non-informative priors were adopted in the estimation of the model. 
This is true in particular for the parameter 6 , for which the prior parameterization 
6  = 0 and u 2 = 106 was chosen, see equation (6 .6 ). One might want to set p, 
the prior probability that d = 1 , to 0.5 or even higher, given the general belief that 
real exchange rates matter for the current account. However, to ensure that this 
assumption does not drive the results, the estimations were carried out with three 
alternative priors for p, namely 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75.
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6.5 Estimation
6.5.1 Estimation results
This section discusses the estimation results. The empirical findings for the two 
countries are quite similar and shall therefore be presented jointly.
Parameter
Posterior
Mean Median 90% interval
a -0.075593 -0.076182 -0.10439, -0.046257
P 0.19047 0.19263 0.13692,0.23745
4>i 0.69158 0.68348 0.51268,0.88568
<j>2 0.032266 0.035050 -0.18404,0.24281
4*3 -0.30266 -0.30395 -0.44706, -0.15467
a 2 0.0053193 0.0051891 0.0038878, 0.0071858
7 i -1.2197 -1.2186 -1.8556, -0.58558
72 1.5887 1.6042 0.91211,2.2351
6 -7.8497 -8.5782 -14.007, 0.00000
Table 6 .1: Parameter estimates for Japan. Mean, median and 90% interval of the 
simulated parameter posteriors.
Consider first the summary statistics for the simulated parameter posteriors of 
the Gibbs sampler, which are given in tables 6.1 and 6.2. Two things are worth not­
ing: First, the parameters a  and (3 are, respectively, negative and positive. The 
regime variable therefore distinguishes whether the current account is trending 
downwards or upwards. Second, 5 has the expected (negative) sign. An appre­
ciated currency will therefore tend to force the current account to weaken, and vice 
versa.
Since the Gibbs sampling scheme simulates the time series of the regime vari­
able during each iteration, it is possible to estimate the evolution of regimes by 
averaging over the simulations. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 depict the estimated regimes 
for Japan and Germany, respectively. For convenience, the time series of the cur­
rent accounts of both countries (deseasonalized, as used in the estimations). In both 
figures, the periods of each of the two regimes, 0  and 1 , are well identified.
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Parameter
Posterior
Mean Median 90% interval
a -28.814 -33.680 -76.491, 40.002
P 378.55 403.33 146.69,490.36
0 i -0.25651 -0.28727 -0.45136,0.071705
0 2 0.097839 0.079024 -0.061187,0.32538
03 -0.23256 -0.24443 -0.39510, -0.031404
04 -0.40391 -0.42418 -0.59101, -0.13973
(J2 24779. 23058. 17343., 39487.
7i -1.2219 -1.2669 -1.8451, -0.38496
72 0.92031 1.1187 -0.84297,1.6821
6 -15.000 -11.806 -43.148,-1.0441
Table 6.2: Parameter estimates for Germany. Mean, median and 90% interval of 
the simulated parameter posteriors.
The top panels of figures 6.5 and 6 .6  plot the estimated probabilities that a par­
ticular regime will persist, that is, Prob(i?f =  0 |f?t_i =  0 ) andProb(i?f =  l\R t-i = 
1). The transition probabilities for the regimes are easily calculated as one minus 
the plotted probabilities. Note that if S was zero, the transition probabilities would 
be constant. However, the estimated transition probabilities in figures 6.5 and 6 .6  
are clearly time-varying. This is due to the fact that the exchange rate does play 
a role in determining the trends and occasional reversals of the current account in 
both countries.
The lower panels of figures 6.5 and 6 .6  plot for each period the expected regime 
duration that would result if the transition probability prevailing in the particular 
period would remain at its present level. The graphs suggest that when the exchange 
rate is favourable to the prevailing trend of the current account, the trend may be 
expected to last very long, provided the exchange rate remains unaltered.
6.5.2 Significance of the exchange rate
Table 6.3 presents the posterior estimates of p, the probability that d = 1, under 
different assumptions about the prior probability, p. Both for Japan and Germany, 
there appears to be strong evidence in favour of including qt, the measure of ex­
change rate pressure, into the latent variable regression in equation (6.3).
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Figure 6.3: Regime probabilities (Japan). Top: Japanese current account (deseason­
alized). Bottom: mean posterior probabilities of the Japanese current account in regime 1, 
Prob (Rt = 1).
Japan: Prob(di =  1) Germany: Probfdi =  1)
Prior: p2 Posterior: P2 Prior: p2 Posterior: p2
0.25 0.84840 0.25 0.95120
0.5 0.86760 0.5 0.96040
0.75 0.87920 0.75 0.96760
Table 6.3: Posterior probabilities that d\ =  1 (Japan and Germany). Posterior 
probabilities p  that d = 1, using different priors, p , for Japanese and German data.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter applies a Markov-switching time series model with time-varying prob­
abilities to the current account balances of Japan and Germany. The current account 
is subject to occasional trend reversals whose probability is assumed to depend, 
among other things, on the level of the exchange rate. It is shown that Bayesian 
inference is feasible via a Gibbs sampling scheme. A variable selection procedure 
is used to investigate whether the real exchange rate helps to explain the occurrence 
of current account reversals.
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Figure 6.4: Regime probabilities (Germany) Top: German current account (deseason­
alized, in millions of German mark). Bottom: mean posterior probabilities of the German 
current account in being regime 1, that is, Prob(-R* =  1).
The chapter finds strong evidence of recurrent current account reversals, both in 
Japan and Germany. For each period, it presents posterior estimates of the probabil­
ity that the current account is in a particular regime (boom or decline) as well as of 
the time-varying probability that the current account will stay in that regime. The 
hypothesis that the real exchange rate can explain the occurrence of current account 
reversals is also supported by data. This result is robust to assumptions about priors 
and other aspects of the model.
This chapter offers a novel perspective regarding the impact of the exchange rate 
on the current account. Underlying the empirical model in this chapter is the idea 
that exchange rate movements can lead to a trend reversals of the current account in 
situations when they move too far away from their trend. In comparison, marginal 
changes in the exchange rate induce only minor adjustments. The chapter’s message 
therefore is that exchange rates only hurt when they move too strongly into the 
wrong direction.
The chapter may thus help to explain why empirical researchers have found it 
difficult to come up with reasonably large—or indeed correctly-signed—estimates 
for the sensitivity of trade flows to exchange rate movements. An interesting aspect
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Figure 6.5: Time-varying transition probabilities (Japan). Top panel: transition prob­
abilities, Prob[i?t =  0|.R£_i =  0] and Prob[i2< =  l \R t-i = 1], for Japan (for quarterly 
data). Bottom panel: expected duration of regime 0 and 1 (in quarters), computed from 
the transition probability in each period, on the assumption that the determinants of the 
transition probability remain unchanged.
of the setup used here is that even though the current account and the exchange rate 
are not independent, neither the level of the current account nor its changes need to 
be correlated with the exchange rate at all.
Further theoretical research would be desirable to better understand the apparent 
persistence of current account reversals that are set into motion by exchange rate 
fluctuations. Another interesting topic for future research is the possibility of a 
dynamic feedback from the current account to the exchange rate, for which there 
seems to be evidence both in the Japanese and German data (Muller-Plantenberg, 
2003c).
193
28
Current account reversals triggered by exchange rate movements
Expected duration of regime
1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990
1990
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
1980 1985
- Expected duration o f regime 0 (in
Prob[R(t)=l|R(t—1)=1] (mean, for quarters)
1.00 
0.75  
0.50  
0.25
 Prob[R(t)=0|R(t—1)=0] (mean, for quarters)
10.0
7.5 
5.0
2.5 
0.0
1985
1 (in quarters)
Figure 6.6: Time-varying transition probabilities (Germany). Top panel: transition
probabilities, Prob[i?t =  0|i?*_i =  0] and Probji^ =  l \R t- i  =  1], for Germany; calcu­
lated for quarters rather than months to facilitate comparison with the corresponding prob­
abilities for Japan. Bottom panel: expected duration of regime 0 and 1 (in quarters), com­
puted from the transition probability of each period, on the assumption that the determinants 
of the transition probability remain unchanged.
Appendix 6.A Bayesian estimation 
6.A.1 Gibbs sampling
To carry out Bayesian inference on the model, the simulation tool of Gibbs sampling 
is used. For an introduction to MCMC methods and the Gibbs sampler, see for 
example Gelman et al. (1995) and Kim and Nelson (1999).
The objective is to find a complete set of conditional distributions of all the pa­
rameters, on which the Gibbs sampling scheme can be run. It turns out that this 
task is facilitated once we treat the regimes, {R\, R 2, . . . ,  R t }, as well as the latent 
regimes, {R*y R %,. . . ,  }, as additional unknown parameters and analyze them
jointly with other parameters (Albert and Chib, 1993). Given the regimes and latent 
regimes, conditional inference on all other parameters amounts to the estimation 
of the parameters of two independent regression equations. Given the parameters,
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however, procedures are available that enable us to retrieve the conditional distribu­
tion of {Ri,  R2, . • •, Rt } and {R\,  R%, • • ■, Rt }-
6.A.2 Conditional structure of the model
For use below, define z =  [z\, z2, . . . ,  z t ]', R t  =  [Ri, R 2 , • • •, Rt]' and R ^ = 
[Ri, R%,. . . ,  R j]f and let (j>= [(j>i,<j)2 , . . .  ,4>p\f. To allow for general applicability, it 
is from now on assumed that, apart from the lagged regimes, there are m  variables 
in the latent regime equation (6.3), denoted q u ,i=  1,2, . . . ,  m. Define the T  x m  
data matrix qr =  [#«]'.
The conditional distributions that form the basis of the simulation are given by:
• a, P | zT, Rt , <t>, o1
•  a2 | zT, Rt , ol, P, <p
•  (j) | z r , R T,a,P,(T2
•  Rt | R_t, zt, R*t , a, /?, (j), a2, 7 1 , 7 2 , £*, t =  1,2 , . . . ,  T
•  | RT,h , lU l2 ,& i
•  7i> 72 |
•  ^ | Rqi, % T , l \ , l2 ,
where R - t =  [-Ri, R2 , • • •, i2t-i} #t+i>. . . ,  it/r]'- Each of these complete condition­
als can be simulated, thus leading, via the Gibbs sampler, to a posterior sample from 
the joint distribution of the parameters, the regimes and the latent regimes.
The Gibbs sampler converges rapidly and is run with 4500 iterations, the initial 
half of which are discarded.
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6.A.3 Simulation of parameters and regimes
Generating a  and p  The parameters a and (3 are generated conditional on zt, 
Rt , 4>, cr2. Consider the following regression:
<f>(L)zt = ot +  (3Rt +  Et, t=  1,2, . . .  ,T,
where </>(L) =  1 — .. .—(f)pLP. Define the matrices Y\ and X \ as the matrices of 
the left-hand-side and th£ right-hand-side variables of this regression, respectively. 
Let 6  =  [a, (3]', and let us adopt a normally distributed prior, 9 ~  N(0,0 ), where 
© is a diagonal matrix. The posterior is then given by:
6\zT,R T,<t>,<T2 ~  N(0,0),
where 0  =  (O’ 1 +  a~2 X i X x) - x and 0 = B{& -x0 + a ^ x p i ) .
Generating a 2 To generate a2 conditional on z t , R t, & and P, the following prior 
is employed:
~ i g ( 7 ’ j )-
where IG refers to the inverted Gamma distribution and i>\ and z>2 are appropriately 
chosen (here i>\ and z>2 are both set to zero, implying a non-informative prior). The 
posterior is then given by:
a 2 fzT,R T, a , l 3 ~ l G ( ^ , ^ ) ,
where = v\ +  T  and z>2 =  z>2 +  (Yi — Xi0y(Yi — X\9).
Generating <j> The parameters </>i, . . . ,  (j)p are generated conditional on zt, Rt ,
P, a2. Consider the following regression:
— a  — PRt = (piZt-\ +  . . .  +  (ppZf—p +  £t, t = 1,2, . . . ,  T.
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Define the matrices Y2 and X 2 as the matrices of the left-hand-side and the 
right-hand-side variables of this regression, respectively. Let us adopt a normally 
distributed prior, 0 ~  i ) ,  where is a diagonal matrix. The posterior is then
given by:
<f> ~  N(0, $)i[a(0 )],
where $  =  (4 " 1 +  o - 2X2 'x 2) " \  4> =  +  <t~2 X'2 Y2) and I[s(<£)] is an
Generating R t The regimes Rt, t = 1,2, . . . ,  T, are generated one at a time, 
where use is made of the single-move Gibbs sampling procedure suggested by Al­
bert and Chib (1993).
Generating R? Once simulated values of Rt  are obtained, it is straightforward 
to generate R%, t = 1,2 , . . . ,  T, from equation (6.3):
Note that the simulation of enables us to analyze the conditional distributions 
of the parameters of equation (6.3). By artificially generating data for the latent 
variable, we are applying the idea of data augmentation as originally proposed by 
Tanner and Wong (1987).
Generating 7 The parameters 70 and 71 are generated conditional on R y, c\t and 
S{. Consider the following regression:
Rt ~ $iQt = 7o(l — R t-1) +  IfiRt-i +  ut .
Define the matrices Y3 and X 3 as the matrices of the left-hand-side and the 
right-hand-side variables of this regression, respectively. Let 7 =  [70,71]', and let
indicator function used to denote that the roots of (j>(L) lie outside the unit circle.
N(7o(1 — R t-1) +  j iR t- i  +  ^2i Si qit, l)i(i^>o) if Rt — 1) 
N(7 o(1  — R t-1) +  7 1 -ftt-i +  Qit-> l)i(#j<o) if Rt — 0-
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us adopt a normally distributed prior, 7  ~  N(7 , f ) ,  where f  is a diagonal matrix. 
The posterior is then given by:
7 | i $ ,S r , * i ~ N ( 7 , r ) ,  
where f  =  ( f " 1 +  X s '^ s ) - 1  and 7  =  r t f - 1'/ +  X'z%).
Generating Si For each ie{l, 2 , . . . ,  ra}, =  0 if =  0. If di /  0, the generation
of 5^ conditional on qr, 7 0 , Sj#, proceeds as follows. Consider the regression:
Rt 7o(l Rt—1) 7i-^t—1 ^   ^ Qit “1“ Ut-
Define the matrices V4 and X 4 as the matrices of the left-hand-side and the 
right-hand-side variables of this regression, respectively. Consider the prior
Si ~  ^{Si^i^lXiCSiKVi],
where I[ ] refers to an indicator function allowing for the possibility of a truncated 
normal prior. The posterior is then given by:
&i\Rri Qt 5 7» ^  N($t, )i[Ai<5i<i>i]?
where a;? =  {6j12+ X 4X 4)~1 and^ =  (u~25i+X4Y4). Notice that the truncation
of the prior carries over to the posterior.
Appendix 6.B Variable selection in latent regime 
equation
This section describes how the variable selection procedure of Geweke (1996) 
is employed in this chapter. Recall that in equation (6.3), a variable qit 
ic  {1 , 2 , . . . ,  m}, is retained if and only if di — 1 ; otherwise it is excluded from 
the model. This suggests carrying out the following procedure during each iteration
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of the Gibbs sampler, consecutively for each z e {1 , 2 , . . . ,  m}: First, evaluate pit 
the conditional posterior probability that di =  1. Then, based on a comparison of pi 
with a drawing from the uniform distribution, set di to 1 or 0 .
Let BFi denote the conditional Bayes factor in favour of di = 1 versus di =  0, 
conditional on the other parameters of the model, and recall that pi is the prior prob­
ability that di = 1. As shown in Geweke (1996), pi can be calculated as follows:
The conditional Bayes factor in favour of di = 1 versus di = 0 is given by:
—  XT It ---------
Pt (I -  pi) + pi xB F '
pi x BF
BF
where <£(•) denotes the cdf of the normal distribution.
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